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Preface
Symbols can have a power over our thoughts, especially if we ex-
perience them in person. I saw such a symbol on arriving in Hong
Kong in the fall of 1973. There, in the harbor, was the wreck of
the former luxury liner, the Queen Elizabeth 1. Half-submerged
and lying on its side was a pride of twentieth-century Western
technology, a carrier of fulfilled class dreams belonging to classes
who viewed the struggling China of the 1950s with suspicion and
misunderstanding.
The Queen had flourished and fallen as a technological victim
to the society that created her. After being shunted from owner to
owner, she was eventually bought by a Chinese shipping magnate
and brought to Hong Kong, there to be outfitted as a floating uni-
versity. Just a few days before her rechristening in January 1972,
fire struck and left a burned and sunken hull. A court of inquiry
cited labor unrest and sabotage, though one still hears dark ru-
mors about insurance money. Left for two years to rust, the Queen
became an object of fascination to visitors. She was a castoff of
Western technology, yet many Westerners wondered how the Chin-
ese could have so mishandled this prize. Viewed as a symbol, that
ravaged hulk was the fruit of years of mutual misunderstanding
between the West and China.
Eventually scrapping operations began, and, by the summer
of 1974, the hull was barely discernible on the horizon. After the
hull disappears, I believe the metaphor will linger. It will linger
on the general level because of the continued misunderstandings
between China and the West. It will linger on the personal level be-
cause of the depth of the struggle within individual minds over the
Peoples Republic of China and the revolutionary, mystifying, and
sometimes xenophoic things that are happening there. Good and
moral things, by the most religious of definitions, have happened,
and yet I sometimes find myself resisting accepting them as such.
Is this the result of prejudice and resistance to change? Could there
be any validity to this resistance? I believe it is something of both.
In the following study of Leibniz and Confucianism, I have at-
tempted to investigate the particular form of misunderstanding and
failure between China and the West that destroyed G. W. Leibniz’
hopes of establishing an accord. Leibniz was deeply committed to
an ecumenism that included not only the reunion of Catholic and
Protestant Christendom but an ecumenism with which the religious
and intellectual beliefs and practices of non-Westerners, such as the
Chinese, could be reconciled. This is an investigation into how that
commitment was pursued and some of the reasons why it failed.
The failure of Leibniz’ search for accord is behind us. Will it
remain the exclusive concern of historians, can it be used to fos-
ter harmony among different religious and ideological beliefs of
the modern world? I believe it can. Consequently, my approach has
been both historical and contemporary. I hope that this study will
be read from the point of view of this dual spirit. And I hope that it
will contribute not only to our thoughts but also to our search for
an accord no less important to our day than it was to the age of
Leibniz.
In my opinion, the section of the book that attempts to explain
the reasons for Leibniz’ ecumenical failure is the weakest portion
of the work. A less competent man should always be aware of his
inadequacies when criticizing one of greater ability. The fact re-
mains, however, that Leibniz failed in his attempt, and I believe
that the reasons for his failure extend beyond philosophic exper-
tise. Leibniz did not limit himself to his areas of expertise, and I
believe that this refusal of limitation is a sign of his intellectual in-
tegrity. I chose to pursue the reasons for Leibniz’ failure because
these seemed to be the logical conclusion of this study. If this book
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opens up a road to further consideration of Leibniz’ work, then
perhaps it will honor him in a way that transcends my more obvi-
ous criticism.
I would advise the reader against taking my judgments as ut-
terly final. At times the geographical, chronological, and metaphys-
ical distances that separated the material with which I was dealing
were so great that I often felt only one step from falling into a
chasm of confusion. No doubt scholarly progress will enable those
who follow me to place that chasm further behind them, and this
book must ultimately be judged by them as well as by the present
readers. I only hope that this book sustains the trust and confi-
dence in me that so many have shown in the path of its creation. To
them, I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude.
This book began as a doctoral dissertation at the University
of California at Berkeley, and I am indebted to the committee
members: Professors Tu Wei-ming (chairman), Benson Mates, and
Frederic Wakeman, Jr. Professor Walter H. O’Briant read a draft
of the dissertation. Dr. Joseph Smith and the Division of Overseas
Ministries of the Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) assisted in
my stay in Hong Kong and, indirectly, helped make possible the
research visit to Rome and Hanover. Members of the Society of Je-
sus and, in particular, Fr. Edmond Lamalle, archivist, and Fr. Josef
Fejér, assistant archivist, of the Roman archives of the Society of
Jesus, facilitated research in Rome. Dr. Albert Heinekamp, Frau
Sigrid Pilawa, and the staff of the Niedersächsische Landesbiblio-
thek were both efficient and cordial in assisting my research at the
Leibniz archives in Hanover and in subsequent correspondence.
The Orientalia Division of the Library of Congress promptly re-
sponded to my queries. Expressions of indebtedness for specific
forms of assistance are noted at appropriate points in the text.
It was my good fortune to have had the stimulation of other
Leibniz projects during the final stages of composing this work.
Professors Henry Rosemont, Jr., and Daniel J. Cook shared their
work in translating Leibniz’ Discourse on the Natural Theology of
the Chinese, and Thatcher Deane shared the current results of the
Leibniz-Bouvet correspondence project.
I am deeply indebted to Henry Rosemont, who gave a great
deal of assistance in the final revisions of the manuscript. I have
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no doubt that without his assistance this work would be less than
it is. Alfred Jensen’s paintings and conversation on the Book of
Changes befuddled me valuably, and I am indebted to my friend
Carol Karasik for introducing me to them. My teacher, Professor
Carl H. Pfuntner, gave support and “philosophy” throughout the
several years’ process. My friend Jay C. Bishop, Jr., contributed
several painstaking drawings. For sustaining me in the trying mo-
ments, I thank my family and, in particular, my wife, to whom this
book is dedicated.
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1
Leibniz’ Contact with China
Gottfried Wilhelm Freiherr von Leibniz (Lai-pu-ni-tz’u) was born at
Leipzig in Saxony on 23 June 1646. His family was of the minor
nobility, but of modest means, and remained so after his father, a
professor of moral philosophy at the local university and an appa-
rently pious man, died six years later in 1652.1 Leibniz’ mother,
who died during his eighteenth year, was herself orphaned at an
early age and raised in an academic environment supplied by a pro-
fessor of theology and by a professor of law who also served as her
guardian. During his early education, Leibniz’ precociousness led
him to the text of the Roman historian Livy and other extracurricu-
lar reading; a minor crisis was created by the objections of his
pedantic instructor, but the situation was resolved in Leibniz’ favor.
After this, he was given free access to his father’s considerable li-
brary and succeeded in mastering Latin by his twelfth birthday.
At fifteen, he matriculated at the University of Leipzig, where
he continued his independent approaches to knowledge. There he
made his acquaintance with the writings of Descartes and felt him-
self provoked into a difficult choice between the substantial forms
of the scholastics and the mechanistic philosophy of the moderns.
(i.e. Cartesians). His increasing tendency toward the latter led him
to the study of mathematics, but Leibniz never lost his interest
in scholastic concerns, even though his approach to these prob-
lems may have been quite modern. This interest is shown by his
concern with the great medieval issue of realism versus nominal-
ism: he favored the latter in his bachelor’s dissertation, Disputatio
metaphysica de principio individui (A metaphysical disputation on
the principle of individuation) (1663), a work guided by the distin-
guished Aristotelian Jacob Thomasius.2
Following his studies at Leipzig, Leibniz was attracted for six
months to Jena where he studied with the mathematician and
moral philosopher Erhard Weigel. Though an opponent of the more
rigid scholastics, Weigel sought a reconciliation of modern phi-
losophy with that of Aristotle. Concentrating upon the study of
jurisprudence, Leibniz readily obtained the degree of master of
philosophy but received a significant setback when he was re-
jected as a candidate for the doctoral degree in law at Leipzig. A
restriction in the number of candidates seems to have combined
with the precedence of several senior candidates to eliminate Leib-
niz. Soon afterward, he left Leipzig and thereafter rarely returned.
Instead he went to Nuremberg and later, matriculating at the Uni-
versity of Altdorf, obtained the doctorate in law with distinction by
writing the philological and juridical thesis De causibus perplexis
in jure (On difficult problems in law).
In 1667, after rejecting the offer of an academic position at
Altdorf, and after a brief experience as secretary to a Rosicrucian
society, Leibniz met Johann Christian Boineburg. The tolerance
evident in Boineburg’s Gallican Catholicism—Boineburg was a
convert from Lutheranism—may have attracted Leibniz, whose
ecumenical Lutheranism and youthful brilliance clearly impressed
Boineburg. For a young man of Leibniz’ ambitions, Boineburg’s
contacts provided an important stepping-stone to recognition, and
Leibniz’ dedication of his Hypothesis physica nova (New physical
hypothesis) (1671) to Oldenburg, the secretary of the Royal Soci-
ety in London, was probably done at the suggestion of Boineburg,
a friend of Oldenburg’s.3 When Boineburg introduced the young
man to the elector and archbishop of Mainz, Johann Phillip, the re-
sult was the beginning of a long and intricate political career. As a
politician, Leibniz was brilliantly naive in his ideas. The notion of
the young Leibniz traveling to Paris in 1672 with a plan for Louis
XIV’s armies to invade the Turkish infidels in Egypt instead of the
Protestants in Germany4 seems almost absurd in modern times;
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yet one can see in this plan an early sign of the vision that was
so much a part of Leibniz’ later work in international law, science,
and religion.
At that time, Paris was the intellectual as well as the political
capital of the Western world, and for some time Leibniz had been
eager to go there. The visit must have been highly stimulating be-
cause we see Leibniz engaging in a wide range of invention and
investigation. In the area of mechanical arts, he improved Pas-
cal’s calculating machine by adding the functions of multiplication
and division to its repertoire of addition and subtraction. He made
inventions in the fields of navigation, hydrostatics, pneumatics, op-
tics, and watchmaking. This was an age unlike our own in several
ways. Breadth of knowledge rather than intense specialization was
part of the fashion, and not only was Leibniz sensitive to fashion,
but his abilities also matched the times. He was eminently quali-
fied for the baroque ideal of “savant,” a notion that gave a learned
man authority to speak in a wide range of fields.
While in Paris, Leibniz made the acquaintance of the eminent
theologian Antoine Arnauld and the mathematician Christian Huy-
gens. Leibniz’ visit to London in 1673 was for the direct purpose
of helping to present to Charles II a proposal from the elector
of Mainz. But when Charles proved no more interested than did
Louis XIV, Leibniz turned an abortive political mission to intellec-
tual advantage by meeting some of the great scientific minds of the
seventeenth century then residing in London, among them Olden-
burg and the chemist Robert Boyle. When news reached London
early in 1673 that the elector of Mainz had died, Leibniz returned
to Paris. The death of the elector, combined with Boineburg’s death
just a few months before, left Leibniz completely without a patron
and with declining means of support. He remained temporarily in
Paris and even considered permanent residence there. It was dur-
ing these years that he developed his infinitesimal calculus.
Finally, Leibniz accepted a third offer from the duke of
Hanover and took up duties as librarian and councilor at the court.
His choice of service appears to have been a wise one, especially
for a man of his interests. Even before his arrival, the court had
been a unique ecumenical center in which a Catholic monarch,
Duke John Frederick, ruled over predominantly Protestant sub-
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jects. Certain elements in both France and Rome were looking
toward Hanover as the key to reunion with the Northern German
Protestants. And nearly coinciding with Leibniz’ arrival at Hanover
in 1677, the Spanish Franciscan Christophede Spinola arrived to
conduct irenic negotiations with the consent of both the pope and
the emperor of the Holy Roman Empire.5
The continuity of Hanoverian ecumenism was assured when
Ernest Augustus succeeded his brother in 1679. Leibniz’ new pa-
tron, a tolerant Lutheran, continued the irenic discussions and
gave Spinola one of the warmest welcomes received from a Protes-
tant court when the latter returned to Hanover in 1683. Leibniz
took an increasingly prominent role in these negotiations until
he finally became chief Lutheran negotiator in later discussions
with Ernst, landgrave of Hessen-Rheinfels; Monsignor Paul Pelison
court historian to Louis XIV; and Bossuet, bishop of Meaux.
Aside from its ascendency as an ecumenical center, Hanover
was also rising to political prominence. Leibniz’ participation in
this growing power was directly dependent on the favor of those
ruling in Hanover. Consequently, his influence was particularly
strong in the late seventeenth century, when he was held in great
favor by Sophia, the electress of Hanover, and her daughter,
Sophia Charlotte. When the latter married Frederick of Branden-
burg (later Frederick I, the first king of Prussia), Leibniz’ influence
spread to Berlin, where it was instrumental in establishing the
Prussian Academy of Sciences, whose presidency he was honored
with in 1700.
With the death of Sophia Charlotte in 1705, and that of Sophia
in 1714, Leibniz’ influence waned accordingly. Furthermore, when
through the English Act of Settlement, Georg Ludwig, duke and
elector of Hanover, became George I of England in 1714, Leibniz
did not participate in this extension of influence. His past disputes
with English thinkers, particularly with Isaac Newton over the prio-
rity of the invention of the infinitesimal calculus,6 contributed to
the court’s decision to have Leibniz remain in the obscurity of Han-
over. There, though increasingly out of favor, he proceeded with
his final achievements. These included a popularized summary of
his philosophy in the Monadology (1714); correspondence with the
English theologian and Newtonian, Samuel Clarke (1715–1716);
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and his major statement of views on Chinese philosophy, the
Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese, completed just
a few months before his death on 14 November 1716.7
On his deathbed, Leibniz is said to have refused the sacra-
ment. Because of his infrequent church attendance and rare com-
munion, the general consensus was, ironically, that he was an
unbeliever and consequently no clergyman would preside at the
funeral. Only his secretary, Eckhart, attended him at the grave.8
The China Mission
The connection between ecumenism and missionary activity was
very strong in Leibniz’ mind and, as with so many other elements
in Leibnizian philosophy, the theme can be traced to his youth. Al-
though Lutherans had shown little missionary zeal, a small but sig-
nificant group of faculty at Wittenburg, starting in 1651, began to
favor some form of missionary activity. Among these was the prea-
cher Dilher of Nuremberg, who befriended and patronized Leibniz
during his stay in the city in 1666–1667.9 Among the authors of
works on China with whom Leibniz was familiar and communi-
cated were G. Spizel, author of De re literaria Sinensium (Leiden,
1660), and Athanasius Kircher, S. J., author of China monumentis
qua sacris qua profundis illustrata (1667).10 It was through Kir-
cher’s work that Leibniz acquired at least part of his knowledge
of the important Jesuit missionary Matteo Ricci, although Ricci’s
journals were also widely available in several translations in seven-
teenth-century Europe. As a Jesuit, Kircher belonged to a group
that would assume great importance in Leibniz’ ecumenical think-
ing.
Perhaps Leibniz’ earliest contact with members of this order
came through Boineburg’s private secretary, the Jesuit Johann Ga-
mans of Aschaffenburg. He introduced Leibniz to several intellec-
tually prominent Jesuits, including Kircher, who shared Leibniz’
interest in developing a universal language, and Adam Kochanski,
court mathematician to King John Sobieski of Poland.11 From 1670
to 1698, Leibniz corresponded with Kochanski, and they shared a
common interest in China. Kochanski was, moreover, a correspon-
dent of Ferdinand Verbiest, a leading Jesuit in the China mission,
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and he aided in the unsuccessful Jesuit effort to have Peter the
Great open up the overland route to China.12
Andreas Müller, provost of Nicolaikirche in Berlin, had been
appointed by Frederick William, the Great Elector, in the capacity
of adviser on Chinese affairs and the possible establishment of
a Far Eastern trading company. Most of Müller’s work was sent
to Leibniz via Johann Elsholz, physician to the Great Elector, and
in 1679 Leibniz addressed a list of fourteen questions regarding
Müller’s unpublished Clavis Sinica (Key to Chinese) to Müller via
Elsholz. Judging from the questions, Leibniz appears to have im-
bibed Müller’s intriguing but linguistically debatable theory that
the Chinese language is pictographic rather than semantic or pho-
netic.13 It was this pictographic thesis that later brought accusa-
tions of heresy and caused Müller’s dismissal by the pious Freder-
ick William. Specifically, the attack was directed toward Müller’s
defense of the Chinese language, which must, so the accusation
went, be the product of the devil since a pictographic representa-
tion of God in the word for God would be equivalent to making a
graven image and would violate the Second Commandment.
In Paris and under the editorship of the Chinese missionary
Philippe Couplet, S. J., the Jesuits published Confucius Sinarum
Philosophus (1687), an attempt to translate several Chinese clas-
sics, including the Confucian Analects, the Great Learning, and
the Doctrine of the Mean. Franz Merkel claims that Leibniz, in a
letter to Ernst, landgrave of Hessen-Rheinfels, dated 9/10 Decem-
ber 1687, demonstrated that he had made a close reading of the
book in the year of its publication.14 However, in view of Leibniz’
infrequent references to the work in later writings, it is ques-
tionable just how much he assimilated from Confucius Sinarum
Philosophus. Nevertheless, at least one sinologist has felt that this
Jesuit compilation directly influenced Leibniz’ philosophy.15
A copy of Confucius Sinarum Philosophus can be found today
in Leibniz’ library preserved in Hanover, and though it contains
little marginal notation in Leibniz’ hand, we can probably assume
that he was familiar with its contents. Influence is quite another
question. One doubts whether his familiarity with the book or
the mental stimulation he received from it could compare with
his reactions to the treatises on Chinese religion and culture by
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the missionaries Longobardi and Sainte-Marie, received at a much
later date. Both the marginal notation in these two treatises and
the consequent production of his own treatise on Chinese philos-
ophy indicate they had a much greater influence on Leibniz than
the Confucius Sinarum Philosophus.
If one divides Leibniz’ development of understanding of China
into early, middle, and late phases, his reading of Confucius
Sinarum Philosophus belongs to an early phase. Although the work
is a substantial piece, perhaps Leibniz was simply unprepared,
given his knowledge of China in 1687, to be very influenced. At any
rate, Confucius Sinarum Philosophus, along with more than fifty
titles on China and Asia, is present in Leibniz’ library. Given the
extent of Leibniz’ intellectual contacts, he was probably aware of
every significant work on China produced in Europe in the seven-
teenth century.
In a letter written in 1716 to Peter the Great of Russia, Leibniz
concedes his debt to Frs. Kircher and Couplet.16 In this letter, Leib-
niz explains how he believes that God has decided to have the sci-
ences of learning extended throughout the world and that Peter is
in an ideal position for being an instrument to that end by drawing
knowledge from both Europe and China. As an aid in propagat-
ing this extension of knowledge, Leibniz claims to have discovered
the secret of deciphering the “characters” (i.e., diagrams) of the
ancient sage Fu Hsi and to have discovered correspondences be-
tween his binary mode of arithmetic and that of Fu Hsi’s diagrams.
In addition to crediting Fr. Bouvet with having assisted his dis-
covery by sending a Chinese copy of Fu Hsi’s diagrams, Leibniz
credits Fr. Kircher for China illustrata and Fr. Couplet presumably
for the Confucius Sinarum Philosophus, which supplied him with
the information on which he based his discovery.
Reading works by Kircher and Couplet, and communicating
with them and with other scholars such as Andreas Müller, was
a mere preliminary to a much deeper involvement with the China
mission. This involvement began with Leibniz’ visit to Rome in
1689 and his meeting with Claudio Filippo Grimaldi, S. J.17 A mem-
ber of the China mission, Grimaldi was in Rome for a visit before
returning to China, where he would succeed Ferdinand Verbiest,
S. J., as head of the Chinese Bureau of Mathematics. This was the
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beginning of a direct source of information not only from Grimaldi
but also, by the latter’s introduction, from other members of the
mission. It is perhaps difficult for someone today to see the sig-
nificance of this contact, but in the seventeenth-century setting,
where formal news media were nearly nonexistent, where the sec-
ondary literature of scholars was unreliable, and where direct
access to China was practically impossible for a man of Leibniz’
commitments, the importance of this contact was crucial to Leib-
niz’ interests in China.
Exclusive reliance upon Jesuit sources left no way to check
some of the Jesuits’ more partial interpretations of Chinese cul-
ture. Fortunately, Leibniz did have a few non-Jesuit contacts with
China. In approximately 1707, for instance, Leibniz spoke with
a Fr. Cima, a missionary recently returned from China. Father
Cima was an Italian of the Augustinian order, an order that had
traditionally opposed the Jesuit position in the China mission.
Though agreeing that the K’ang-hsi emperor was enlightened, Fr.
Cima was far less optimistic than Bouvet and other Jesuits on the
chances for the monarch’s conversion.18
The Jesuits themselves provided a limited corrective to one an-
other’s interpretations. For example, when Grimaldi told Leibniz
that using mathematical instruments and books, the K’ang-hsi em-
peror studied for three or four hours daily with Verbiest, there
were few offsetting views to counteract Leibniz’ overoptimism re-
garding the use of his combinatory art in China and his belief that
knowledge of the sciences could be attained only through geome-
try. Later, another Jesuit tutor to the K’ang-hsi emperor, Joachim
Bouvet, would point out in a letter to Leibniz that there had been
great exaggeration of the emperor’s interest in European knowl-
edge, but Leibniz had to wait several years for this rectifying
opinion. Leibniz shared with the Jesuits the view that European
science was the key to Christianity’s reception in China, and he
shared the belief held by many Jesuits that knowledge of these sci-
ences could foster religious piety.19
It was this belief that helped found, as well as eventually
frustrate, the ecumenical efforts of Leibniz and certain Jesuits in
China. Leibniz had failed to comprehend the limitations of these
universal sciences, both for the Chinese and for the West. Further-
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more, in his concern that the West should profit as much as China
in an exchange of ideas, culture, and artifacts, and in his belief
that the revealed religion of the West would be an equal trade for
the natural theology and ethics of China, Leibniz was negotiating
both sides of the ecumenical discussion. He thought that Bouvet
and the other Jesuits were accurate interpreters of the Chinese
position, when actually they seem to have been projecting a good
deal of their own needs onto the Chinese. In fact, China was not
interested in having religion revealed on the terms that Leibniz
and Bouvet set. They might have been open to elements of what
Leibniz and Bouvet proposed—if these elements had been couched
in something more akin to the Confucian-Christian synthesis sug-
gested by Matteo Ricci.20
The Rites Controversy
Since Leibniz’ ecumenical plans for China were so closely tied to
the Society of Jesus, any difficulties for the latter would inevitably
affect Leibniz. With a group as talented, disciplined, and spiritually
ambitious as the Jesuits, conflict with outsiders was inevitable. The
order had been founded in the sixteenth century by the Basque
Ignatius of Loyola (1491–1556). Instead of stressing contempla-
tive mysticism and the notion of an elect, Ignatius emphasized the
ability of all to reach God through will and purpose. To this end, he
devised his Spiritual Exercises as a manual to cultivate the disci-
plined experience of both heaven and hell. An intense experience
of the senses in the secluded atmosphere of an organized spiritual
retreat was stressed; one was prepared by the exercises of this
manual to make his choice for God’s will.21 Christ was transformed
from an object of quiet reverence into a militant figure leading
his disciplined order into battle against the devil. This militancy
and the “corpselike obedience” of the Jesuits were fundamental
because, in their view, obedience possessed a saving power.
The Protestant suspicion toward the methods of Spiritual
Exercises was intensified by Ignatius’ view that obedience must be
unlimited, even to the point of violating one’s convictions. Critics
called it an “obedience unto sin,” but obedience was not a new
element in Christianity. The difference was that whereas previous
religious orders had directed their obedience toward a cloistered
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setting, the Jesuits aimed at carrying their obedience into the
secular world. The Jesuit prescription was contemplativus in ac-
tione—contemplation in action.
There were several theological bases for the disputes of the
Jesuits with other Roman Catholics and Protestants. The Jesuit
stress upon free will conflicted with the emphasis upon grace by
the Lutherans, Calvinists, and Jansenists. The latter were the lead-
ing opponents of the Jesuit order in France and included some of
the most brilliant intellectuals of the day. The Provincial Letters
(1665–1666) of the mathematician and philosopher Blaise Pascal
set forth the essential Jansenist position in the debate, while An-
toine Arnauld, a later correspondent of Leibniz’, was the leading
Jansenist polemicist.22
As an extension of their emphasis on free will, the Jesuits
tended toward absolution and the judging of sin in terms of the
intention of the will. Following Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics,
which stressed the conscious basis of moral judgment, the Jesuits
applied moral evaluation to an act only if the will and reason were
present and not hindered, for example, by fear. In his Provincial
Letters, Pascal accused the Jesuits of sanctioning (1) the notion of
the ends justifying the means and (2) the swearing of false oaths
and the practice of deception. Yet the Jesuit casuists recognized
only two permissible forms of deception: amphiboly, that is, the
use of ambiguity to confuse the listener; and reservatio mentalis
(mental reservation), that is, mentally formulating the complete
truth but suppressing certain parts in its oral expression.
Another basis of dispute, particularly between the Jesuits and
the Dominicans, was the issue of “Probabilism” versus “Probabil-
iorism.” Though Probabilism can also be traced to Aristotle’s
Nichomachean Ethics, it was first formally presented in a complete
theological and philosophical structure in 1577 by the Dominican
monk Bartholomeus de Medina. Initial adherents of the position
were drawn from several religious orders, but by the end of the
sixteenth century the Jesuit casuist Vasquez adapted the position
for the Jesuits, who became progressively more identified with it
while the Dominicans moved toward the less lenient position of
Probabiliorism.
The frequent discrepancy between the actual situation with
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the penitent and the cases in the Jesuit confessional manuals
served to point up the problem. According to Probabilism, if two
contradictory positions regarding the law can be merely enter-
tained, the law need not be applied by the confessor. According to
Probabiliorism, the nonobservance of the law is justified only if the
probabilities against it are greater than those in favor of it. By the
late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, moral laxity in the
administration of confession by the clergy was evident. Stimulated
by an article against “Laxism” by Pascal in the Provincial Letters,
Pope Alexander VII condemned certain of the more extreme princi-
ples of Probabilism. Popes Innocent XI and Alexander VIII further
limited Probabilism, while the Dominicans in Rome exerted pres-
sure for a victory of Probabiliorism over the Jesuits’ Probabilism.
Jesuit laxity in the confessional may have been a source of con-
tention in Europe, but the members of the order in the field were
realizing that a less rigid view of doctrine and rites provided room
for maneuvering that could be converted into a highly useful pro-
selytizing tool among foreign peoples. The conflict in the famous
Rites Controversy centered precisely on the validity of this looser
approach. Was it heresy, or was it expediency in the positive sense?
Was it the fruit of Jesuit aggression, or the serving of God’s will?
Whose method was that of the true Christ?
As applied to the Chinese Rites Controversy, the essential posi-
tions began to solidify around 1610. There were those, primarily
Jesuits, who held that the Chinese ancestral rites and the cere-
monies in honor of Confucius were not essentially religious but
social and civil in character; they also felt that ancient Chinese
terms such as shang-ti (King-on-high) and t’ien (Heaven) were suit-
able equivalents of the Christian God. The opponents of this view,
who tended more and more to be associated with the Dominicans,
Franciscans, Augustinians, and the French Society of Foreign Mis-
sions (Société des Missions étrangères), held that the Chinese
rites were religious in character and that only a new Chinese term,
such as t’ien-chu (Lord of Heaven), could be used with validity to
render the term “God.”
In Europe, a tremendous propaganda battle began to emerge
that in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries cen-
tered at Paris. In 1697, Joachim Bouvet, one of the first French
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Jesuits sent to China, returned to Paris to secure funds and re-
cruits for the mission and to publish his Portrait historique de
l’Empereur de la Chine (Historical portrait of the emperor of
China), a flattering appraisal guaranteed to show the Chinese
K’ang-hsi emperor in his most enlightened aspects and calculat-
ingly dedicated to Louis XIV. In 1697, Louis le Comte, a fellow
member with Bouvet of the first group of French Jesuits in China,
also returned to Paris to publish his Nouveaux Mémoires sur l’État
present de la Chine (A report on the present condition of China).
The work is a lengthy two-volume book, filled with descriptions
and illustrations on a wide variety of topics ranging from the man-
ner in which the emperor received the missionaries on their arrival
in Peking to the character of the Chinese spirit.
In 1698, Charles le Gobien, S. J., published Histoire de l’Edit de
l’Empereur de la Chine en faveur de la Religion Chrestienne (The
history of the edict of the emperor of China in favor of the Chris-
tian religion). Although Le Gobien had not traveled to China, he
had access to field reports through his Paris office, which acted as
a clearinghouse for the European dissemination of these reports.
The Chinese edict referred to in Le Gobien’s work was one of reli-
gious toleration for Christians, issued by the K’ang-hsi emperor in
1692. The extended, complicated negotiations and court lobbying
that led up to the edict are described in detail and certainly not in
a manner unsympathetic to the Jesuit fathers, who a good deal of
the time seem to have been in a state of considerable uncertainty
about their status and even their lives. The Edict of Toleration,
which is translated and quoted in full by Le Gobien,23 was a great
triumph for the Jesuits, and the contrast with Louis XIV’s revo-
cation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 must have been striking to
many, at least Protestant, eyes. Yet the Jesuits were not trying to
criticize their patron so much as encourage him in his support of
the China mission and Jesuit techniques.
But the French were not of one opinion on this matter. In
China, in 1693, the year following the K’ang-hsi emperor’s Edict
of Toleration, Charles Maigrot, the vicar apostolic of Fukien and
an associate of the Society of Foreign Missions, issued a decree
that forbade Chinese Christian neophytes in his region to partici-
pate in Confucian or ancestral ceremonies and condemned the use
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of t’ien and shang-ti as equivalents for God. In France, Antoine
Arnauld was writing his seven-volume critique of Jesuit methods,
Morale pratique des Jésuites (The moral practice of the Jesuits).
The Jesuit confessor of Louis XIV, Michel le Tellier, wrote his highly
controversial Défense des nouveaux chrétiens (Defense of the new
Christians), to which the Dominicans responded with Apologie des
dominicains (Apology of the Dominicans). The entire debate was
degenerating into heated and superficial polemics when in 1700
the Society of Foreign Missions, after having referred the matter
to Rome for a decision, nevertheless convened a commission itself
to examine the recently published works of Le Comte and Le Go-
bien.24
Among the main issues investigated was the extent to which
China had possessed the knowledge of the true faith. The climate,
however, was too politicized and controversial for genuine discus-
sion to occur, and the commission ended with each side holding to
more rigid views on the matter than before the investigation had
begun. Leibniz watched these events with dismay. His inclusion of
Jesuit writings in his Novissima Sinica (Latest news from China)
(first edition, 1697; second and enlarged edition, 1699) and his
correspondence clearly show him to be a Jesuit sympathizer, but
he feared that the growing feelings against Jesuits’ methods would
lead Rome to rulings that could destroy the China mission.25
The Question of Influence
The emergence of correspondences between the philosophy of
Leibniz and that of China brings up the question of whether Leib-
niz was influenced by China. There seems little reason to suggest
that Leibniz himself influenced China, although the attainment of
such an influence through Jesuit missionaries and an ecumeni-
cal form of Christianity was a goal that he and other Europeans
attempted unsuccessfully to realize. The late E. R. Hughes sug-
gested that key Leibnizian notions of a “simple substance” and
“pre-established harmony” were influenced by his reading of Con-
fucius Sinarum Philosophus.26 Hughes is correct in linking the
period of Leibniz’ initial exposure to that collection of translations
of Chinese classics in 1687 with the particularly fertile years of
1686–1690 during which Leibniz corresponded with Arnauld. The
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year 1686 was crucial in the transition from Leibniz’ youthful
atomism to the development of his mature philosophy of the spiri-
tual atom, or what was eventually to be called the “monad.”
Nevertheless, an examination of the Leibniz-Arnauld corre-
spondence, which seems to have served as a catalyst for develop-
ing these notions, shows that the more substantial half of that
correspondence, along with the composition of the Discourse on
Metaphysics, had been written by the end of 1686. Since 1686 was
one year prior to the publication of Confucius Sinarum Philoso-
phus, the influence of the latter upon these notions could not have
been formative.27 Moreover, we have already noted the infrequent
explicit references to Confucius Sinarum Philosophus in Leibniz’
writings. There is, however, a difference of opinion among Leibniz
scholars as to the importance to be assigned to the Discourse on
Metaphysics. Although Bertrand Russell thought it Leibniz’ best
account of his philosophy, Leroy Loemker regards it as an incom-
plete and inadequate account preceding Leibniz’ full development
of the notions of vis viva (force), the gradations of individual sub-
stances and their perceptions and appetites, and the nature of cor-
poreal beings.28 The difference in interpretation seems to follow a
difference in emphasis between Russell and others, who stress the
logical ingredients of Leibnizian philosophy, and Loemker who em-
phasizes the Discourse on Metaphysics as part of Leibniz’ larger
theological plan.
Another reason for minimizing the possibility of Chinese in-
fluence by way of Confucius Sinarum Philosophus is that Leibniz’
knowledge of China in 1686 was very undeveloped. His intensive
contact with the China mission did not begin until his visit to Rome
and acquaintance there with the Jesuit Grimaldi in 1689. Addition-
ally, his most complete formulation of views on Chinese philosophy,
the Discourse on The Natural Theology of the Chinese, was not
composed until 1716, the year of his death and long after his phi-
losophy had come to maturity.
In Science and Civilisation in China,29 Joseph Needham has
suggested that the modern European philosophies of organism, by
which the perennial conflict between theological idealism and me-
chanical materialism could be overcome, are traceable to Leibniz,
where they stop. Needham believes that Leibniz may have bor-
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rowed his synthesis from the organic world view of the Chinese,
and particularly from Sung Neo-Confucianism. Later chapters in
this study will consider the nature of the transmission of ideas
from China to Leibniz, but for the moment I would suggest that
the Chinese influence on Leibniz was more corroborative than ger-
minal. It is my belief that an examination of Leibniz’ contact with
China will show that the significance of the relationship resided as
much in the ecumenical potential that was never realized as in the
history of that contact. That potential is not a speculative recon-
struction on my part but is evident from Leibniz’ philosophical and
religious premises and plans, even though the reasons for its fail-
ure may require some explanation.
But what of the correspondences that existed between Leibniz
and China—correspondences between Leibniz’ organicism and
Neo-Confucian organicism, between Leibniz’ concept of the monad
and the Neo-Confucian concept of li (principle), between Leibniz’
binary arithmetic and the hexagrams of the Book of Changes, be-
tween Leibniz’ tendency to reduce physics and ethics to the more
common denominator of the monad and the Chinese tendency to
merge the natural world with the moral world, between Leibniz’
notion of force (vis viva) and the Chinese notion of ch’i (material
force)? If these are not to be explained by the cultural diffusion of
ideas from China to Leibniz, and if mere coincidence seems over-
burdened by such a degree of similarity, then could spontaneous
generation explain these correspondences?
The spontaneous generation of similar ideas in cultures re-
moved in time and distance from one another is a view that has
often attracted adherents by default—that is, by the absence of
documented evidence showing actual diffusion of elements from
one culture to another. Since there is an inherent demand in cul-
tural diffusion for documentation that can never be fully satisfied,
the absence of confirmed diffusion may indicate a lack of knowl-
edge rather than a lack of diffusion. Yet the point comes where
the absence of cultural diffusion seems to be a justifiable hypoth-
esis and specific notions of spontaneous generation arise. There
is the similarity of external conditions or of interior human struc-
ture, resulting in similarity in thought perhaps akin to Jungian
archetypes and the universal unconscious. Another explanation of
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spontaneous generation is that there is a similar complex of hu-
man needs that arises in far-removed races and tends to require a
similar type of gratification.
Leibniz’ view of spontaneous generation in China is consistent
with his mathematical and logical preferences. In his Discourse on
the Natural Theology of the Chinese 31,30 Leibniz describes Chi-
nese views and worship of God as fully in accord with natural law,
which is “engraved in our hearts.” This implication of spontaneous
generation is supported when Leibniz, in the same section, refers
to the Chinese heavenly commandment and law as equivalent to
the Western “light of reason.” Yet Leibniz recognizes the possibil-
ity that cultural diffusion played some role in developing ancient
Chinese culture. In the Discourse 24 and 32,31 he refers to the pos-
sibility of certain knowledge having been diffused to China from
the “Patriarchs.” This reference, however, is not necessarily to the
Hebraic Abraham and his immediate descendants. It is quite pos-
sible that Leibniz has in mind the Figurist view of Joachim Bouvet
and other Jesuits who held that some knowledge was transmitted
to China by certain patriarchal figures who were neither Western
nor Chinese but universal figures who transmitted knowledge to
the West and China in common. (See chapter 3.) Finally, Leibniz’
suggestions of cultural diffusion would account for only part of the
Chinese learning that Leibniz perceives as bearing great similarity
to European knowledge.
Leibniz explains the concurrence of correspondences between
his own and Chinese philosophy as the result of his view of truth
being universal in its validity. It is in Leibniz’ tendency to see
these correspondences as corroborations of truth that one sees
a diminishment of the possibility that China had an appreciable
influence on him. It was this overemphasis on interpreting corre-
spondences in terms of universal truth, rather than any similarity
of needs or common interior human structure, that led to an im-
balance in Leibniz’ ecumenism and perhaps condemned it to its
ultimate failure even as it began its mission.
But why should one devote a book to a failure? It occurs to
me that Leibniz scholars might be inclined to ask this question,
particularly since Leibniz was so successful in other areas. It has
generally been recognized that Leibniz’ efforts as a political pam-
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phleteer and jurist fell considerably short of his achievements in
logic, mathematics, and metaphysics. What makes a study of Leib-
niz’ search for accord and its failure worthy of attention is the
monumental scope of the project and the fact that it was severely
hindered by the neglect of certain very basic insights into the na-
ture of religious experience. The failure of genius always makes an
interesting tale, and I believe that this one has much to teach us.
Perhaps no less because we too are prone to a similar neglect.
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2
Leibniz’ China Interpreters
The key interpreters of China on whom Leibniz relied were all
missionaries, primarily of the Jesuit order. They included Frs. Mat-
teo Ricci, Nichola Longobardi, Antoine de Sainte-Marie, Claudio
Filippo Grimaldi, and Joachim Bouvet, of whom only the last two
were contemporary to Leibniz. Much of the sixteenth century was
marked by the failures of the Portuguese from their position at
Macao and the Spaniards from the Philippines to establish a mis-
sionary and trade base on the Chinese mainland. When the first
penetrations were made, the effort was dominated by Italian Je-
suits who entered by way of the Jesuit bases in India and Macao.
Matteo Ricci’s entry onto the mainland in 1683 was not first
chronologically, but he easily qualifies as the father of the China
mission. Ricci came trained in the most current European science
of his day and is said to have been an outstanding pupil at the
Roman College. There he was trained by the leader of Jesuit astron-
omy and author of the Gregorian calendar, the German Christopher
Clavius, the same Clavius who later, just before his death in 1611,
was to prove cautiously receptive to the views of Galileo.1
Matteo Ricci, S. J.
Matteo Ricci (Li Ma-t’ou, 1552–1610) was born in Macerata and
entered his novitiate at Rome. He reached Macao in 1582 and one
year later at Canton entered the Chinese mainland. There he spent
the remaining twenty-eight years of his life acquiring a knowledge
of Chinese language and culture that few Westerners have known.
Of the five interpreters discussed in this chapter, Ricci attained the
greatest respect among the Chinese literati, particularly as the au-
thor of works written in Chinese.
Ricci represented a new approach in missionary methods. Dis-
agreeing with the rigid Spanish and Portuguese treatment of for-
eign people as pagans whose traditional culture conflicted with
Christianity, Ricci and others in the Society of Jesus sought more
of a reconciliation of the native culture with Christianity. These dif-
ferences in approach would eventually give rise to the protracted
debate known as the Rites Controversy, which did great damage
to the Christian mission in China. The differences between the
accommodation and the Europocentric attitudes came to settle
on specific questions involving terminology: Should a traditional
Chinese term such as shang-ti be used for God or should the
nontraditional but native t’ien-chu be used or should there be a
Chinese transliteration of the Latin Deus? Another specific issue
on which the debate focused was whether the rites to Confucius
and to one’s ancestors constituted idolatry: Were such practices
religious—and therefore a violation of the First Commandment—or
merely civil and social? The accommodation viewpoint tended to
accept shang-ti and t’ien-chu as suitable equivalents for God (Ricci
had originated this usage) and to regard the Confucian and ances-
tral rites as primarily civil and social in character.
Ricci’s authority and influence were such that his position on
the Chinese rites was accepted with only quiet objection, and the
long debate on the rites question did not really begin until after
his death in 1610. His views on China were presented to Europe
in 1615 in a Latin edition of his journals entitled De propagatione
Christiana apud Sinas (On the propagation of Christianity among
the Chinese), which had been extensively edited and amended in
translation from the original Italian by Ricci’s co-worker, the Bel-
gian Nichola Trigault, S. J. (Chin Ssu-piao, 1577–1628).
Ricci’s journals were widely read in seventeenth-century Eu-
rope and appeared in a number of Latin, French, German, Spanish,
and Italian editions. From Leibniz’ general familiarity with seven-
teenth-century works on China and from his specific familiarity
with Ricci’s views, we might assume that he had read the journals.
LEIBNIZ’ CHINA INTERPRETERS 19
Yet while frequent citations of the works of Sainte-Marie and Lon-
gobardi appear in Leibniz’ Discourse on the Natural Theology of
the Chinese of 1716, he makes little reference to Ricci’s journals.
The most specific reference appears in a two-page discussion of
the journals found among Leibniz’ papers at Hanover.2
On one side of the Rites Controversy of 1610–1742 were those
Christians who stressed some common ground for reconciling
Western and Chinese beliefs. These were the advocates of adapt-
ing Christianity to the native culture. They were opposed by those
who refused to separate Christianity from European culture. The
latter held that there was little or no basis for reconciliation and
that Chinese religious practices violated the essence of the “true
faith.” The view sympathetic to the Chinese rites, which became
increasingly associated with the Jesuit order, tended to reject mod-
ern Confucianism as a distortion of the original canon. By doing
so, the missionaries avoided facing the modern Chinese skepticism
on the subject of spirits and souls and also the lack of a clearly
defined divinity. In rejecting the moderns and going back to the
classics, the fathers followed a very old Chinese practice of re-
turning to the original canon to seek the “true” meaning of the
ancients. Far from being a sign of disintegration of classical au-
thority, such a practice had traditionally been a recurring sign of
the great vitality in the Confucian tradition.
We may ask to what extent the Christian fathers observed
more than the forms of this traditional Confucian practice and
to what extent there was a basis to their interpretation of the
“true” meaning of the ancients. Though there was a real familiarity
with the classics on the fathers’ part, their position cannot be
reviewed solely in terms of doctrine but must include reference
to a key Jesuit concern—namely, conversion through a blending
of Christianity with the native culture. Such conversion through
cultural assimilation, rather than through less subtle methods of
propagation in which the missionary maintains his foreign status,
remained an essential distinction for the China mission.
Matteo Ricci was aware of the strong strain of xenophobia
that seems to ebb and flow as a perennial stream in China.3 The
more he observed the Chinese, the more he tended to conclude
that Confucian culture was too embedded to be displaced by Chris-
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tianity. The brilliance of Ricci’s insight was to see that although
displacement may have been out of the question, the enormous
Chinese capacity to tolerate complementaries would give a care-
fully defined Christianity admission into the Chinese soul. He re-
alized further that this admission would be eased by an alignment
that sought to displace what was a traditional heterodoxy in Confu-
cian eyes, namely Buddhism. This insight helps explain why Ricci
sought to align himself with contemporary literati of more ortho-
dox Confucian coloring and to avoid those associated with the
various syncretic schools of the time that were proposing a har-
monization of separate Confucian, Buddhist, and Taoist strains.
Ricci’s approach was to emphasize the social aspects of Confucian-
ism and the complimentary religious aspects of Christianity while
simultaneously attacking Buddhism, which he believed stood di-
rectly in the Christian path.
Frequently, both sides in the Rites Controversy looked unfavor-
ably on certain elements of modern Confucianism. A main differ-
ence between the sides was that those who adopted a critical
view of Chinese rites condemned the entire Confucian tradition,
including the legendary sages of the third millennium B. C. and
compilers of the classical canon around the time of Confucius
nearly 2000 years later. Among those sympathetic to the Chinese
rites, there was sometimes a tendency to group these legendary
sages and Confucius together, but there was precedent in the
orthodox Confucian interpretation for viewing these sages and
Confucius as part of a single, continuous tradition. It was among
these ancients that such people as Bouvet and the Figurist group
saw a common legendary origin linking Europe with China, and it
was among these same ancients that Leibniz saw a long-forgotten
basis for natural theology in the diagrams of the Book of Changes.
Ricci was an outstanding advocate of a sympathetic or accom-
modating Christian interpretation of Chinese rites. This interpre-
tation heavily favored the ancient and classical Chinese, yet Ricci
was far less critical of contemporary literati than were many who
held the accommodation view. This sympathy for contemporary
Chinese was a distinguishing mark of Ricci’s approach and is a key
to understanding the high regard in which he has continued to be
held. In the next century, even Ricci’s sympathy toward contempo-
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rary Confucianists would be outdistanced by Joseph Henry-Marie
de Prémare, S. J. (Ma Jo-se, 1666–1736), who represents per-
haps the high-water mark in Jesuit attempts to reconcile Sung
Neo-Confucianism, the orthodox philosophy of seventeenth-and
eighteenth-century China, with Christianity. Although Ricci re-
garded the ancient Chinese shang-ti as equivalent to the Christian
God, he stopped short of including the more modern Neo-Confu-
cian terms such as wu-chi (Ultimate of Nonbeing) and t’ai- chi
(Supreme Ultimate) in that equation. Prémare was to identify the
Neo-Confucian wu-chi with the Christian God and to regard t’ai-
chi as secondary.4
Trying to explain Ricci’s sympathy for contemporary Chinese
on grounds of missionary expedience raises the issue of “Jesuit-
ism”—i.e., crafty and duplicitous tactics. But it is difficult to com-
prehend the fundamental Jesuit notion of contemplativus in ac-
tione (contemplation in action) without the conviction in Christ.5
When we look at Ricci’s Journals, we find a strong devotion to
duty spiked with intolerant pronouncements whenever he came
across what he considered to be ignorance or superstition. This
was particularly true in regard to the “sect of idols” or “school of
Satan,”6 his designations for the faith of the Buddhist priests, who
he eventually realized were often low on the social ladder. When
the Jesuit fathers first entered the Chinese mainland, they adopted
the clothing of the Buddhist priests. Perhaps projecting from their
experience in Japan, they believed that this was the most expe-
dient approach to cultural assimilation. They soon recognized the
humble status of these priests and so adopted the more revered
robes of the literati.
To a lesser extent, Ricci also criticizes Taoism, but for a six-
teenth-century European, he displays remarkably little Christian
chauvinism. Where chauvinism does emerge, the object is usually
quite specific and, this writer feels, closely linked with Ricci’s de-
sire to propagate the faith. In noting the friendships that Ricci
slowly developed with certain literati, one wonders to what extent
the long moral cultivation of these Confucianists was responding
to the spiritually cultivated ways of this priest. It is unlikely that
his commentary on Christian moral maxims would have attained
its attributed popularity among the literati had not some depth
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of accord existed between the two.7 Many of the Chinese were
experienced practitioners of moral discipline and were unlikely to
be deceived by mere craft.
It is possible to view Ricci’s empathy with the Confucian
literati as a reaction to their fewer superstitions, at least as Ricci
viewed them in relation to the Buddhist and Taoist adherents.
But Ricci’s fundamental objection to Buddhism may have stemmed
from the realization that religious temperaments responding to
Christianity would very often be the same temperaments that were
attracted to Buddhism. This notion is evident when one examines
the former commitment of many of Ricci’s literati converts. For in-
stance, the Buddhist commitment applied to both the family and
the person of Hsü Kuang-ch’i (1562–1633), also known by his bap-
tismal name of Paul Hsü. It applied also to (Michael) Yang T’ing-
yün (1557–1627) and to the converted viceroy of the province
of Shantung, Feng Mu-kang.8 Moreover, Ricci was anxious about
the recent resurgence of Buddhism along with its tendency to be
increasingly syncretized with Confucianism and Taoism. Conse-
quently, his program for conversion through assimilation included
caustic attacks upon Buddhism combined with treatises written to
appeal specifically to the literati.
The most influential of these treatises was the T’ien-chu shih-i
(The true meaning of God), which, characteristically of the ac-
commodation method, emphasizes logical persuasion rather than
spiritual or scriptural authority.9 The arguments are presented in
the form of a dialogue between a Chinese literatus and a West-
ern scholar. Ricci’s aim was captured in the phrase attributed
by Ricci to Hsü Kuang-ch’i: “Pu Ju i Fo” (Complete Confucianism
and displace Buddhism).10 Consequently, the T’ien-chu shih-i at-
tempts to refute the Chinese religious sects of Buddhism and
Taoism by lumping them together into the single category of “Fo-
Lao” (literally, “Buddha-Lao-tzu” or “Buddhism-Taoism”).11 This
reductionism may not be entirely due to Ricci’s bias but may
also reflect the religious syncretism prominent in the Ming period
(1368–1644). Though Ricci accepts the syncretism when it merges
Buddhism with Taoism, he is critical of the syncretic tendency
when it includes Confucianism. Consequently, he strongly rejects
the blending of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism that was var-
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iously known as san-chiao i-ho (the harmonization of the three
teachings) or san-han chiao (the three teachings united). Ricci is
far more favorable toward Confucianism, which he tries to recon-
cile with Christianity by emphasizing the common basis of both in
natural reason.
The T’ien-chu shih-i emphasizes philosophy and religion in
China since the composition of the Confucian classics, from which
Ricci quotes. It is now generally believed that, apart from the
Analects, Confucius’ role in the composition of the classics was
minimal. There was, however, a traditional view, which Ricci may
have shared, that Confucius’ role in the formation of the classics
was closer to authorship. Ricci’s emphasis on Confucius contrasts
with the position of later Europeans sympathetic to the Chinese
rites, including Leibniz, who stressed the period leading up to and
sometimes including Confucius, as opposed to the post-Confucius
era.
Writing from an anti-Buddhist perspective similar to that of
the T’ien-chu shih-i, Ricci in his Journals attacks the Pythagorean
doctrine of the transmigration of souls and indirectly attempts to
refute the Buddhist notion of the transmigration of the soul. Here
again, one must fault Ricci on his treatment of Buddhism. Greater
familiarity with Buddhist doctrine would have indicated that only
in the grossest Buddhist view is the soul said to transmigrate. On
the contrary, one finds repeated references in Buddhist literature
to the denial of the existence of a soul, along with the acceptance
of transmigration. (True to the Christian tradition, Leibniz also re-
jected transmigration of the soul when it appeared in the context
of Pythagoreanism, though he accepted many other Pythagorean
notions.)12
Ricci was exposed to a Buddhism that had degenerated from
an earlier apogee in Chinese history and had since become
blended with a number of Taoist and popular religious customs. On
the other hand Buddhism was undergoing a limited revival during
the Ming period and Ricci’s balance of favor toward the Confu-
cianists and his criticism of the Buddhists are simply unjustified by
any impartial standard. Ricci might have been offended by certain
practices in the local Buddhist temples, but he was also exposed
to articulate proponents of Buddhism and surely they would have
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confirmed that Buddhism in essence was not an idol-worshipping
religion and contained little theism. But Ricci was not prepared
to listen to these Buddhist spokesmen. His description of debates
with them represents an embarrassing lapse in a generally fair and
perceptive mind.13
The fact is that there were bases of Buddhism from which simi-
larities between it and Christianity could have been established
as effectively as between Confucianism and Christianity, had Ricci
been sufficiently objective and willing or had circumstances been
ripe for such an effort.14 Our own era is participating in attempts
at accord between Christianity and Buddhism by a number of peo-
ple, including the Jesuit William Johnston, who is discussed in the
concluding chapter.
When we deal with Ricci’s treatment of Chinese thinkers who
stand outside the orthodox Confucian path, the customary praise
for Ricci must abate. For example, Ricci had some contact with
the learned Chinese iconoclast Li Chih, who was attempting a new
synthesis of various schools including Buddhism and Confucian-
ism. But Li Chih had placed himself beyond the pale of current
Confucianist orthodoxy, and this fundamental fact seems to have
diminished him in Ricci’s eyes. Otto Franke, in his article on the
contact between Ricci and Li Chih, suggests that not only could Li
Chih have corrected Ricci’s erroneous view that ancient China was
Confucianlike, but Li and his heretical followers might also have
provided a more lasting alliance with the Christian mission than
did the orthodox literati Ricci chose to cultivate.15
Franke’s suggestions are intriguing, but they contradict the
fundamental approach of Ricci and the Jesuits that relies on
cultivating the powers that be. To the extent that Li Chih dissoci-
ated himself from those powers, he could not have been accepted
without a basic shift in method. One deficiency of this approach
was that it tended to place the Jesuits outside the most creative
cultural currents of the day. In Ricci’s time, such a current was
shared by Li Chih. Later, in Bouvet’s time, the most creative cur-
rent was shared by Ming loyalists and others, whose research and
new conclusions on the Book of Changes appear to have eluded
Jesuits working on the same classic. Since the Jesuits tended to
align themselves with the status quo, any shift in power would re-
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quire a rapid shift in allegiance. Sometimes, as in the transition
from the Ming to Ch’ing dynasties in the mid-seventeenth century,
they were capable of such a fast transition. Where the transitions
were more subtle, as in changing cultural conceptions among the
literati, the Jesuits were less successful.
Nichola Longobardi, S. J.
Nichola Longobardi (Lung Hua-min, 1565–1655) was born into a
patrician family at Caltagirone, Sicily and entered the novitiate at
Messina in 1582. After arriving in China in 1597, he worked with
Ricci as one of the pioneer missionaries, though their techniques
differed. Longobardi combined pious zeal and technical skill with
tireless energy, but he was far less refined than Ricci in his knowl-
edge of philosophy and theology.16 While Ricci inclined toward the
cultivation of literate Chinese, Longobardi excelled in programs
such as the campaign of street preaching aimed at the people in
the suburbs of Shao-chou which, according to Ricci’s evaluation,
was successful.17 Yet Longobardi was not without literary ability.
Sometime around 1600, he expressed his critical attitude toward
the Chinese rites in an unpublished Latin manuscript, De Confu-
cio ejusque doctrina tractatus (A treatise on Confucius and his
doctrine), which was condemned by the vice-provincial, François
Furtado, S. J. Consequently, the work was temporarily suppressed;
later it was translated into Spanish and published by Fr. Domingo
Navarette in his Tratados (Madrid, 1676–1679).18 It was later
translated into French by Monsignor de Cicé and published by the
Society of Foreign Missions as Traité sur quelques points de la
religion des chinois (A treatise on several matters of the Chinese
religion), hereafter referred to as Religion Treatise (Paris, 1703).
It was this French version that had a great influence upon Leibniz
when its completed form came into his hands late in 1715. While
this work reflected an outlook which differed from that of Ricci,
Longobardi was not outspoken in his differences while Ricci lived.
Yet on many matters involving the mission, Ricci and Longobardi
appear to have been in basic agreement, and Ricci appointed him
as his successor just before dying.19
After Ricci’s death Longobardi openly sided with the emerging
position critical of the Chinese rites and rejected the cautious
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course pursued by Ricci and favored by such prominent Chinese
converts as the “Three pillars of the early Catholic Church” (K’ai-
chiao san-ta chu-shih)—(Paul) Hsü Kuang-ch’i, (Michael) Yang
T’ing-yün, and (Leo) Li Chih-tsao (1570–1630). At the Nanking
mission, Alfonso Vagnoni, S. J. (Wang Yi-yüan, 1566–1640) had
become overintoxicated by initial success and became less cau-
tious in his methods. With Vagnoni, Longobardi favored a more
open approach and—against the advice of the Chinese Christian
literati—suggested petitioning the emperor for formal recognition
of freedom to practice Christianity. (On the other hand, Vagnoni
did not share Longobardi’s objections to using traditional Chinese
terms to refer to God.) The less cautious tactics of the Jesuits ex-
posed them to attack from their Chinese enemies, and in 1617
there began a brief suppression of Christianity. In 1622, Longo-
bardi was succeeded as head of the mission by João de Rocha,
S. J. (Lo Huai-chung, 1561–1633), though he remained active in
the China mission until his death in 1655 at the venerable age of
ninety.
The tendency to interpret Chinese beliefs in terms of Christian
equivalences in objects of worship rather than seeing the functions
of that worship is common to nearly all Europeans of this period. But
what distinguishes Longobardi’s interpretations from those of Ricci,
Bouvet, and Leibniz is a certain coarseness of view. This is appar-
ent in his tendencies to presume a correspondence between Chinese
and gentile (i.e., non-Christian) philosophies as a whole (Religion
Treatise 3:1) or between Chinese and European idolatry (Religion
Treatise 13:1). To be fair, one should note the existence of forced ten-
dencies on the part of both those sympathetic to, and those critical
of, the Chinese rites; but in sum, it seems that Longobardi’s views
are less discriminating than those of Ricci and Bouvet.
Longobardi relied far more upon the views of contemporary
Chinese in formulating his interpretation of the Chinese than did
Ricci and those sympathetic to the Chinese rites. The use of his con-
versations with Chinese literati as source material gives the reader
an unusually direct access to Chinese views, particularly when he
includes long quotations from these men. As with any oral device,
however, there are qualifying factors of which Longobardi shows
little awareness. For instance, he cites the spoken views of “Dr.
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Paul” (Hsü Kuang-ch’i) that the Chinese shang-ti (King-on-high)
could not be equivalent to the Christian God, that neither the an-
cient nor modern Chinese would have had any recognition of this
God, and that the fathers proposed these Chinese equivalents to
avoid alienating certain Chinese scholars (Religion Treatise 17:34).
We do not know when Hsü may have said this, but it is probable that
it was after his conversion of 1603, particularly since he had not at-
tained the chin-shih (doctoral) degree before that date and would
not have borne the title of “Dr.” until a year later. Consequently,
Hsü’s views cannot be assumed to be completely unbiased or repre-
sentative of Confucianism. Furthermore, in any conversation with
Longobardi, Hsü would have been quite aware that he was talking
with a priest, especially if he himself professed the faith.
Another pertinent conversation between Longobardi and a
literati convert—this time with “Dr. Michael” (Yang T’ing-yün)—is
reported at length in the Religion Treatise 17:19–32. In the course
of this conversation, Yang criticizes Confucianism for neglecting
the other life and praises Buddhism for proposing an eternity and
paradise (Religion Treatise 17:24). Yang’s reference to a Buddhist
paradise probably means the Western Paradise of Amitabha, which
became an object of great attention to many devotees of this popu-
lar form of Buddhism. Actually, this paradise was not a permanent
abode like that of the Christian heaven, but only a rewarding way
station for those on their way to Nirvana, technically not a place so
much as a state of consciousness in which desire is extinguished.
In his praise of Buddhism and throughout the entire conversa-
tion, Yang gives evidence of syncretic tendencies. In the Religion
Treatise 17:32, discussing the notion that all things are one, he re-
sponds to an objection of Longobardi’s by saying that if the three
sects of Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism followed their res-
pective doctrines in their purity, they would remove practices con-
trary to Christianity. One can almost feel the discomfort such syn-
cretic attitudes created in Longobardi. For Ricci, it was just such
a searching openness that would encourage accord. To the extent
that a syncretic attitude is much more willing to allow—indeed,
seek—substitutions than is a dogmatic attitude, Ricci could use this
syncretic attitude to create a role for Christianity by the displace-
ment of Buddhism. The substitution would be possible because
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Buddhism and Christianity share similar approaches and concerns.
Yang reflects this shared concern in his praise for Buddhism’s at-
tention to the afterlife, also a fundamental Christian concern.
Although the syncretic attitudes of Yang and other Chinese
literati accepted this displacement of Buddhism by Christianity, Li
Chih and his followers would probably have rejected it. The Li Chih
group would perhaps have been more inclined to displace Confu-
cianism, but Ricci had set the Jesuits of the China mission on a
path toward a Confucian-Christian synthesis in which Buddhism
was the inevitable choice for elimination. For reasons of doctri-
nal belief and temperament, Longobardi could not work with such
syncretic approaches. In his eyes, they amounted to building the
Church in China on sand.
Longobardi states that in their emphasis on objects of worship
rather than substance of worship, Chinese religious notions are
not equivalent to those of Christianity because they are only
superficially spiritual and lack any true conception of a divinity
who dispenses recompense and retribution (Religion Treatise
16:4). The concept li (principle) was used by those sympathetic to
the Chinese rites, and by Leibniz in particular as a basis for find-
ing a Chinese equivalent for the Christian God. This concept is
defined by Longobardi as “prime matter” (Religion Treatise 14:18)
and elsewhere as “universal substance” (Religion Treatise 17:28).
He defines the complementary of li (that is ch’i) as “primeval air”
(l’air primogéne) (Religion Treatise 14:19).
Leibniz later criticizes this interpretation of li, as is discussed
in chapter 4, and he does so on valid grounds. The Chinese did
not view li as material substance. Given his definition of li, Lon-
gobardi is able to interpret the Chinese view as materialistic and
lacking the spirituality found in Christianity. Yet though his defin-
ition of li is inaccurate, Longobardi’s treatise deserves attention,
for when Leibniz composed his Discourse on the Natural Theology
of the Chinese he relied primarily not on Ricci’s journals but on the
treatises of Longobardi and Sainte-Marie.
Antoine de Sainte-Marie, O. F. M.
Antoine de Sainte-Marie, alias Antonio Caballero a Santa Maria
(Li An-tang, 1602–1669), was born at Baltanás, Spain, on 20 April
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1602.20 He entered the Order of Friar Minors (Franciscans) in
1618 and traveled to the Philippines in 1628.21 In 1633, Sainte-
Marie sailed for China from Manila in the company of the Do-
minican Juan Bautista de Morales and fellow Franciscan Francisco
Bermúdez. His initial contacts with Jesuits in China were very
unfavorable. This was due to more than interorder and nationalis-
tic rivalries, for the situation of Christianity and the Jesuits at that
time in China had become very delicate because of the persecution
led by the scholar-official Shen Ch’üeh. As a new arrival in China,
Sainte-Marie was insensitive to the situation and, in a scene with
comic overtones, the Jesuits had him kidnapped by Chinese Christ-
ian laymen and removed from the tense Nanking area. In a tribute
to Sainte-Marie, a recent Jesuit historian describes him as holding
no grudges in the aftermath of the kidnapping.22
Sainte-Marie, along with Morales, Bermúdez and Francisco
Diez, began to question Jesuits and Chinese Christians and to
compile for their superiors a report critical of Jesuit methods. In
February 1636, Sainte-Marie sailed for Manila with the completed
reports and, though imprisoned by the Dutch en route, reached
Manila in June 1637. These reports have become primary sources
for the study of the Rites Controversy, though in terms of Sainte-
Marie’s contribution they reflect less than three years’ experience
in China whereas his later Mission Treatise reflects over thirty
years of experience. In 1643, he received the decrees appoint-
ing him prefect apostolic in China. By 1649, he was locating in
Shantung Province where, with some financial assistance from
Adam Schall at Peking, he established a long-lasting mission. In
the persecution of 1665, he was banished with other missionar-
ies to Canton. He acquired a knowledge of Chinese sufficient to
collaborate in the writing of several books in Chinese on religious
themes, including T’ien Ju yin (Christianity and Confucianism com-
pared) (1664).23 Throughout, he remained a persistent critic of the
Jesuit position that was sympathetic toward the Chinese rites. He
died at Canton on 13 May 1669.
Longobardi, Vagnoni, and, to a lesser extent, Visdelou24 were
rare Jesuits who deviated from the predominantly sympathetic po-
sition toward the Chinese rites. As the controversy intensified, the
Jesuit order became more exclusively identified with the sympa-
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thetic position and, for the most part, criticism of this accommo-
dating view in missionary methods came from non-Jesuit orders
such as the Dominicans, Franciscans, Augustinians, and the So-
ciety of Foreign Missions. The Spaniard Morales, head of the
Dominican order in China, and Sainte-Marie led the formal oppo-
sition to the Jesuits’ methods in the mid-seventeenth century.
The Franciscans and Dominicans were closely associated with
the fortunes of Spain and Portugal. Consequently, the eclipse of
these powers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries left these
orders in a weakened position and led to resentment of the rise of
the Society of Jesus in China. Yet the existence of Portuguese Jesuits
blurs any clear-cut alignment in the matter. Additionally, the six-
teenth and early seventeenth-century prominence of Italian Jesuits
gave way to the late seventeenth-and eighteenth-century dominance
of German and, particularly, French members, signifying a northerly
shift in European political power. The methods of the Franciscans
and Dominicans were far harsher and less subtle than those of the
Jesuits who seemed more conscious of the need to correct some of
the uncompromising elements that led to the missionary disaster in
Japan during the first half of the seventeenth century.
The smoldering Rites Controversy flamed up in 1648 when
Morales protested that the adaptiveness of the Jesuit methods de-
filed Christian doctrine by admitting various native Chinese super-
stitions into the practice of Christianity. Father Morales’ intemper-
ate behavior led to his expulsion by the Chinese, who were probab-
ly goaded on by the Jesuits, and Morales traveled to Rome to tell
his story. In response, the Jesuits sent Fr. Martin Martini (Wei
K’uang-kuo, 1614–1661) to Rome, and he presented the Jesuit side
of the question so effectively that by 1656 he had secured perhaps
the only markedly pro-Jesuit decree in the controversy. Sainte-
Marie was quite aware of this background of events and in his
Mission Treatise (pp. 10–11 and 47–49) specifically attempts to re-
fute several of the views that Martini presented at Rome. In the
same passage, Sainte-Marie states that he met with Martini in
1659, just after the latter’s return from Rome, and personally dis-
agreed with him.
Sainte-Marie completed his Mission Treatise in December
1668. Its full title is Traité sur quelques points importants de la mis-
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sion de la Chine (Treatise on a few important points of the mission
of China).25 This title represents the French translation made from
the original Spanish edition and published at Paris in 1701. It was
in this form that the treatise came into the hands of Leibniz, who
made considerable use of its contents. Leibniz was aware of the
treatises by Longobardi and Sainte-Marie as early as 1709, though
he did not see copies of them until late in 1715.26 Then, in January
1716,27 Leibniz wrote of his plan to use the Chinese sources of Lon-
gobardi and Sainte-Marie in composing a discourse in French on
the high quality of ancient Chinese philosophy. This essay material-
ized as the Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese.
Claudio Filippo Grimaldi, S. J.
Claudio Filippo Grimaldi (Min Ming-wo, 1638–1712) was born in
the Piedmont, in northwestern Italy, on 27 September 1638 and
entered the Society of Jesus just over nineteen years later. After a
long voyage of two years’ duration, he arrived in Canton in 1669.
He was soon residing in Peking, where in 1671 he constructed a
model of a steam-turbine road carriage.28 He and Verbiest were of
great assistance to the K’ang-hsi emperor (r. 1662–1722) in deal-
ing with the Russian embassy of Nikolai Gavrilovitch Spathary in
1676, since Spathary’s knowledge of Latin provided the Jesuits
with a medium of communication not possessed by the Chinese.29
In the years of 1683 and 1685, Grimaldi accompanied the K’ang-
hsi emperor on excursions to Tartary. He departed from Canton in
1686 for a return voyage to Europe where, at Rome in 1689, Leib-
niz made his acquaintance.
Leibniz’ papers indicate that this acquaintance occurred at an
early stage of his developing knowledge of China. In the Leibniz-
Grimaldi file at Hanover, one can find notes made by Leibniz from
a conversation with Fr. Grimaldi, presumably in Rome in 1689. In
these notes, a mathematical basis for the relationship is definitely
established. Leibniz was aware that Grimaldi was an associate of
and designated successor to Ferdinand Verbiest, S. J. (Nan Huai-
jen, 1623–1688), who had achieved a position of great influence
in the Chinese court. Leibniz connects Verbiest with the Chinese
“Tribunal in Mathematics,” of which he was director.30 The for-
mal name of this agency was the Bureau of Astronomy (Ch’in
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t’ien chien), and it dealt with astronomy as well as mathematics.
Essentially the bureau was responsible for composing the official
calendar—a task of supreme importance in China—but it was also
involved with developing hydraulic and mechanical instruments.
Verbiest had tutored the youthful K’ang-hsi emperor in geometry,
philosophy, music, and, whenever possible, religion. In consequent
years, astronomy, mechanics, and hydraulics provided the basis for
the K’ang-hsi emperor’s interest in foreign missionaries on the bu-
reau. As Verbiest’s associate, Grimaldi would have been part of
these activities and would have shared this access to the Chinese
throne. His knowledge of China would be considered as remark-
able today as it was in the seventeenth century. Given Leibniz’
orientation toward court politics, his expertise in mathematics,
and his encyclopedic interests, it is not surprising that the stimu-
lus provided by Grimaldi should have been an important factor in
Leibniz’ subsequent interest in China.
While in Rome, Leibniz wrote a letter, dated 19 July 1689, con-
taining a list of thirty questions for Grimaldi to answer at his
leisure.31 The questions reflect little knowledge of China. Typically
Leibnizian in scope, they cover a broad range of topics—plants,
and agriculture, the production of paper, silk, porcelain, and leath-
er, medicine, geometry, astronomy, chemistry, metallurgy, machines,
and instruments with military and nautical uses. In his short intro-
ductory letter to this list, Leibniz mentions his awareness of the
great antiquity of Chinese culture and anticipates the notion of an
exchange of learning—an idea that is to become prominent in his
later writings. He states that in exchange for the great mathematical
sciences of the Europeans, the Chinese could teach Europeans the
natural arcana they have observed through their long history. Fur-
thermore, the ancient imperial traditions are present in China in a
way now lost to Europe because of migration of populations, and
Leibniz believes we could learn much from the records of this tradi-
tion preserved in China. Possibly, Leibniz implies, we could also
learn much about Europe by studying these records. In this letter
and list we see Leibniz’ encyclopedic mind responding to a stimulus
supplied by conversations with Grimaldi. Leibniz’ notions of Chinese
antiquity are general and unrefined, in the manner of a bright mind
quickly catching on to a new subject. But we are observers at the
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still-early stages of a process that is to end twenty-six years later
with a knowledge of China rare among Europeans of his day.
Sometime before leaving Rome, Leibniz met with Grimaldi and
received answers to most of his thirty questions.32 In response to
Leibniz’ query concerning Chinese astronomy, Grimaldi makes the
interesting reply that Chinese celestial observations are not very
trustworthy. He characterizes Chinese astronomers as mercenary
men whose astronomy is determined more by their search for ma-
terial rewards than for truth. The reference here is possibly to
Mohammedan astronomers who had imported Arabic astronomi-
cal knowledge and techniques into China. These Mohammedans
seem to have been essentially observers of celestial movements
whose rigidity in outlook increased in proportion to their decline
in knowledge of applied and theoretical mathematics.
By the time the Jesuits arrived, the Mohammedans appear to
have degenerated into mere meticulous recorders of what they ob-
served. In tests played out before the court, the Jesuits were able
to demonstrate a superior ability in calculating precise times for
eclipses and in suggesting reforms for the calendar. Since mem-
bers of the Jesuit society such as Johann Adam Schall von Bell
(T’ang Jo-wang, 1592–1666) and Ferdinand Verbiest had been in-
volved in direct and bitter confrontations with the Mohammedans
over these points, Grimaldi could hardly be expressing a detached
opinion on their merits. At any rate, Grimaldi’s first-hand accounts
probably laid the foundation for Leibniz’ later low opinion of the
knowledge of mathematical sciences in modern China. His low re-
gard for modern Chinese knowledge led Leibniz to support the
view held by Ricci—a view later emphasized by Bouvet and the Fig-
urists—that only the ancient Chinese possessed an understanding
of the sciences consonant with a knowledge of the True Religion.
Joseph Needham’s extensive investigation of Chinese science
has given us reason to doubt this seventeenth-century evaluation of
Chinese mathematical astronomy. Needham believes that the over-
ly low assessment was caused by two main factors. First, there
was a deterioration of a sophisticated Chinese astronomical tradi-
tion late in the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). This would help explain
why Grimaldi, among others, viewed the Chinese astronomers of
the late Ming as mere observers and recorders of celestial phe-
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nomena. Second, and perhaps more significant, Needham maintains
that the Jesuit astronomers did not devote sufficient effort to study-
ing Chinese astronomical records because they carried a firm and
unshakable conviction in the superiority of European science.33 Fi-
nally, apart from Needham’s argument, it should be noted that the
Jesuits’ scientific integrity in their work in astronomy in China, and
specifically in their presentation of Copernican heliocentric theory,
was not always as unimpeachable as their writings might indicate.34
Leibniz’ letters to Grimaldi emphasize astronomy and mathe-
matics, no doubt reflecting Grimaldi’s expertise in these fields in
China. Leibniz’ letter of 21 (?) March 1692 is of additional inter-
est in that it refers to an exchange between Terrentius (Johann
Terrenz Schreck; Teng Yü-han, 1576–1630), a Jesuit astronomer
in China and the famous European astronomer Johannes Kepler
(1571–1630).35 According to Leibniz, Terrentius wrote to Kepler
in 1623 concerning astronomical matters and Kepler replied in
1627.36 In his letter, Kepler made some comments on the origin
of Chinese civilization that bear a remarkable similarity to the
Noachide theory later to become prominent among the Jesuits.
According to the Noachide theory, the three sons of Noah—Sham,
Ham, and Japheth—spread throughout the world, the descendants of
Japheth, the oldest, travelling to northeast Asia. They took with them
God’s Law, which over the years became corrupted, though elements
of it can still be detected in such doctrines as the virgin birth of the
Prince of Millet (Hou Chi), said to be the first ancestor of the Chou
dynastic line. The Society of Foreign Missions opposed this theory on
the grounds that it diminished the authority of the Jews as the cho-
sen people. If God’s Law were carried to other peoples of the world,
the line of descent from Noah to Abraham, Moses, and the prophets
would no longer have such singular authority to speak for God. It was
also said to diminish the importance of Christ’s redemption of man.
I am unable to ascertain whether Kepler’s notions have any
direct link with the Noachide theory, but Leibniz does say that
Kepler identified King Yao with Japheth’s son, Javan. Legendarily
speaking, Yao has several predecessors, including Fu Hsi and the
Yellow Emperor (Huang Ti), but Kepler is apparently referring to
the earliest Chinese ancestor. Besides Javan, Japheth’s six sons
include Magog, Madai, Tubal, Meshach, and Tiras.37 Kepler also
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claimed that Tubal was the ancestral father of the Tartars, al-
though Leibniz believed that the Chinese and Tartars were more
dissimilar in origin than this.
In spite of Leibniz’ disagreement on the origin of the Tartars,
he was later to be generally sympathetic to the view, held by so
many Jesuits, that ancient China did possess the True Law and that
this was the basis on which cultural accord between China and
the West could best be established. This view is implicit in Leib-
niz’ letter of 20 December 1696 to Grimaldi, in which he presents
his binary system of mathematics.38 This appears to be the last
letter of significance between Leibniz and Grimaldi preserved in
the Hanover files. Soon afterward, the more important correspon-
dence with Bouvet begins.
Joachim Bouvet, S. J.
Joachim Bouvet (Po Chin, 1656–1730) was among the first group
of French Jesuits to enter China. Five of them arrived in Peking
in 1688. Two of the group, Bouvet and Jean-Francois Gerbillon
(Chang Ch’eng, 1654–1707), were ordered by the court to remain
at Peking and use their mathematical and technical training in
support of astronomical and other activities for which the Jesuits
were now responsible.39 This was not the first French mission
sent to China, for the Society of Foreign Missions had emerged
from a Parisian seminary founded in 1633 to train missionaries in
methods of foreign proselytizing. Unlike the other orders engaged
in China, however, the missionaries of this society were secular
clergy and unaffiliated with any religious order. Their efforts were
spread throughout Siam and Indochina, as well as parts of China
itself, and were not concentrated upon Peking as were those of the
Jesuits.40
The rivalry between the Portuguese and Spanish missionaries
and interests present from earlier times now intensified with the
entry of the first French Jesuits, who unlike the German Jesuits in
China were closely allied with their home state. The king of Por-
tugal was highly protective of his official status as patron of the
religious missions in China, and to minimize conflict the French
stressed the scientific rather than the religious nature of their
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first officially patronized mission.41 It was not long before the
French achieved formal recognition of their separation from the
Portuguese mission. In Bouvet’s participation in the ensuing ri-
valries and intrigues, he appears to have expressed devotion to
France, but even more to the Jesuit cause in which his commitment
to Christ was profoundly embedded.
Unlike the missionary careers of Ricci and Longobardi, Bou-
vet’s stay in China was from the start spent almost entirely at the
center of imperial power. Even his trip to Europe in 1697–1699
was made partly in the capacity of an official gift-bearer of the
K’ang-hsi emperor and partly to seek reinforcements from France
for the Jesuit cause.42 His association with the K’ang-hsi emperor
seems to have been among the closest of all the Jesuits. His activ-
ities included tutoring the royal family,43 helping at the emperor’s
command, to survey the area around Tientsin as a basis for a flood
control project,44 and, like Ricci, composing treatises in Chinese
on Christian themes that would appeal to the literati.45 Bouvet as-
sumed a leading role on the side sympathetic to the Chinese rites
and became associated with the Figurists, who emphasized the
common origin of Chinese and Western cultures. His participation
in the Rites Controversy included letters written from Peking to a
number of European correspondents, one of whom was Leibniz.
Writing from Paris on 10 November 1701, the Jesuit Fr. Le Go-
bien forwarded a letter from Bouvet, along with a covering note,
to Leibniz.46 Le Gobien’s note states that since Bouvet’s letter of
8 November 1700 an additional letter of 2 December 1700 had
arrived, reporting that the Jesuits had consulted the K’ang-hsi em-
peror on the question of Chinese rites. Their written petition gives
some indication as to how much the Jesuits had mastered the deli-
cate art of memorializing the emperor. Rather than merely asking
the emperor for clarification, their petition in fact went on to offer
a set of tentative explanations of the rites by which the Chinese
honored Confucius and their ancestors. Their explanations em-
phasized the “good reasons”47 on which these ceremonies were
founded. The prescribed manner in which a Chinese emperor re-
sponded to a memorial was generally either to return it unsigned,
indicating disapproval, or to accept it, sometimes with short com-
ments appended in vermilion. Le Gobien tells us that the emperor
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accepted the Jesuit explanation without alteration and that the de-
cision acquired the force of law on 30 November 1700.
Here we have one of the less admirable instances of Jesuit
procedure. Several years of proximity to the throne had given the
Jesuits access to the seat of power. They were quite right in recog-
nizing the supremacy of the Chinese emperor as head of both
administrative and religious affairs in China. By writing an inter-
pretation of Chinese rites that carefully appealed to the K’ang-hsi
emperor’s own views, while simultaneously expressing the domi-
nant Jesuit view of sympathy toward the rites, the Jesuits had
resolved the question in a manner acceptable to the Chinese. But
the rites question for Europeans and for missionaries in China was
not resolved merely by the emperor’s concurrence that the nature
of the Chinese rites was completely civil and social. A question of
Christian doctrine could not be settled by political authority, and
certainly not by Chinese political authority alone. The eventual rul-
ings of Rome—Ex illa die (1715) and Ex quo singulari (1742)—went
against the Jesuits, though political pressures were applied from
both sides. The Jesuit position was not, however, simply a matter
of political intrigue. There was a definite doctrinal view justifying
a sympathetic interpretation of Chinese rites that had been de-
veloped by the society through years of experience, discussion,
and reflection. Yet one would also probably have to concede that
there was something in the methods and outlook of the Jesuits
which helped to predispose this sympathetic interpretation even
before the interpretation was begun. Bouvet’s letters indicate a
substantial concern for the reasoning that went into the Jesuit
interpretation. They also indicate his own political motives. His let-
ters were quite influential in shaping Leibniz’ views on China.
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Leibniz and Bouvet
Leibniz’ China interpreters divide into two groups. In the first, we
find missionaries such as Ricci, Longobardi, and Sainte-Marie, all
of whom lived before Leibniz’ time and with whom he made con-
tact only through their written works. In the second group, we find
missionaries who were contemporary to Leibniz and with whom his
contact was direct, both through correspondence and, occasional-
ly, personal meetings. Principal among these was Bouvet.
Projection of European concepts and needs upon Chinese cul-
ture was a characteristic of both groups, but with Bouvet the pro-
jection differed in its specific form. Longobardi and Sainte-Marie
laced their writings with extensive quotations from the Chinese
classics. Bouvet pays frequent veneration to the classics, but his
approach is more that of universalist and syncretizer than scholar.
His hypotheses are far more daring than those of Longobardi and
Sainte-Marie, whose interpretations tend to be so literal that they
often mislead. Because Longobardi and Sainte-Marie are negative
in their interpretations of Chinese culture while Bouvet is highly
creative, it is not surprising that Leibniz cast his lot with the latter.
The Relationship
The Leibniz-Bouvet correspondence is one of the most important
sources for the study of cultural relations between Europe and
China in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The
correspondence has been frequently cited by scholars and interest
has extended to the Far East. Early in the twentieth century, the
Japanese scholar Gorai Kinzō traveled to Germany, where he
copied the Leibniz-Bouvet correspondence out of the Leibniz ar-
chives at Hanover. Upon returning to Japan, he included parts
of this correspondence in his study on the influence of Confu-
cianism on German political thought.1 Gorai’s rendering of this
correspondence was later translated into Chinese by Liu Pai-min
and published in 1941 as part of a study on the Book of Changes.2
The Leibniz-Bouvet correspondence consists of at least fifteen
letters dating from the year 1697 to 1707 or shortly thereafter.3
The exchange of letters was irregular, for a while Bouvet was
clearly the initiator and was active in the early correspondence,
his last recorded letter to Leibniz is dated 8 November 1702.
Leibniz then wrote five more letters which, if the archives are com-
plete, remained unanswered.
Bouvet’s sudden silence would probably be explained more by
a change in priorities or interests than by any lack of vigor, since
he continued to be active in the China field until his death in 1730.
The Rites Controversy was at its peak between 1700 and 1704, at
which time Pope Clement issued his decree disapproving the Jesuit
position and dispatched his representative, Tournon, to China. The
Tournon mission of 1704–1710 marked the beginning of the end of
Jesuit success in China. Perhaps Bouvet felt himself so embroiled
in this struggle that he could no longer find the time to carry on
a correspondence with Leibniz. With the European tide apparently
turning against the Jesuits, Bouvet may have felt that the real fight
was now to be one of devoting all effort to cultivating the support
of the K’ang-hsi emperor and allied forces in China as a counter-
vailing force against anti-Jesuit hostility in Europe. Possibly Bouvet
regarded the correspondence with Leibniz as expendable or, less
cynically, perhaps he really did intend to continue, but demands
were such that he could no longer find the time.
Though the lapse of the Bouvet correspondence greatly re-
duced Leibniz’ direct contact with the China missionary field, Leib-
niz maintained indirect contact through his European correspon-
dents.4 Furthermore, not all Jesuits lost interest in corresponding
with Leibniz. In January 1706, Bartholomew des Bosses, a promi-
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nent Jesuit theologian and mathematician at the Jesuit seminary
at Hildesheim, initiated an extensive correspondence with Leibniz
that continued until the latter’s death. Many of their letters refer
to news and concerns of China, for Des Bosses was in touch with
missionary currents at Rome and elsewhere. Leibniz expressed his
disappointment over Bouvet’s lack of response in several letters to
Des Bosses.5 Naturally, Leibniz would have been disappointed by
the abrupt end of a correspondence so auspiciously begun and in
which he had been such an active participant. It was no doubt with
Leibniz’ assistance that Bouvet’s correspondence was extended to
a larger European audience with the publication in the journal
Mémoires de Trévoux in 1704, of Bouvet’s long letter to Leibniz of
4 November 1701.6
Leibniz’ initial interest in China can be traced to his reading of
books on the subject from as early as the 1660s and his concern
with Chinese as a universal language during the 1670s. This initial
stage can be distinguished from a second stage in the development
of Leibniz’ knowledge of China, beginning with the meeting with
Grimaldi at Rome in 1689 and Leibniz’ subsequent intensification
of interest in China. A third stage coincides with the Bouvet corre-
spondence from 1697 to 1707. The culmination of Leibniz’ under-
standing was not to come until the last year of his life. This is the
period in which others were increasingly abandoning Leibniz to
the isolation and declining influence of his situation at Hanover. It
was during this final stage that Leibniz discovered the Longobardi
and Sainte-Marie treatises and their translations of Chinese philo-
sophical texts, and it was at this time that his mature assimilation
of Chinese civilization was expressed in his treatise on Chinese
natural theology in 1716.
The relationship between Liebniz and Bouvet was tactical from
both sides. It was a symbiosis fed on the one hand by Leibniz’ rep-
utation and wisdom and on the other by Bouvet’s knowledge of
Chinese culture and contacts with the K’ang-hsi emperor. Bouvet
needed support for his missionary projects. For example, he re-
quired four or five fellow missioners for the tasks of compiling a
new commentary to the Chinese classics and editing a new Chi-
nese dictionary for Europeans. His hope was that Leibniz’ standing
in Europe would influence Louis XIV’s Jesuit confessor, François
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la Chaise,7 and his secretary, Antoine Verjus, S. J., to seek support
from French sources. In turn, Leibniz needed the cooperation of
the Jesuits for his ecumenist cause.
Initial contact between Bouvet and Leibniz was made through
the intermediary Verjus. Leibniz was in correspondence with Ver-
jus concerning the China mission and had sent him several copies
of the first edition of the Novissima Sinica (1697).8 When Bouvet
returned to Europe in 1697 with the intention of gathering further
support for the Jesuit cause, he presumably read one of these
copies of the Novissima Sinica. Consequently, Bouvet sent Leibniz
a copy of his recently published Portrait historique de l’Empereur
de la Chine (Historical portrait of the Emperor of China) along with
a letter dated 18 October 1697.9 Leibniz answered on 2 Decem-
ber 1697 by forwarding through Verjus a letter which—in addition
to requests for information on the Chinese language, history, and
so forth—asked that he be permitted to reprint Bouvet’s Portrait
historique in the second edition of Novissima Sinica.10 Bouvet was
happy to oblige, and the Portrait historique was reprinted in the
1699 edition.
On 28 February 1698, just before departing from La Rochelle
for China, Bouvet wrote to Leibniz. In this letter he refers to
the Book of Changes and briefly describes what has come to be
known as the Figurist view of Chinese history. Bouvet believed that
the lines of the hexagrams composed by Fu Hsi were in fact the
first characters, that is, the basic linguistic units, of the Chinese
language and culture. In effect, one sees here the Pythagorean im-
plications of a common denominator for both an arithmetical and
linguistic system in which language can be analyzed with mathe-
matical precision. This notion coincided with the belief, so preva-
lent among certain Europeans, including Leibniz, that a “key” to
the Chinese language could be developed. Reflecting a more prac-
tical awareness of the Chinese language, Bouvet in a letter to
Leibniz of 19 September 1699 shows a certain caution toward
their chances for developing the sort of key conceived by Andreas
Müller of Berlin, who spoke of the common origin of Chinese char-
acters and Egyptian hieroglyphs. Yet Bouvet himself believed in
the theory of common origin.
In his letter of 28 February 1698, Bouvet refers Leibniz to Fr.
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Couplet’s Confucius Sinarum Philosophus for a representation of
these ancient Chinese characters. In fact, Bouvet believes that the
diagrams of Fu Hsi concentrate not only arithmetical and linguis-
tic elements but also the natural principles of all sciences. This
metaphysically complete system was thought to have been lost by
the Chinese long before the time of Confucius (551?–479? B.C.),
though the diagrams themselves have remained known to the Chi-
nese through their classic, the Book of Changes.
Bouvet and Leibniz shared a common assumption of the
age—namely, that “reason” was absolute in commanding assent
and led to confirmation of the “true religion,” Christianity. Bouvet
believed that the conversion of the Chinese to Christianity could be
accomplished by reteaching the Chinese what had previously been
part of their knowledge. Leibniz subscribed to this view, particular-
ly since he himself was working on an arithmetical common denom-
inator for solving general problems of knowledge. One can imagine
his excitement when he later discovered the similarities in progres-
sion between the hexagrams and his own binary arithmetic.
Bouvet was always pressed in trying to find time to respond to
Leibniz’ many questions and suggestions for ambitious schemes.
Practical matters frequently interfered, both from the European
and from the Chinese ends. In his letter of 19 September 1699,
written just after his return to Peking, Bouvet refers briefly to
distractions connected with his return journey to China. Though
Louis XIV had subsidized the initial Jesuit mission of 1685, he
was unwilling to underwrite the sending of additional Jesuits to
China. Since Bouvet had returned to Europe in 1697 not only at
the K’ang-hsi emperor’s request but also to expand the China mis-
sion, his efforts were aimed at finding additional support. Thus
the publication of Portrait historique (1697) was, in part, a propa-
ganda maneuver. The arrangement that Bouvet eventually made
was with a French glass producer in search of profit. This Jean
Jourdan de Groussay agreed to invest in a ship carrying a cargo
of glasswares, and he included passages for several Jesuits only
after Bouvet convinced him of their potential usefulness as nego-
tiators when the cargo arrived in China. Consequently, the ship
Amphitrite brought ten additional Jesuits to the China mission.11
Bouvet probably had some share in selecting these Jesuits.
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Two in particular came to share Bouvet’s interest in the Book of
Changes. Father Joseph Prémare joined Bouvet in developing Fig-
urist theories and later wrote a lengthy study on the manifestation
of Christian dogma in the diagrams of the Book of Changes.12 An-
other member of the group traveling to China on the Amphitrite,
Fr. Jean-Baptiste Régis (Lei Hsiao-szu, 1664–1738) made a Latin
translation of the Book of Changes, even though he was apparently
not a Figurist.13
Before describing more of the Leibniz-Bouvet correspondence,
it may be useful to refer to a piece written by Leibniz that repre-
sents one of several anticipations of similarity between his philos-
ophy and that of China. The setting is a New Year’s letter of 1697
addressed to his patron, Rudolphus Augustus, duke of Brunswick-
Lüneburg-Wolfenbüttel.14 The ostensible purpose of the letter is to
propose the coining of a medallion that would contain Rudolphus
Augustus’ image on one side and the Imagio Creationis (Image of
Creation), an exemplification of the dyadic or binary system, on
the other. The letter provides a glimpse of how Leibniz’ mathemat-
ical ideas intersect with his ecumenical interests in religion and
politics, for Leibniz believes that his binary system presents an in-
stance of how God created the world out of the units of 0 (Nothing)
and 1 (God). It is this process that Leibniz refers to as the “secret
of creation.”
Though he had been told by Grimaldi in Rome that the K’ang-
hsi emperor was being tutored in mathematics and geometry by
Verbiest, Leibniz had received little information regarding China
on which to base his notion of potential similarities between the
hexagrams of the Changes and his binary progression. Yet in the
discussion of the Imagio Creationis, Leibniz says that he has com-
municated his concept of number in the “secret of creation” to
Grimaldi in the hope of appealing to the emperor’s interest in
number.15 He feels that the Chinese response to European mathe-
matics may enable the binary system to operate as a tool, if not to
convert the emperor to Christianity, at least to bring him into some
ecumenical accord with Christian principles by demonstrating the
universal validity of these principles.
Bouvet’s letter of 8 November 1700 from Peking was sent to
the French Jesuit Charles le Gobien with the request that it be
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forwarded to Leibniz. Le Gobien, too, was intimately involved with
the Jesuit mission in China and had authored the Histoire de l’Edit
de l’Empereur de la Chine en faveur de la Religione Chrestienne
(Paris, 1698). In a previous letter,16 Bouvet had described Le Go-
bien’s role as that of a clearing house for the release of Jesuit
reports from China. It was Le Gobien who decided which of the re-
ports were to be released to the public, and consequently it was to
Le Gobien that Leibniz wrote for information on China. Le Gobien
forwarded Bouvet’s letter along with a covering letter dated at Pa-
ris, 10 November 1701. This covering letter mentions the receipt
of a new letter from Bouvet, dated 2 December 1700, announcing
that the K’ang-hsi emperor had accepted the Jesuits’ memorial as
a valid explanation of Chinese rites as of 30 November 1700. In ef-
fect, Le Gobien fully accepts this resolution of a doctrinal question
by the political authority of the Chinese emperor. In supporting
this official acceptance of the Jesuits’ action, Le Gobien notes that
the “senior missionaries,” that is, the Jesuits, have spent the past
thirty or forty years studying this matter at Peking and in consulta-
tion with Chinese savants. Consequently, they would have a better
understanding of the situation than the “new missionaries,” that
is, the non-Jesuit orders, that have resided in China for a mere
twelve to fifteen years and in locales far from the capital. (Actually,
although Le Gobien assumes otherwise, court obligations were fre-
quently a hindrance to comprehension of Chinese culture in that
their official duties kept the Jesuits involved at the Manchu court
and limited their contact with the Chinese literati.) Le Gobien con-
cludes his letter with praise for Leibniz’ Novissima Sinica.
As a stimulus and source of information on China, the Leibniz-
Bouvet correspondence ended when Bouvet’s last letter reached
Leibniz, probably in 1703. Leibniz’ interest in China was still in-
tense and his assimilation of Chinese philosophy would not peak
until his composition of the Discourse in 1716. For this reason, I
place the Leibniz-Bouvet correspondence in an intermediate stage
in the development of Leibniz’ understanding of Confucianism.
There are, however, exceptions to this placement. There are sev-
eral notions about Chinese culture that reached their mature
development in Leibniz’ thought at the time of his exchanges with
Bouvet. These include certain premises of natural theology in re-
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gard to the Chinese that were shaped by Bouvet’s Figurist views.
They also include Leibniz’ ideas on the arithmetical progression
embodied in the diagrams of the Book of Changes. The three let-
ters from Bouvet to Leibniz (8 November 1700, 4 November 1701,
and 8 November 1702) considered in the following section repre-
sent the culmination of the correspondence in that they are the
last letters that Bouvet wrote. More significantly, for the purposes
of this study, these three letters contain most of the basic infor-
mation that Bouvet transmitted to Leibniz on the key subjects of
natural theology and the Book of Changes.
The Letters
Bouvet’s Letter of 8 November 1700
to Le Gobien and Leibniz
Bouvet’s letter of 8 November 1700, forwarded to Leibniz by Le
Gobien, cites the Book of Changes as the oldest work of China and
perhaps of the world. In this position, Bouvet is in accord with sev-
eral modern sinologists who defend the Book of Changes as the
oldest extant Chinese work. Disagreeing with many critics of his
own time, Bouvet praises the Changes as the source of all Chinese
science and of a philosophy perhaps superior to that of contem-
porary Europe. While admiring the text of the Changes, Bouvet
believes that many of the commentaries written on it are full of er-
rors and, expressing a characteristic missionary’s complaint, notes
that a section in the Changes on divination is pure superstition.
Bouvet compares the corpus of the Changes to a precious
residue left from antiquity. Time has since overlaid this corpus
with errors that obscure what the original patriarchs taught to
their descendants. Placing the origins of China back 3000 or 4000
years prior to A.D. 1700, Bouvet refers to Fu Hsi as the first legisla-
tor who composed this famous diagram of 64 figures and 384 lines.
The reference here is to either the circular or the square arrange-
ments in the Prior to Heaven order (Hsien-t’ien tzu-hsü), in which
each of the 64 figures contains six lines. These figures when mul-
tiplied together, yield a total of 384 lines. Bouvet believes that this
diagram summarizes in a Pythagorean fashion the perfected state
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of the sciences of arithmetic, music, astronomy or astrology, medi-
cine, and physics possessed by the Chinese forefathers.
Bouvet detects a great accord between the knowledge of the
Chinese ancients of 4000 years ago and that of Western sages
of antiquity. He claims that the figures of Fu Hsi were invented
as universal symbols for the same purpose as the figures of the
Hermes Trismegistus of the West—that is, to represent these ex-
tremely abstract principles. The many commentaries on the work
written by authors, including Confucius, in the intervening 3000
years, dating from the time when Fu Hsi’s system was understood
down to A.D. 1700, are seen by Bouvet to have merely obscured
the original import of Fu Hsi’s figures. Consequently, he has left
aside all the Chinese commentaries in order to study these figures
as an independent unit and believes he has arrived at a solution by
means of numerical analysis and combination.
Bouvet agrees with other “disciples”—it is not certain whether
the reference here is to Chinese disciples or European Figur-
ists—that Fu Hsi was not a Chinese but a universal figure whose
system comprehends all other sciences. Bouvet and those of his
fellow missionaries known as Figurists had held the view that Fu
Hsi was not a Chinese but the original lawgiver of all mankind.
This lawgiver was said to be recognized in different societies with
different names—Fu Hsi among the Chinese, Hermes Trismegistus
among the Egyptians and Greeks,17 Enoch among the Hebrews,
Zoroaster among the Persians.
Bouvet regards the Prior to Heaven diagram as reflecting a
general method of science that combines three sets of numerical
progressions, geometrical figures and proportions, and laws of
statics designed to order the sciences and make rational God’s
creations. In short, everything is reduced to number, weight, and
measure. The science of this method derives from a system of
numbers, a double set of numbers on a geometrical plane and
solid, linked in such a way as to yield all the harmonies of music.
Furthermore, Bouvet sees the 64 hexagrams and their 384 lines
as representing the harmonies of celestial movement, with all the
necessary principles that explain the nature of all things and the
causes of generation and corruption. In his eyes, all this reinstates
the lost music of China, lost some fifteen to twenty centuries ago,
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and also that of Greece, including the three musical systems of
diatonic, chromatic, and harmonic scales. Detecting a correspon-
dence between the numbers of Fu Hsi and those of Pythagoras
and Plato, Bouvet is led to believe that they stem from the same
system. He notes a further correspondence to the numerical mys-
teries of the Cabala and consequently comes to link the ancient
Chinese philosophy with that of Plato and the ancient Hebrews,
treating them all as the common revelation of the Creator.
Bouvet severely criticizes Maigrot of the Foreign Mission, who
in 1693 as bishop of Conon and vicar apostolic in Fukien had man-
dated all priests of his vicarate to discontinue using the Chinese
t’ien and shang-ti as equivalents for the Christian God. Bouvet
urges that the missionaries, instead of completely rejecting the no-
tion of equivalents, should study the ancient classics associated
with Fu Hsi and Confucius to see how the later Chinese had distor-
ted what was once a religion in consonance with Christianity. This
would be preferable to dwelling on the corruption of these post-
Confucius writings and insisting, as did Maigrot, that the Chinese
abandon these customs as corrupt. Bouvet thinks that such sever-
ity will place an insuperable obstacle in the path of converting
the Chinese and lose a hundred years of missionary effort. The
abortive missionary experience in Japan might well have been in
his thoughts.
Bouvet suggests a gradual and compromising path in spite of
the fact that such a path may be less convenient to the Holy See,
the congregation, and the vicars apostolic.18 He proposes that all
the missionaries join together to study the ancient Chinese classics
and use the Chinese custom of veneration of antiquity to overcome
modern corrupt interpretations of the classics and restore the true
philosophy of Fu Hsi. In the process, “the light of right reason”
would be employed. By rejecting current interpretations of the
classics and proposing what he regards as their original meaning,
Bouvet follows an approach that has traditionally been part of the
Confucian tradition—namely, that of returning to the true mean-
ing of the classics. This search and debate had been under way in
China for over 2,000 years.
Noting the necessary connection between the “true philoso-
phy,” which the Chinese of antiquity had, and the “true religion,”
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which is Christianity, Bouvet thinks that the task of showing the
Chinese the erroneous and superstitious nature of their post-an-
tiquity philosophy is very feasible. Besides involving the literati
in the effort to establish Christianity in China, Bouvet also sug-
gests directing a particular work at the K’ang-hsi emperor. He
conceives of this work as the reestablishment of the sciences of an-
cient China in accordance with the system of Fu Hsi and thinks it
would give the emperor such pleasure that it would be circulated
throughout the realm bearing the force of law. Such an outcome
would both elevate the status of Christianity and also confirm the
common nature of Chinese antiquity with Christianity.
Bouvet’s Letter of 4 November 1701 to Leibniz
Bouvet could have learned of Leibniz’ binary arithmetic through
two sources. The first is Leibniz’ letter to Grimaldi of 20 December
1696 containing a two-page explanation of Leibniz’ binary system
of numerical progression.19 The second source is Leibniz’ letter to
Bouvet of 15 February 1701 written from Braunschweig.20 From
Bouvet’s frequent references to Grimaldi and from his acquain-
tance with the Leibniz-Grimaldi exchanges, we might assume that
Bouvet saw Leibniz’ 1696 letter to Grimaldi. In any case, some-
thing seems to have triggered Bouvet’s enthusiastic response of 4
November 1701. The 1701 and 1702 letters by Bouvet to Leibniz
constitute the more substantial sections of Bouvet’s part in the
correspondence. A letter of 15 February 1701 would seem to have
had just sufficient time to travel from Europe to Peking—delivery
took at least seven months—and to have arrived in time to stimu-
late Bouvet in his response of 4 November 1701.
In the letter of 4 November 1701,21 Bouvet sees Leibniz’
numerical calculus as beneficial to the religious causes of both the
missionaries and ecumenism. He notes the marvelous similarity
between Western and Chinese principles and sees them as hav-
ing a common basis in the science of numbers found in both Fu
Hsi’s diagram and Leibniz’ calculus. He also believes that Fu Hsi’s
numerical system, now lost, explained all the Chinese sciences, in-
cluding those of physical principles and causes of generation and
corruption. Bouvet refers specifically to Leibniz’ numerical table
with its double geometrical progression that corresponds to the
system of Fu Hsi. He then suggests that were Leibniz to continue
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his binary arithmetic from the fifth degree (that is, 00 000 or 32)
to the sixth degree (that is, 000 000 or 64), substitute broken and
unbroken lines for 0 and 1 respectively, and then curve the result
into a circular form, the result would correspond to the circular
arrangement found in Fu Hsi’s Prior to Heaven diagram, of which
Bouvet encloses an example.22 A photographic reproduction of the
diagram that Bouvet enclosed in his letter to Leibniz of 4 Novem-
ber 1701 appears in Diagram 1.
Diagram 1. The Prior to Heaven hexagram order (Hsien-t’ien tzu-hsü).
A reproduction of the diagram that was enclosed with Bouvet’s letter
to Leibniz of 4 November 1701 (Leibnizbriefe 105, pp. 27–28). Cour-
tesy of the Leibniz Gesellschaft, Niedersächsische Landesbibliothek,
Hanover, Germany.
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Although Bouvet stresses a correspondence with the cirular
arrangement of the diagram, he quite clearly intends a correspon-
dence with the rectangular arrangement also, since the latter
consists of the same 64 hexagrams but in a different geometrical
order. Bouvet refers to the broken and unbroken lines 0 and 1 as
“two universal and magical symbols” that contain the principles of
all knowledge. Bouvet describes the second figure in the Prior to
Heaven diagram as a magical square arranged within a circle. This
too is attributed by Bouvet to the authorship of Fu Hsi.
Employing the Prior to Heaven diagram, Bouvet and Leibniz
were able to draw correspondences between its order and the
binary progression by letting a divided line in the hexagram rep-
resent 0 and an undivided line represent 1. A binary progression
is thus derived. For example, k’un , the first hexagram in the
upper left-hand corner of the square arrangement in the Prior to
Heaven diagram, would in the denary system represent 0, which
for purposes of clarification will be represented as 000 000. Fol-
lowing the sequence in the square arrangement, the second hexa-
gram, po , would be 1 in the denary system and 000 001 in the
binary system. The third hexagram, pi , would be 2 and 000
010; kuan would be 3 and 000 011; and so on up to ch’ien
, the sixty-fourth hexagram, which would be 63 in the denary pro-
gression and 111 111 in the binary.
In regard to the square arrangement in the Prior to Heaven dia-
gram, Bouvet and Leibniz diverged from the traditional transfor-
mation of the diagrams, which changes from the bottom upward;
for example, using the traditional transformation, 000 001 would
be rendered as fub instead of po. However, this probably repre-
sents more a sign of the flexibility of the system than ignorance of
the Chinese tradition. Bouvet must have been aware of the more
traditional method, and Leibniz shows in his letter to Des Bosses
of 12 August 1701 that he is capable of counting the lines from the
bottom up.23 It would certainly be consistent with Bouvet’s belief
that the hexagrams contained the key to all ancient Chinese sci-
ences to treat the diagrams in as fluid a manner as possible.
Apparently out of the scientific stimulus he had received in his
Paris and London visits (1672–1676), Leibniz developed his analy-
sis of the dyadic or binary (i.e., base of 2) arithmetical progression
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and in 1679 presented his findings in a paper, De Progressione
Dyadica. In contrast to the binary base, Europeans had been em-
ploying a denary (i.e., base of 10) progression. In his later Expli-
cation, Leibniz holds that a denary base is neither of the highest
antiquity nor is it necessarily superior to other systems, though it
has acquired a certain unique facility among us through habit.24
According to Leibniz, the Greeks and Romans were aware of its
advantages and yet did not utilize it. Leibniz traces its introduc-
tion to Europe via the Spanish Moor influence of Gerbert (d. 1003),
later known as Pope Sylvester II. Apparently, along with it came
the “place value” characteristic that Europe had learned in the six-
teenth century from the Arabs, who in turn trace it back to A.D.
sixth-century Hindus.25 Leibniz based his analysis upon the recog-
nition that certain properties of numerical systems are common
to all numbers and that, while 10 has acquired an easy familiarity
among Europeans, the selection of a base number is in fact rather
arbitrary and need not be 10: it could be 2 or 12 or any number.
Actually, the correspondences Bouvet perceived between Leib-
niz’ binary system and the Prior to Heaven order of the hexagrams
emerge from the basic fluidity of that order, which permits several
possible readings. The square arrangement within the circular
might be read horizontally beginning with k’un from left to right
and from top to bottom, as Bouvet seems to have done; or it might
be read horizontally beginning with ch’ien from right to left and
from bottom to top, as the Neo-Confucian philosopher Shao Yung
(1011–1077) seems to have done. The circular arrangement pre-
sents similar alternatives if one reads the lines of each hexagram
from the center outward. Reading in this way, a binary progression
is made possible by moving counterclockwise in a semicircle, from
k’un at the bottom up through kou , then leaving off and pick-
ing up with fu at the bottom to trace another semicircle by moving
clockwise through ch’ien.
It is interesting to note that the research of Hu Wei
(1633–1714) and other contemporary Chinese scholars was lead-
ing them at this same period to different conclusions. For example,
they attributed the Prior to Heaven diagram not to Chinese antiq-
uity but to the much later creation of Shao Yung of which more
will be said below. In contrast to this, Bouvet thinks the Chinese
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commentators, including Confucius, are very mistaken in their
analyses. Continuing with his letter of 8 November 1700, Bouvet
relates how his discovery of the correspondence between the an-
cient Chinese system and Leibniz’ numerical calculus raised both
his esteem of Leibniz and his hopes that the ancient system of
science might be recovered. There seems little doubt that it also
raised Bouvet’s hopes for converting the Chinese.
Bouvet refers favorably to Leibniz’ plan for a Universal
Characteristic that would represent thoughts in the same way that
universal characters represent laws, calculations, and demonstra-
tions of reason.26 He thinks such a genre would correspond both
to the ancient hieroglyphs of the Cabala and to the characters of
Fu Hsi, which he identifies with the double geometrical system
of Leibniz. One could use this system to order all phenomena in
terms of genus and species in a natural metaphysic. Bouvet offers
the organic metaphor of a genealogical tree proceeding from the
trunk down to the smallest subdivision of a branch. The sign of the
point (·), the simplest sign, represents unity and is the characteris-
tic sign of both the first principle and the transcendent being. The
two genres that arise from the point, or first principles, are per-
fection and imperfection, represented by the binary number of two
points (··) and by the ternary number of three points (···)‚ respec-
tively. Or they can be represented by two lines, one whole line (—)
representing the perfect number and one broken line (– –) repre-
senting the imperfect number.
Bouvet applies the double geometrical progression to colors by
reducing color to the two simplest components of light and dark-
ness and degrees of variation therefrom.27 Light at its most intense
would be white; in a lesser state of intensity, yellow. Shadow at its
most intense would be black; in a lesser state of intensity, blue.
(Bouvet’s emphasis on degrees of variation is very similar to an
emphasis found in Leibniz.) Bouvet correlates these four primary
colors with the eight trigrams by grouping two trigrams with each
primary color. He then introduces these eight trigrams as the fun-
damental figures of Fu Hsi and the foundation of all sciences. In
attributing the trigrams to Fu Hsi, Bouvet is in accord with Chi-
nese researchers of both his own and more modern times. It is by
means of similarities and analogies drawn from the progressions
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found in figures of the Prior to Heaven diagram that Bouvet feels
confident he can explain principles of many types of science.
Bouvet explains the Chinese emphasis on the third (trigram)
order and the sixth (hexagram) order in a very Pythagorean man-
ner by squaring 8, the number of trigrams, to yield 64, the number
of hexagrams or six-lined figures. Bouvet also relates these to
the eight degrees of Aristotelian qualities. In applying the figures
to colors, Bouvet sees sixty-four colors grouped into eight types,
each of which breaks down into eight degrees. The result is that
everything can be translated into a continuum in which one thing
varies only a slight degree from the thing beside it. This is highly
reminiscent of Leibniz’ tendency to view things in terms of grada-
tions. Bouvet holds that what explains colors can also explain all
phenomena. By determining the two simplest elements, one can
explain all species. For example, one might assign 4 to white, 8 to
black, 2 to heat, 6 to cold, 5 to dryness, and 7 to dampness; then
one might refer to the seventh grade or degree of dryness, since
each element in turn breaks down into eight degrees of gradation.
With such a tool, Bouvet believes it is possible to attain a precision
akin to the exactness by which one refers to the 360th part of a
circle or to a celestial sign as the twelfth part of the zodiac.
Bouvet calls Fu Hsi the prince of philosophers and thinks that
if Aristotle and other great Western philosophers were viewed
from the right perspective, the fundamental similarity of their
ideas would be understood. Quickly moving to cut off any suspicion
that he is elevating China over his “dear fatherland” Europe,
Bouvet holds that European attainments are superior to modern
Chinese achievements and again puts forth the proposition that
Fu Hsi was not Chinese, but a universal figure. He identifies Fu
Hsi with such characters of the Levant as Zoroaster, Enoch, and
Hermes Trismegistus and draws support for this identity from an
analysis of several Chinese hieroglyphs and even from the name
Fu Hsi itself. Bouvet rightly points out that the character fua is
composed of the character for man (jena) and for dog (ch’üan).
Bouvet thus interprets fu as meaning man-god, or the wise dog
who comes and searches out causes and principles, and claims
that Hermes Trismegistus is also represented by the head of a dog
on a human body.28 He interprets the character for the name Hsia
as referring to sacrifice and to Fu Hsi’s role as the director of
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sacrifices. This claim is supported by a closely related term, hsib,
which refers to sacrificial victims. Bouvet also claims that Fu Hsi
is referred to by the alternative name “Taï-hao,” a term he inter-
prets as signifying “thrice great,” the same meaning assigned to
the name Trismegistus.
Bouvet notes that if we believe Chinese chronology, Fu Hsi
lived 4600 years ago—once more a variation in Bouvet’s chrono-
logical placement of Fu Hsi—and his work represents the oldest
monument on earth. Bouvet associates such antiquity with an
awareness of the Creation and sees this awareness reflected in the
six degrees (i.e., lines) of generation, representing the six days of
labor, and then the lapse into the mystery of the seventh, corre-
sponding with the Sabbath. Bouvet further notes that according to
Fu Hsi, Heaven and Earth are said to be the first degree of natural
production, akin to the unbroken and broken lines in the diagrams.
He quotes a passage from the Record of Rites (Li Chi)—“T’ai-i fen
erh kuei t’ien-ti”—and translates it as “the great unity, or to say
the same thing, the triple unity (for the two hieroglyphs t’ai-i con-
tain these three meanings) is the principle of Heaven and Earth.”
A less trinitarian rendering might be: “The Supreme Unity divides
and forms Heaven and Earth.”29
To show that this t’ai-i (Supreme Unity) is equivalent to the
supreme deity, shang-ti, Bouvet cites the Shih chi (Historical
records) of Ssu-ma Ch’ien (145–90 B.C.). Here, Bouvet claims, it is
said that in ancient times one sacrificed and offered victims of the
first order to t’ai-i, which is the same as the Maximal One.30 Bouvet
then presents the radical claims that eventually became known as
the Figurist view. He states that the ancient Chinese understanding
included not only seeing God as Creator and Principle of all nat-
ural things, but also encompassed the mystery of the Holy Trinity.
Bouvet claims that there are numerous passages in ancient Chi-
nese books that confirm a knowledge of sin, the punishment of evil,
angels, the first man (i.e., Adam), the corruption of human nature
by sin, the Flood, the Incarnation of Christ to come, and Christ’s
redemption of man. In short, Bouvet states that at one time in the
past, China had a very clear conception of the Divinity.31
Bouvet believes there is a technique present in the construction
of Chinese characters that was developed not by the Chinese but by
the ancient fathers of the world. To support his point, he postulates
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similarities in sound and meaning between the most ancient Chi-
nese characters and the Egyptian language, and he believes these
similarities are still apparent in spite of historical alterations in the
language. Even the most tolerant reader would hesitate over the
sweeping nature of such comparisons, but Bouvet promises that
should he find the time, he will make some “surprising” remarks on
these similarities. (Unfortunately, he never found the time.)
Bouvet explains that distractions have prevented the French
Jesuits from carrying out their plan of sending yearly messages
to Europe explaining the Chinese science and other matters, but
he is hopeful that the situation will shortly improve. He expresses
the wish that Leibniz will communicate his own discoveries and
those of his academy so that the missionaries will have tools with
which to destroy the demonic empire and establish Christ’s realm
in China. On the concept of using knowledge as a tool for reli-
gion, Bouvet and Leibniz agree. In this regard, they reflect the
optimism toward potential fruits to be harvested from the applica-
tion of knowledge, a view symptomatic of the emerging European
Enlightenment.
Apparently in response to Leibniz’ request for information on
the Chinese language, Bouvet answers that Fr. Claude de Visde-
lou (Liu Ying, 1656–1737) is in the early stages of translating a
Chinese dictionary into a European language. He adds that he him-
self would like to write an analysis of the language, but it would
distract him from more important duties involving religion and sci-
ence. Bouvet notes that as soon as the dictionary being translated
from Chinese into Tartar (i.e. Manchu) is completed, missionaries
will render it into Latin or French. One wonders whether Bouvet
eventually participated in this project and whether the result is the
dictionary that is said to rest among his manuscripts in the library
collection at Le Mans, France.32
Speaking as a proselytizer, Bouvet stresses the need to wait
for the right moment to introduce their discovery (i.e., the connec-
tion between numbers and creation) to the K’ang-hsi emperor. But
the emperor is not as accessible to Bouvet now as he was earlier
when he was indulging his fascination for European science with
Jesuit tutors. Bouvet requests further information on Leibniz’ the-
ory so that he will have sufficient knowledge to make the full case
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the emperor will demand. He explains that since returning from
his trip of 1697–1699 to Europe, his only direct service to the em-
peror has been working with three other Jesuits, among them Fr.
Antoine Thomas (An Tuo, 1644–1709), constructing a map to in-
clude the imperial hunting grounds.
In response to overly optimistic claims by certain Europeans,
and to the questions of a Mr. Scrokins and Fr. Kochanski—at Leib-
niz’ suggestion, Kochanski submitted a list of questions to Bouvet
in 169733—Bouvet gives the sobering reply that the emperor can-
not read any European language. Once, Bouvet relates, the em-
peror and the crown prince showed enough curiosity to have the
letters of the alphabet written for them and to have the mission-
aries read from a European book, but never with the desire of
learning the language. On the other hand, the emperor and some of
his children have found European numerals simpler than the Chi-
nese for calculation and so they use a table of sines and logarithms
modeled by Bouvet on those used in France. Ever conscious of a
universal logic of arts and sciences, Bouvet argues that if one could
grasp the logical connection Bouvet and Leibniz presume to ex-
ist among the Chinese characters, the Chinese language could be
used without the tiresome study the language now requires.
Bouvet concludes this letter with analyses of several Chinese
characters that he claims have been in use by Oriental philoso-
phers for 4500 years. These characters signify the Sovereign Be-
ing, the equivalent of the Christian God, which they recognized and
worshipped in that time. Bouvet begins with his very Pythagorean
premise that the arithmetical and geometrical basis of all Chinese
science is reflected in the construction of the Chinese character
for the deity. It should be noted, however, that “arithmetical” and
“geometrical” are not necessarily synonymous; at least one inter-
preter of the Book of Changes disagrees with Bouvet and Leibniz
and claims that the progression found in the Changes is arithmeti-
cal rather than geometrical (see the appendix).
Bouvet holds that the signs of the point (·) and unity (—) are
the two simplest elements to be imagined. Bouvet’s claim that in
antiquity the character represented by the point and pronounced
“chua” expressed the idea of master or Sovereign Lord is sup-
ported by the identity of this character with the more modern
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chub, which bears a similar meaning. Bouvet again invokes the
quotation from the Record of Rites (Li Chi)—“T’ai-i fen erh kuei
t’ien-ti”—to signify that t’ai represents the many and i the one and
that together they represent the number three or triple unity. To
support this notion, Bouvet quotes a phrase from an unspecified
Chinese dictionary, “T’ai-i han-san” (The Great Source contains
a unity), to make the point that the one and the many certainly
involve a trinity. Furthermore, Bouvet holds that the character
t’ai is composed of ta (great) plus the point chu (master) and to-
gether signifies “one, three together (i.e., trinity) greatest.” When
ta (great) is combined with the word for unity, i, the result is
t’ien (Heaven), in the archetypal or spiritual rather than material
sense. Historically speaking, t’ai-i was originally a Taoist term. It is
said to have first appeared in Eastern Chou dynasty (770–221 B.C.)
literature, where it had the same meaning as tao. It was later intro-
duced into the Han dynasty (206 B.C.–A.D. 221) state religion and
associated with the great sacrifice by the emperor on T’ai moun-
tain.34
Bouvet refers to the characters ti and shang-ti as being the
most commonly used in referring to the Sovereign Lord. Bouvet
analyzes ti to be composed of lic, which he interprets as “first
established,” and chin, a standard or sign of authority. Bouvet in-
terprets this as referring to God’s sovereign authority in the world.
He next analyzes the characters chub and tsai. Chub (master) is
composed of Wanga (king) and the point chua (master). The hiero-
glyph tsai is composed of mien (which signifies a cover in the form
of a roof and denotes Heaven) and shih, located at the bottom of
the character. This same figure, according to Bouvet, signifies the
number 10 for the Chinese, the Egyptians, and the Romans. Bou-
vet claims that shih signifies the universality of all things, just as
Pythagoras represented all things by the four figures 1, 2, 3, 4,
which together total 10. The third element of the character is found
in the middle and, as above, is lic denoting building and elevation.
Bouvet’s Letter of 8 November 1702
and Leibniz’ “Explication”
Bouvet’s letter of 8 November 1702 is considerably briefer than
that of 4 November 1701, perhaps because he had not yet received
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Leibniz’ reply to his last letter.35 In the opening lines, Bouvet re-
lates that during the past year he has continued his study of the
Chinese classics and has discovered in them a great similarity with
religion. He says they use a path that can easily and naturally lead
not only to comprehension of the Creator and natural religion but
also to understanding of Jesus Christ and difficult Christian truths.
He holds that a near-complete system of the true religion is to be
found in the Confucian classics and that this system includes the
mysteries of the incarnation of the Word, the life and death of the
Savior and the principal functions of the latter’s holy ministry con-
tained in prophetic manner (prophetic because the classics were
written before the birth of Christ).
For nearly 2000 years, Bouvet believes, the Chinese have been
without any knowledge of the true God because they have lost
both the hieroglyphic significance of these characters and also the
wisdom of the classics. Ultimately, he contends, only a superficial
part of the doctrine has been perpetuated. The essence of this lost
knowledge is universal, predating the Chinese as a race. The Chi-
nese have conserved this essence more faithfully than any other
(gentile) tradition. Here Bouvet’s call is to the true meaning of
the classics, an appeal that has always commanded respect among
Confucianists and has been a key concern in a continuing debate
at the core of the Confucian tradition.
Bouvet discusses the way in which the Chinese, like the
Greeks, have distorted their original history from Fu Hsi down to
Confucius. He feels that they have couched this period in a histori-
cal allegory or historical poem in order to better explain the system
of ancient religion. Within this context, he sees two paths. Some
have abandoned the ancient traditions, corrupted their manners,
and constructed a religion reflecting the disorder of their pas-
sions. (It is not certain to what extent this reference goes beyond
the atheistic tendencies that developed within Confucian tradi-
tion to encompass the Taoist and Buddhist beliefs.) Others have
tried to maintain the purity of the original doctrine and to this
end have preserved many of the ancient practices of religion. This
may be seen in a precise analysis of the hieroglyphs the ancients
employed to embody the principles of arithmetic, geometry, astron-
omy, astrology, music, metaphysics, physics, and so forth. Bouvet
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concedes the still flimsy nature of some of his ideas but notes that
he has had success with testing several of them, particularly those
mentioned in his letter to Leibniz of the previous year, 1701.
Bouvet reemphasizes the importance of his common interests
with Leibniz in understanding antiquity and analyzing the charac-
ters of language. In praising Leibniz’ knowledge in this area, he
asks that Leibniz recommend to Fr. Verjus books that might be
helpful in this task.36 He briefly cites a plan to compile a new set
of commentaries to the Chinese classics and a new dictionary, all
of which, he feels, would substantiate his theories on reestablish-
ing the ancient and universal sciences of China, once synonymous
with the natural law of religion. To this end, he will need the assis-
tance of several fellow missionaries, and he asks that Leibniz use
his influence with Frs. Verjus and La Chaise to help secure funds
from the French court for this project.
The extent to which Leibniz was influenced by Bouvet’s letters
is documented in the short piece by Leibniz entitled Explication
de l’arithmétique binaire, which appeared in a 1703 edition of Mé-
moires de l’Académie des sciences.37 This essay begins with a brief
presentation of his dyadic or binary mathematics, which he calls a
“double geometrical progression.” There follows a presentation of
some similarities between his dyadic and the 4000-year-old lines
of Fu Hsi. Leibniz’ material is taken almost entirely from Bouvet’s
letters, particularly from that of 4 November 1701. (The “Explica-
tion” text mistakenly dates this letter 14 November.) Aside from
his statement that the Chinese have been without the true sig-
nificance of Fu Hsi’s diagrams for over a thousand years—Bouvet
places the loss as being close to 3000 years in duration—Leibniz
presents Bouvet’s ideas accurately.
Leibniz presents two bases for establishing similarities be-
tween certain Chinese and European notions and their universal-
ity. The first is in regard to numbers and the second concerns
language. Besides sending Bouvet a description of his dyadic,
Leibniz had also sent a description of his plan for a Universal
Characteristic, and Bouvet’s analysis of certain ancient Chinese
characters indicates that he is in accord with Leibniz’ ideas on the
matter. In his paper, Leibniz seems more cautious than Bouvet in
asserting that the Chinese language possesses such logical bases
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in its structure; however, he hopes that Bouvet is right and that the
Chinese characters will yield evidence of a logical system which
operates in a manner akin to calculation. This hope was probably
stimulated by the recognition that European knowledge of Leibniz’
day was attributing to Hermes Trismegistus the invention of num-
ber and language just as Bouvet was attributing origins of number
and language to Fu Hsi.
In his presentation of the Universal Characteristic in the man-
uscript Scientia Generalis. Characteristica38, Leibniz uses demon-
stration rather than experiment although he considers both to be
paths to certain knowledge. He seeks to construct an “alphabet
of human thought” that will function as a type of calculus and
likens this language to the arithmetic of Pythagorean numbers or
a Cabala of mystic vocables. Leibniz distinguishes between contin-
gent truths, which involve truths of fact and whose demonstration
requires an infinite analysis capable only by God, and necessary
truths or truths of reason, whose demonstration involves a finite
analysis within the range of human ability. Leibniz implies that
this Universal Characteristic will involve truths of a necessary na-
ture, but that careful construction of a system of characters is
necessary to make them amenable to calculation. By “signs” Leib-
niz means the symbols our thoughts use to signify things—for
example, words and letters, chemical, astronomical, and Chinese
figures; hieroglyphs; musical, cryptographic, arithmetical, and al-
gebraic notions. By “characters” Leibniz means signs that are
written, drawn, or carved.
Leibniz plans a system of characters capable of such precise
calculation that mental error would be equivalent to an error of
computation. In a rather incredible, if not, to modern minds, naïve
view, Leibniz speaks of a result in which philosophical disputation
would be replaced by a smooth exchange between two computers.
In this context, discussing philosophy would be akin to sitting down
with one’s abacus and calling to a friend: “Let us calculate.” Ob-
viously such a situation would be ideally suited to an academy of
scholars whose origins might transcend national lines. Referring
in addition to his ecumenical plans, Leibniz believes it is hopeless
to think of resolving controversies among the sects—religious and
philosophical sects tend to converge in Leibnizian philoso-
LEIBNIZ AND BOUVET 61
phy—until complex reasonings can thus be reduced to simple cal-
culations and vague words delineated by precise characters.39
Bouvet, Leibniz, and the Book of Changes
The Book of Changes has a continuous tradition of commentaries
that revolve around the twin themes of divination and philosophy.
Sometimes one theme will dominate over the other, as in the
case of the Sung Neo-Confucian philosopher Chu Hsi, who inter-
preted the Changes more as a divinatory than philosophical text.40
The somewhat earlier Neo-Confucian philosopher, Shao Yung
(1011–1077) emphasized the philosophical significance. Bouvet
made little use of this particular commentarial tradition.
The significance of Bouvet’s omission appears when one con-
siders the tradition as it stood at Bouvet’s time. Seventeenth-cen-
tury Chinese scholarship was undergoing a revival of an intensive
textual study devoting considerable effort to the Changes. In about
1661, Huang Tsung-hsi (1610–1695) wrote I-hsüeh hsiang shu-lun
(A treatise on the symbols and numbers of Changes-learning). This
work, in six chapters, attempted to sort out actual origins from
the legendary ones attributed by Sung thinkers to certain dia-
grams of the Changes. Though several studies were written on
the Changes, perhaps the most influential was that of Hu Wei
(1633–1714) entitled I-t’u ming-pien (An elucidation of the dia-
grams of the Changes) in ten chapters (1706). This work is of
particular interest because it was completed while Hu was resid-
ing in the same city, Peking, and apparently at the same time,
around 1700, as Bouvet when he was writing the above-cited letter
to Leibniz.41 Furthermore, during his stay of 1699–1701, in Peking,
Hu frequently discussed his ideas with prominent official literati
such as Li Kung, Chin Te-ch’un, and Wan Ssu-t’ung, the latter of
whom was writing a preface to Hu’s I-t’u ming-pien. These discus-
sions would indicate that the Book of Changes was a prominent
topic of interest among Chinese literati contemporary to Bouvet,
yet Bouvet gives little indication of having been in touch with such
contemporary interest.
Another sign of Bouvet’s isolation from life outside the court
appears in his letter to Leibniz of 19 September 1699 where
he states that Manchu is the dominant language in the Chinese
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empire. Actually, the Manchus represented a small and isolated
warrior elite in a nation of over 100 million. Very few Chinese
learned Manchu, but Manchus increasingly learned Chinese. This
phenomena is a recurring one in Chinese history, where military
and political conquerers of China are in the end “conquered”
by Chinese culture. Unless Bouvet is speaking of anything but a
purely “official” and court dominance of the Manchu language, his
statement is misleading.
These signs indicate the extent to which the Jesuits at Peking
were isolated from literate Chinese society. In contrast, Jesuits who
worked in the Chinese provinces were frequently in close touch
with a wide range of literati thinking. This was certainly the case
with Joseph Prémare, S. J., Bouvet’s fellow Figurist.42 The isolation
of Jesuits at the imperial court was furthered by Chinese loyalty
to the Ming dynasty, a native Chinese dynasty displaced in 1644.
Among Chinese scholars there was a strong resistance to partic-
ipating in the intellectual life of the new rulers who represented
an alien northern race. These Manchus, like all foreign peoples, in-
cluding Europeans, were barbarians who had to prove their civiliz-
ed status in order to be even partially accepted in Chinese eyes.
Feeling a sense of insecurity and cultural inferiority in their new
hegemony, the Manchus sought to establish their credentials by
embracing traditional forms of Chinese culture, which consisted
predominantly of Sung Neo-Confucianism. In this practice they
continued the policies of the Ming rulers who had institutionalized
Sung Neo-Confucian commentaries on the classics as the basis of
the civil service examinations. But the vital and creative intellec-
tual life of learned Chinese was reacting against Neo-Confucianism
and the speculative textual studies of Sung Neo-Confucianism.
In the renewed search for the “true” meaning of the classics
among Chinese literati, there arose an emphasis on careful and
extensive textual research that was particularly apparent in ref-
erence to the Book of Changes. Isolated in the court life of the
Manchus and a growing but still limited number of Chinese col-
laborators, Bouvet and the other Jesuits were apparently cut off
from this new research on the Book of Changes. Consequently, it
appears that Bouvet had limited contact with the critics of Neo-
Confucianism and did not understand that the Prior to Heaven
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hexagram order, which he believed to be the work of the ancient
Fu Hsi, was probably the unique rearrangement of the Neo-Confu-
cianist Shao Yung.
Hu Wei must be seen as one of these critics of Neo-Confucian-
ism. In contrast to the approach of Bouvet, who ignored previous
Chinese commentaries on the Changes as misleading, Hu Wei
takes his essential task to be that of sorting out the original cor-
pus of the Changes from contributions by later commentators. To
this end, his work—unlike that of Bouvet, or even of Longobardi
or Sainte-Marie—is arranged with sections of extensive quotations
from these commentaries, followed by sections containing Hu
Wei’s own comments and conclusions on the given issue. The work
is divided into ten chapters, each of which takes up a specific dia-
gram or set of diagrams such as the River diagram, the diagrams
associated with the Five Forces and Nine Colors, the Dragon dia-
gram, and so forth. The sixth and seventh chapters, however,
pursue the Prior to Heaven diagrams of the Changes, and the
eighth chapter considers the diagrams of the Posterior to Heaven
learning. In the seventh chapter, is found the same Prior to Heaven
diagram that Bouvet sent to Leibniz.43
Hu aligns the theories on change of King Wen, the duke of
Chou, and Confucius with the original theories of Fu Hsi.44 How-
ever, he thinks that beginning with the Han period, certain Taoist
elements had become confused with the original body of the
Changes. In particular, he believes that from the time of the Sung
dynasty notions of change associated with these three—Lao-tzu
(the supposed originator of Taoism), Lieh-tzu (a Taoist author who
shares with his work of debatable origin and authenticity), and
Ch’en T’uan (who lived circa 906–989 and was a famous practi-
tioner of Taoist immortality techniques)—have been used to inter-
pret Fu Hsi’s work rather than the more rightful notions of King
Wen, the duke of Chou, and Confucius.
In Hu’s view, Confucius held that numbers and words make up
the entire content of the Changes and that heavenly images and
calendrical calculations, which assume such great importance in
the views of Taoists, are not involved. Hu further describes Con-
fucius as maintaining that the changes operate through processes
whereby the even numbers 2, 4, and 8 are generated. A view of
creation associated with the double geometrical progression of a
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numerical sequence involving 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, and on into infin-
ity is not a product of the ancient Chinese sages, such as Fu Hsi,
but of the mathematical learning or numerology of Shao Yung.
Hu cites Chu Hsi to the effect that Shao Yung’s mathematical
learning stems from the Taoist Ch’en T’uan, who mistakenly iden-
tified the Taoist Great Origin learning with the learning of the
ancient sages. Hu holds that Ch’eng I was the last scholar to
emphasize the “Ten Wings” (ten appendices) of the Changes and
therefore able to distinguish the Huang-Lao (Yellow Emperor–Lao-
tzu) elements of Taoism, which had become mixed with the original
Changes, from authentic elements derived from the ancient sages.
As a result, Ch’eng I was able to see the Prior to Heaven diagram
as a Taoist addition and to separate it from the original text of the
Changes. Hu maintains that since the end of the Sung and early
Yüan periods, no one else has made such a separation. He attempts
to correct this lapse.
Since Hu’s work denies both Fu Hsi’s authorship in the Prior
to Heaven diagram and a double geometrical progression in the
original Changes diagrams, Bouvet could hardly agree with his po-
sition without altering some of his own theories. If one applies
Hu’s conclusions, then Bouvet’s claim to having discovered the
original meaning of the Changes diagrams must be translated into
a discovery of a much later, and Taoist-influenced, corruption of
these diagrams.
Even though Hu’s work was based on careful textual research,
it hardly represents the final word on the diagrams of the Changes.
It does, however, represent a significant contribution to studies of
the Changes and at least demands an answer. If Hu’s work be-
trays a weakness of abstractive powers that typifies many works of
Ch’ing philological scholarship, perhaps Bouvet’s and particularly
Leibniz’, powers in this area could have provided valuable rebut-
tals to certain of Hu’s points. Unfortunately, the evidence gives no
grounds for assuming that Bouvet was even aware of Hu’s theories,
and consequently the problem was never presented to Leibniz. We
are left with pieces that only imply their roles in a larger puzzle.
Leibniz’ Last Words on the Book of Changes
From 1706 to 1716, Leibniz carried on a an extensive correspon-
dence in Latin with Bartholomew des Bosses, a Jesuit theologian
LEIBNIZ AND BOUVET 65
who had a great interest in mathematics.45 The correspondence
is marked by frequent references to the China mission, and an
enclosure within his letter to Des Bosses dated 12 August 1709
is particularly significant of Leibniz’ attempt to synthesize what
he had received from his Chinese interpreters. In the enclosure,
which may have been written as early as 1701, Leibniz cites a
collection of writings received and published by the directors of
the Society of Foreign Missions seminary, a missionary group un-
sympathetic to the Chinese rites and to Jesuit methods in China.
The writings include references to the debate among Jesuit mis-
sionaries in China shortly after Ricci’s death in 1610 in which
Longobardi, then head of the Jesuit mission, arranged to have
both sides of the question presented. On the side unsympathetic to
Chinese rites were Frs. Francesco Pasio (Pa Yung-lo, 1554–1612),
Jean Ruiz (João Rodrigues; Lu Jo-han, 1561–1633), and Sabatino
de Ursis (Hsiung San-pa, 1575–1620).46 The side sympathetic to
Chinese rites included Frs. Diego de Pantoja (P’ang Hsün-yang,
1571–1620) and Alfonso Vagnoni (Wang Yi-yüan, 1566–1640). Leib-
niz states that those who followed Longobardi’s position held that
the Chinese recognized no incorporeal things and consequently
were unaware of gods, angels, and souls; moreover, they claimed
the Chinese shang-ti was not equivalent to the Christian God.
In a preview of the argument later developed in far greater
detail in his Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese,
Leibniz cites and then rejects the argument of those unsympa-
thetic to the Chinese rites. He describes them as believing that the
Chinese have known no spirituality and that things emerge from
the principle t’ai-chi, which contains li, defined as the prime ma-
terial and substance of a thing, and ch’i (primitive ether), defined
as approximating matter. (The questionable validity of these defin-
itions is discussed in the following chapters.)
After some discussion, Leibniz gives his reasons for rejecting
these views. He believes it is insufficient to claim that the Chinese
lack equivalences to Christianity because their texts lack refer-
ences to incorporeal substances or rewards in another life. Even
the Old Testament contains little reference to incorporeal sub-
stances or such rewards. Furthermore, he claims that the Chinese
would not have cultivated either ancestors or good merit without
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having some understanding of the power of giving thanks to a
supreme force. Leibniz maintains that the ancient Chinese did
teach of divine things and spirits.
In a technique much duplicated in the later Discourse, Leibniz
borrows part of Longobardi’s interpretation, though not his con-
clusion, to see t’ai-chi, li, and ch’i as corresponding to a Christian
or Platonic Trinity in which t’ai-chi represents the power or first
principle, li the knowledge of ideas or essences, and ch’i the will
or love that is called spirit. Li is taken as a source of emanations
for which a fountain metaphor is proposed. In further discus-
sion of the equivalences between the “philosophy,” by which he
means natural theology, of ancient China and Christianity, Leib-
niz presents a brief analysis of correspondences between Fu Hsi’s
recognition of the origin of things out of the binary units of one (—)
and nothing (– –) and the Christian view of Creation which Leibniz
sees represented in his binary progression of 1 and 0.
Through the detection of this correspondence, Leibniz implies
that he and Bouvet have helped resolve the Rites Controversy,
which was then under way in Europe and stood as a direct obstacle
to Leibniz’ ecumenical plans. However, writing in 1710 to Des
Bosses,47 Leibniz bemoans Bouvet’s failure to continue their col-
laboration and to supply further information he has requested.
Since Bouvet has sent no letter explaining the sixteen Chinese
volumes he has received, Leibniz complains that he is unable to
decipher the content of these works.48 With this lapse in communi-
cation from Bouvet, Leibniz’ sources of information on China were
diminishing. It was only with the arrival in late 1715 of copies of
the treatises by Longobardi and Sainte-Marie and their generous
quotations from the Chinese classics that Leibniz was stimulated
into his most philosophically substantial work on China—the Dis-
course on the Natural Theology of the Chinese.
Leibniz’ last written words on the diagrams of the Changes ap-
pear in the concluding sections of the Discourse. There he adds lit-
tle to what he had synthesized in his “Explication” of 1703, except
for specifying several other scholars also engaged in the pursuit of
understanding Chinese culture. These include the German Andreas
Müller, who investigated the meaning of the Chinese characters,
and the Arab Abdalla Beidavaeus, who wrote on Chinese mathe-
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matics.49 In explaining the similarity between his binary mathema-
tics and Fu Hsi’s diagrams, Leibniz refers to his former teacher, the
Pythagoreanist Erhard Weigel of Jena.50 Leibniz also makes a criti-
cism that resembles the criticisms of Hu Wei and could conceivably
refer to several of the same Taoists whom Hu criticized: Leibniz
states that those Chinese who lost the true significance of the
Changes diagrams deviated from their real meaning by interpret-
ing them in terms of strange symbols and hieroglyphs.51
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4
The Discourse on Chinese
Philosophy: Part I
The Work and Its Stimulus
The direct stimulus for Leibniz’ writing of the Discourse on the
Natural Theology of the Chinese came from Nicholas Remond,
chief counsel to the duke of Orleans and a follower of Nicholas
Malebranche (1638–1715). Inspired by a reading of Leibniz’
Theodicy, Remond initiated a correspondence by writing a letter
of praise to Leibniz in 1713.1 In a letter of 12 October 1714, Re-
mond states that he has read Longobardi’s Religion Treatise and
asks for Leibniz’ opinion on it.2 He appears to raise the possi-
bility of Leibniz composing a formal treatise when he mentions
having read Nicholas Malebranche’s Entretien d’un philosophe
chrétien et d’un philosophe chinois sur l’existence et la nature de
Dieu (A conversation between a Christian philosopher and a Chi-
nese philosopher on the existence and nature of God) of 1708.
When Remond repeats his request for an opinion from Leibniz
on the Longobardi treatise, Leibniz replies that he has not yet
seen the treatise by Longobardi and Malebranche.3 Consequently,
with his letter of 4 September 1715, Remond sends copies of
Longobardi’s Religion Treatise, Malebranche’s Conversation, and
Sainte-Marie’s Mission Treatise to Leibniz.
In a letter of 4 November 1715,4 Leibniz refers to the Longob-
ardi and Sainte-Marie treatises Remond had sent him, but he gives
no signs of actually composing the treatise. These signs come in
his letter of 17 January 1716, where he speaks of having composed
an entire discourse on the theology of the Chinese that touches
upon God, spirits, and the soul.5 Ten days later, Leibniz states
that he has finished his Discourse, a small treatise which he com-
pares in length to that by Malebranche.6 In March, however, he is
speaking of the need for a bit more work in order to complete the
Discourse.7 By November Leibniz was dead, and I have seen no ev-
idence that he ever sent the Discourse to Remond. The only extant
original appears to be the manuscript written in Leibniz’ own hand
and presently on file in the Leibniz archives at Hanover.
The Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese—also
known as the Letter on Chinese Philosophy—is a work of thirty-
two manuscript pages in folio that compares in length to Leibniz’
important Discourse on Metaphysics.8 Leibniz divided the work in-
to four sections that deal with Chinese conceptions of (1) God, (2)
the creation by God of matter and spirits, (3) the human soul, its
immortality, and its rewards and punishments, and (4) the charac-
ters and binary arithmetic of Fu Hsi. The evidence offers some
support for concluding that the fourth section was added after a
lapse in composition.9 At any rate, Leibniz’ concern with God and
God’s process of creation is reflected in the fact that these first
two sections occupy three-fourths of the total length of the Dis-
course. Christian Kortholt, who edited the first published version
of the Discourse, made editorial divisions of the work into seventy-
five subsections, an arrangement that has been followed by later
editors.10
Throughout the treatise, the chief protagonists are Frs. Longo-
bardi and Sainte-Marie. Leibniz begins by referring to the fun-
damental and parallel themes of the Chinese ancients versus the
moderns and Ricci versus Longobardi. In contrast to Ricci’s “ac-
commodation” theory (Discourse 1)11, which stressed the Chinese
ancients and the similarity of their doctrine to the True Law of
Christianity, Longobardi emphasized dissimilarities to the True
Law he found in the doctrines of contemporary Chinese. Reflecting
his sensitivity to politics, Leibniz treats Longobardi’s preoccupa-
tion with criticizing the contemporary Chinese as a result of the
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chaos of his age, which has since been pacified with the authority
of a new “prince” (that is, the K’ang-hsi emperor) and the many
capable people of his court (Discourse 1).12 The reference here is
to the chaos of the late Ming period: the dynasty was collapsing
under the pressure of internal struggles among cliques and eu-
nuchs and also external pressure from peasant secret societies,
pirates on the southeastern coast, and aggressive Manchus on the
northern border. The dates of Longobardi’s and Sainte-Marie’s re-
spective treatises, about 1600 and 1668, parallel the protracted
turbulence of the transition from the Ming to the Ch’ing dynasties,
which occupied most of the seventeenth century.
In aligning himself with authorities such as Martino Martini
who follow Ricci’s position, Leibniz notes that they have persisted
in the face of opposition not only from other missionaries but also
from Chinese mandarins. They have done so not only because of
the inherent logic of their argument but also because the Chinese
classical texts support their view. (Leibniz notes here that his ex-
amination has been limited to doctrine and does not extend to
ceremony and cultic rites.) It is here that we come to the funda-
mental importance of the Discourse as a document that records
the transmission of concepts from Chinese classical texts directly
to a prominent European philosopher via missionary mediaries.
The Discourse offers an unusual opportunity for evaluating this
transmission and assessing early eighteenth century European un-
derstanding of Chinese philosophy and religion.
In the Discourse 3,13 Leibniz concedes that since the extracts
from Chinese documents available to Europeans are still limited,
any judgment of their doctrines must remain provisional. Since
Leibniz has drawn his conclusions from Longobardi’s and Sainte-
Marie’s translated extracts, however, and since these extracts
have been used to support conclusions contrary to his own, Leibniz
notes that Longobardi and Sainte-Marie could hardly be accused
of biasing the argument by selecting extracts to flatter Leibniz’
argument. Perhaps this approach helps explain why Leibniz does
not directly refer to a more complete set of extracts from Chinese
classical texts contained in Confucius Sinarum Philosophus, a doc-
ument produced by a group of Jesuits at Paris in 1687. At any
rate, Leibniz thinks that Chinese antiquity predates that of Europe
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and contains a “natural theology” or knowledge of God derived
simply from observation of nature, and that this characteristic, to-
gether with an admirable moral exterior, has fostered a China that
in many ways surpasses Europe.
The Chinese Sources
In his Discourse, Leibniz cites seven Chinese texts: Book of
Changes, Book of History, Book of Odes, Analects, Doctrine of the
Mean, Compendium and Comprehensive Mirror.14 Putting aside
the Book of Changes and the Comprehensive Mirror, to which he
makes only passing mention, Leibniz uses the indirect sources of
Longobardi’s Religion Treatise and Sainte-Marie’s Mission Trea-
tise to draw upon five important Chinese texts. The texts associ-
ated with Neo-Confucianism—the Compendium, the Mean, and the
Analects—are cited most often. The choices are ironic since Leib-
niz expresses a strong preference for Chinese antiquity and the
older or classical Confucianism.
The Compendium—more fully, the Great Compendium of
Natural and Moral Philosophy (Hsing-li ta-ch’üan shu)—is cited
most often by Leibniz. It represents an anthology drawn from
the Neo-Confucian school associated with the Sung dynasty (A.D.
960–1280) philosophers Ch’eng I (I-ch’uan, 1033–1108) and Chu
Hsi (1130–1200) and symbolizes the Ch’eng-Chu school of the
Hsing-li (natural and moral, or more literally, human nature and
principle) philosophy, from which the complete Compendium title
derives. The work was compiled in 1415 under the direction of
Hu Kuang (1370–1418) at the order of the Yung-lo emperor (r.
1402–1424). The latter’s wish to filter out certain politically un-
desirable elements from Sung Neo-Confucianism had resulted in
the production of three new anthologies: (1) the above-cited Com-
pendium, (2) the Ssu-shu ta-ch’üan (Great compendium of the four
books), and (3) Wu-ching ta-ch’üan (Great compendium of the five
classics). These three, but particularly the Compendium, became
the basis of all civil service examinations. The Compendium is a
lengthy compilation of seventy chüan (chapters).15 It is entirely de-
rivative, though selectively so. Yet it is derivative not of the classics
themselves but of a definite interpretation—or reinterpretation—of
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the classics that emphasized the classical texts and fragments
known as the Four Books (Analects, Doctrine of the Mean, Men-
cius, and Great Learning).
Leibniz goes along with Ricci and those sympathetic to Chi-
nese rites in holding that the modern Chinese are atheistic and
only the ancient Chinese and the ancient texts reflected the nat-
ural religion. Nevertheless, he cites from the Compendium as if
it were merely a summary of the classical texts and not itself the
product of a much later school of interpretation. Leibniz’ confusion
on this point may be traceable to his great reliance on the Religion
Treatise and the Mission Treatise for information on Chinese tex-
tual matters.
In the Religion Treatise 1:2, Longobardi classifies the four
kinds of books found in the literati sect of Confucianism. The first
includes books by ancient kings and savants such as the Book of
Changes and the Book of History. The second type of work con-
sists of commentaries on these books that subdivide into (1) those
of a brief and precise nature that contain the text and a gloss by
a single author, for example the “Zu-Xu” (presumably the detailed
commentary appended to each section of text by Chu Hsi in his ar-
rangement of classics called the Four Books) and (2) the ta-ch’üan
(great compendium) type, which includes a collection of comments
by different authors on a specific subject. The third type of work is
said to be a compendium of natural and moral philosophy known
as the hsing-li (literally, human nature and principle). Longobardi’s
fourth category includes books by authors who had lived since the
burning of the books by Ch’in Shih Huang-ti in 213 B.C.16
In the Mission Treatise (pp. 2–3) Sainte-Marie gives a concise
description of the Chinese classics. He refers to the Five Classics
(Book of Changes, Book of History, Book of Odes, Spring and Au-
tumn Annals, and Record of Rites) as the five doctrinal works
of Confucianism edited by Confucius. He compares the Chinese
reverence toward the Four Books (Great Learning, Doctrine of
the Mean, Analects, and Mencius) to the Christian veneration of
the four Gospels. Next, Sainte-Marie refers to the Tasiven Singli,
(Hsing-li ta-ch’üan), which he refers to as a work compiled over
300 years before, although it was closer to 250 years. Sainte-Marie
emphasizes the anthologylike nature of the Compendium and the
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theory of its being a mere collection of previously scattered inter-
pretations. Longobardi had also stressed the remarkable accord
on points of doctrine to be found among authors of the literati sect.
From a marginal notation made by Leibniz in his copy of
the Religion Treatise17 and by his references there to Sainte-
Marie’s descriptions, we know that he accepted the classifications
of these missionary interpreters. Here he outlines a division
into four main types that correspond to those of Longobardi as
supplemented by Sainte-Marie. In his Discourse, Leibniz makes
abundant use of Longobardi’s translations from the Compendium,
and thus he would seem to accept the notion that this com-
pendium represents a collection of views continuous with and in
agreement with the beliefs of Chinese antiquity. In fact, they are
from a much later school of Confucianism that had a very spe-
cific interpretation of Chinese antiquity and the classics. But if
the differences in interpretation between the original Confucian
classics and the commentaries by the Sung school of Neo-Con-
fucianism were minimal—a highly debatable claim—then such a
compendium of views subscribed to by the entire sect of literati
would appear possible.
Leibniz may have followed this line of thought, and this may
explain why he shows so little hesitation in citing the Compendium
to help explain a classical passage. In this practice, he is merely
following Longobardi. However, Leibniz disagrees with many of
Longobardi’s interpretations—both in terms of the Chinese rites
and in the meaning of key Chinese terminology. Specifically, while
Leibniz believed there was a need to distinguish between the an-
cient and modern Chinese as natural religionists and atheists, re-
spectively, Longobardi believed that the entire tradition was athe-
istic. Given such a premise, Longobardi would be led to minimize
textual differences between the various schools and to minimize
also any differences in points of view presented in the original clas-
sics contradicting those of the Compendium. Something similar
might be said of Sainte-Marie. But from the Chinese point of view,
the differences were considerable. The energy and feeling with
which the literati engaged in differences over interpreting these
classics indicated how unreal the Chinese would have considered
any such notion of exegetical uniformity. Yet one’s view of a prob-
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lem can very often depend on one’s position. In his failure to take
these differences into account, Leibniz fell victim to his reliance on
secondary sources. The problem here appears to be not so much
that Longobardi and Sainte-Marie were wrong as that Leibniz was
confused over where he stood. In his interpretation of the Chinese
texts, he was in fact seeing things from a point of view basically
different from that of these Chinese interpreters.
The Compendium is actually a product of neither the ancients
(the alleged natural religionists) nor the modern literati (the al-
leged atheists) but of an intermediate group.18 Yet Leibniz makes
no real distinction between the classical Confucianism of the an-
cients and the Neo-Confucianism of the intermediate group. He
treats both views as synonymous and contrasts them with the
contemporary Chinese view. He appears to be unaware that this
treatment somewhat contradicts his position that only the Chinese
of antiquity produced a form of natural religion from which later
practitioners deviated. Only the books produced in this period,
that is, those that came to be called the Chinese classics, preserve
traces of this natural religion.
To the extent that the Neo-Confucian philosophy was created
by men who followed nearly 1300 years after the end of Chinese
antiquity—for our purposes, the end of antiquity is the close of
the Chou dynasty at about 250 B.C.—Neo-Confucianism does not
reflect natural religion. But to the extent that the Neo-Confucian
philosophy was a reinterpretation based on the classical texts, el-
ements of natural religion are preserved. Since Leibniz depends
upon distinctly Neo-Confucian terms such as li (principle), ch’i
(material force), and t’ai-chi (ultimate maximization) as well as
terms drawn from the classical corpus such as shang-ti (King-on-
high or God), tao (the Way), and kuei-shen (spirits), it would seem
that both the classical Confucian and the Neo-Confucian interpre-
tations are necessary to his presentation.
Li, the First Principle
The fundamental Chinese term in the Discourse is li, which Leibniz
interprets as a first principle. It is this important Chinese term
that Leibniz saw as the foundation stone for ecumenical accord be-
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tween China and the West. He defines the term at an early point in
the Discourse 419 by saying:
The first principle of the Chinese is called li (Religion Treatise
2:1)‚ that is, Reason or the foundation of all nature (Religion
Treatise 5:1), the most universal reason and substance (Religion
Treatise 11:2); there is nothing greater nor better than li (Religion
Treatise 11:10). This great and universal cause is pure, still, sub-
tle, without body and without shape, and can be known only
through understanding (Religion Treatise 5:1).
Leibniz’ description of the first principle of the universe as
“still” (quiéte) brings to mind descriptions of God found in both
the mystical poetry of T. S. Eliot and the philosophy of Aristotle.
While Eliot’s Four Quartets refers to the “still point of the turning
world,”20 Aristotle’s Metaphysics describes an “Unmoved Mov-
er.”21 Both are descriptions of God as the real or apparent paradox
of a force that activates and yet remains unactivated or still.
In comparing this interpretation with Chinese expositors of li,
one finds differences in emphasis as well as fundamental similari-
ties. For instance, the approach of the foremost Neo-Confucianist,
Chu Hsi, uses quiescence as a description of one aspect of the
phenomenal world. Instead of having quiescence describe the first
principle and activity describe the first principle’s productions,
quiesence (ch’ing) and activity (tung) are used along with yin
and yang as complementary pairs to describe these productions.
These complementary pairs compose the material force (ch’i), the
complementary element to the First Principle (li).22 This interpre-
tation differs from that of Leibniz in reflecting less of a stress on li
as a first principle and more of a stress on li as a complementary
force. On the other hand, Chu Hsi does recognize a logically prior
aspect of li. Furthermore, t’ai-chi, which Chu Hsi partially equates
with li,23 has the aspect of a Supreme Ultimate or Supreme Pole
whose metaphysical significance bears a similarity to Eliot’s “still
point.” In Hsing-li Neo-Confucianism, t’ai-chi contains both quies-
cence and activity and so parallels the paradoxical containment
found in Eliot’s “still point” and Aristotle’s “Unmoved Mover.”
Though the term li is not philosophically significant in the
original classics, it appears to have had the early meaning of or-
dering or patterning. Later, Han dynasty scholars stressed the
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etymological interpretation of li as containing the semantic par-
ticle for jade, yü, and the phonetic-semantic particle lia, which
refers to an inner sense as, for example, in the lining of clothing,
lib. Li combines these senses to refer to the inside of jade as in
the sense of natural grain or a system of veins, which the jade cut-
ter must ascertain and follow in making an effective break. This
organic sense of the internal structure that determines a thing’s
nature and content was emphasized by the Sung Neo-Confucian-
ists when they incorporated li into their metaphysics.24
One of several parallels between Leibniz and Chinese philos-
ophy appears in connection with this etymological significance of
li. In 1700, a French translation of John Locke’s Essay Concerning
Human Understanding (London, 1690) came into Leibniz’ hands.
This became the basis of a critique by Leibniz entitled Nouveaux
Essais de l’Entendement humaín (New essays concerning human
understanding), written by 1704 but unpublished until 1765.25 In
the New Essays, Leibniz rejects Locke’s comparison of the soul,
a term including much of our modern notion of the mind, to the
Aristotelian tabula rasa. Instead of a blank tablet or completely
uniform block of marble, Leibniz uses the metaphor of a “block of
marble that has veins.” He states:
For if the soul resembled these blank tablets, truths would be in
us as the figure of Hercules is in the marble, when the marble is
wholly indifferent to the reception of this figure or some other. But
if there were veins in the block which should indicate the figure
of Hercules rather than other figures, this block would be more
determined thereto, and Hercules would be in it as in some sense
innate, although it would be needful to labor to discover these
veins, to clear them by polishing, and by cutting away what pre-
vents them from appearing.26
This is very close to the sense in which the Hsing-li school uses
the term li, and it is confirmed by an instance from a favored
Neo-Confucian text, Mencius 6:1.1, in which it is said that man’s
moral cultivation must follow the inherent nature of man just as
the carving of utensils must follow the organic or natural grain of
the willow.
Of the Chinese texts that Leibniz relies upon in developing his
interpretation, only the Compendium presents li in its metaphys-
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ical maturity, for only the Compendium among all these texts is
fully reflective of the Hsing-li school. Only in that school did li
reach full development, even though it must be reemphasized that
the school always took certain Chinese classics as its basic texts.
Though li rarely appears in these classics—and when it does it has
little philosophical significance—it was believed that li was implied
by these works and that such a term as tao (the Way) could be
taken as an approximate equivalent.
Leibniz did not have direct access to the Chinese originals,
yet Longobardi’s Religion Treatise and Sainte-Marie’s Mission
Treatise contain lengthy quotations and paraphrases from these
texts, which Leibniz used as indirect sources. Longobardi and
Sainte-Marie wrote their treatises with the specific purpose of
rejecting any sympathetic interpretation of the Chinese rites to-
ward ancestors and Confucius, as well as discarding any equiva-
lences between Chinese and Christian religious concepts. Leibniz,
of course, opposed their positions, but he was able to use their
work as source material for deriving opposite conclusions.
While Longobardi and Sainte-Marie argued that Chinese philo-
sophical concepts were ultimately materialistic, Leibniz stressed a
spiritual guiding force that in its different aspects may be called
li (principle), t’ai-chi (Ultimate Maximization), tao (the Way), or
shang-ti (King-on-high). To emphasize that the direction and pro-
duction of phenomena lie not in things themselves but in li, Leibniz
in the Discourse 427 quotes almost directly from Sainte-Marie in
the Mission Treatise (p. 73), which in turn draws from the Com-
pendium (bk. 26, p. 8a).28 (Longobardi gives a fairly careful para-
phrase of this same Compendium passage in the Religion Treatise
13:5.) An examination of the Compendium passage shows Sainte-
Marie to be neither quoting nor giving even a close paraphrase
so much as presenting an interpretation. Sainte-Marie in the Mis-
sion Treatise (p. 73) describes the Compendium (bk. 26, p. 8b) as
maintaining that cosmic generation “is not at all in the disposition
of things nor does it depend on them, but that it consists and re-
sides in this li; that it predominates over everything; that it is in
everything, governs and produces everything in the absolute mat-
ter of Heaven and Earth.” But this is a misleading interpretation
that overemphasizes li at the expense of the complementary li-ch’i.
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The Compendium (bk. 26, p. 9a) makes specific reference to this
complementary and to the necessary presence of both li and ch’i.
The implications of this essential complementary ingredient of the
Hsing-li school are something that Sainte-Marie and Longobardi
never fully face. Rather, they deemphasize such an approach and
tend to treat the two as different manifestations of the same ele-
ment—that is, ch’i as “air” and li as “prime matter.” But in the
Hsing-li school’s view, li and ch’i are not both material elements.
Ch’i is a material force, but li, while clearly not material, is said
to be normally unable to subsist independently of the material ele-
ment, ch’i. Li rather represents principle, a component that orders
the chaotic ch’i.
What allows Longobardi’s and Sainte-Marie’s views some mea-
sure of plausibility is their concession that li appears superficially
to be both rational and spiritual and that only deeper investigation
will show it to be ultimately material. In such a way, Leibniz ex-
plains li by emphasizing the Neo-Confucian view that “All things
are one” (Discourse 21–22)29 and holds that both Longobardi and
Sainte-Marie express this view, although it would seem that their
presentations of this notion are far less explicit than that of Leib-
niz. On the other hand, Leibniz (Discourse 26)30 follows Longob-
ardi’s interpretation (Religion Treatise 13:6) of the Compendium
(bk. 1, pp. 31a–b) by stating that li, which Leibniz—not Longo-
bardi—equates with reason, dominates worldy phenomena and
needs nothing from them. The Compendium passage consists en-
tirely of commentary based on correlating the Five Phases31 (wu
hsing) with the directions and seasons and generally stresses
the orderly unfolding of universal processes. From the Chinese
sources, Leibniz seems to have derived, rather than quoted or even
paraphrased, the notion the li governs worldly phenomena while
being fully independent of influence from these phenomena.
Li and the Monads
It is not certain that li was as independent of ch’i in the Neo-
Confucian conception as Leibniz sees it, but it is clear in Leibniz’
philosophy that the monads are entirely unaffected by the activity
of phenomenal forces. The monads translate the progress of the
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phenomenal world without being affected by it. Nor do the monads
affect one another; they are said to be windowless. They are
likened by Leibniz to a series of clocks that manage to keep time
without being connected. The Leibnizian notion of “preestablished
harmony” guarantees accord between monads without any need of
either interaction betweens the two or outside intervention by a
supernatural force. The content of the monads is predetermined by
a subject-predicate logic in which all the predicates are contained
within the subject.32
More specifically, each monad is characterized by a “complete
concept” within which all its predicates and rules of development
are contained. Consequently, were one able—as is God—to deter-
mine a given complete concept, then the particular monad’s future
development could be completely foreseen by logical derivation. It
was on the basis of comparing an infinite number of complete con-
cepts that God chose those of our particular world to actualize on
the grounds that while it was not completely perfect, it contained
the greatest amount of perfection possible or was the “best of all
possible worlds.” The Leibnizian concept of reality always begins
with logic and metaphysics, from which one works into progres-
sively more exterior ontological orders. And this correspondence
and harmony between the various orders come from the Leibnizian
notion of a derivative (i.e., more exterior) level of reality being
“well-founded” upon a higher (i.e., more interior) realm.
Leibniz emphasizes the internal nature of li and draws from
Longobardi’s interpretation (Religion Treatise 13:5) of the
Compendium (bk. 26, p. 8a). This interior aspect has a certain
affinity with Leibniz’ conception of the monads. For example the
Monadology no. 11 states: “The natural changes of the monads
must result from an internal principle, since no external cause
could influence their interior.”33 Leibniz conceived of existence as
made up of individual units. The function of the monads was to join
these units with the realm of logic and with statements about uni-
versals. In the process of translating individual units into a more
interior representation, any given monad will present a living mir-
ror of the universe. In terms of physical theory, when Leibniz trans-
lates monadic perceptions into lower ontological levels, physics
is expanded beyond the Cartesian components of extension and
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impenetrability to include natural inertia.34 This is a fundamental
alteration of a physics of inert substance into a physics of force.
Leibniz summarized his position of physical theory in regard
to Cartesianism in a letter to Bouvet of 2 December 1697. The
context is a discussion of what form of philosophy—Leibniz’ uni-
versal perspective prevents him from calling it “Western philoso-
phy”—should be introduced to the Chinese as a means of prepar-
ing them to receive “the true religion,” that is, Christianity. While
recognizing that some Europeans would hope to abolish the “phi-
losophy of the schools” (that is, Scholasticism, or modified Aris-
totelianism) and replace it with Cartesianism, Leibniz thinks that
the application of certain insights of modern philosophy to the phi-
losophy of the ancients could suitably enrich the latter and prepare
it as a vehicle for teaching the Chinese. In a letter to Bouvet, Leib-
niz had referred to his intense debates with Cartesians:
And I have demonstrated to them by means of mathematics that
they themselves do not at all have the true laws of nature and that
in order to have them, it is necessary to consider in nature not
only matter, but also force, and that the forms of the ancients or
entelechies are nothing but forces. And by this means I have faith
in rehabilitating the philosophy of the ancients.35
Leibniz reiterates this theme in his letter to Bouvet of 1703 when
he aligns his position with that of the ancients and opposes the
“material philosophy of the moderns,” that is, the Cartesians. Leib-
niz regards force as the essence of corporeal substance and again
asserts the identity of force with the entelechy of the ancients.36
“Entelechy” and “substantial form” were two of Leibniz’ alterna-
tive terms for designating the monad.
The term “monad” does not even occur in the Discourse,
though the concept is present. This is surprising only if one fails
to realize that “monad” was only one of a number of terms for
designating this central element of Leibniz’ philosophy. In his first
formulation of this concept—in the Discourse on Metaphysics
(1686)—Leibniz refers to it as “individual substance.” Prior to
1696, Leibniz used the term “monad” infrequently. He clearly
prefers the word in the popularized summary of his philosophy en-
titled the Monadology (1714); however, he continued to use several
designations for the concept.37 A grasp of the monad is necessary
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to understand Leibniz’ interpretation of Chinese natural theology
and, particularly, his interpretation of the relationship between the
Neo-Confucian li and ch’i and the issue of the relationship of parts
to the whole. For example, see the Discourse 7, 13, and 26.38 Leib-
niz frequently uses ‘entelechy” to designate the monad. This term
appears, in singular and plural forms, in the Discourse 14, 19, 21,
and 38.39 “Spirit” and “soul,” terms that Leibniz sometimes uses to
refer to the monad, occur throughout the Discourse.
In his short piece De primae philosophiae emendatione, et
de notione substantiae (On the improvement of first philosophy
[metaphysics], and the notion of substance)40 of 1694, Leibniz in-
vokes the notion of force (Latin: vis or virtus; German: Kraft) to
offer a new and, he believes, more fruitful definition of substance.
He clearly states that force is inherent in all substances—physical
as well as spiritual. Consequently, the notion of force becomes a
link between the metaphysical and physical realms. To what extent
does this metaphysical view compare to the Neo-Confucian view of
li and its complementary, ch’i?
In a letter to De Volder in 1703, Leibniz refers to (1) the prim-
itive entelechy or soul (primitive active force) and (2) primary
matter (primitive passive force) as two aspects that together com-
pose a monad.41 Since the monad is on a metaphysical level and
these notions of the soul and primary matter are on a phenomenal
level, li would compare to metaphysical reality and ch’i to phenom-
enal reality. The Neo-Confucian view of ch’i accords with Leibniz’
rejection of inert matter as a phenomenal explanation and with the
emphasis upon force as a primary component. In addition to im-
penetrability and extension, Leibnizian primitive force is charac-
terized by inertia. This is not an inert element but a force in a
state of resistance to motion. Complementary to this is the first
entelechy, or primitive moving force, which joins with extension
(the purely geometrical) and with mass (the purely material) and
acts. This primitive active force is known as a soul or substantial
form, depending on whether the given entity is living or nonliv-
ing.42 Consequently, on a metaphysical level there are monads
and perceptions, of a clear and confused type, respectively. Corre-
sponding to this is the abstract level of phenomenality where there
are corporeal substances that duplicate a twofold breakdown into
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the complementaries, primitive active force and primitive passive
force. In turn, corresponding to this is the observable level of phe-
nomenality containing bodies that continue the twofold division
into derivative active and passive forces.
Ch’i is conceived of as an activated and fluid form of matter,
perhaps best described as having the breathlike connotations of
ether or pneuma—that is to say, without direction. The direction is
provided by li, and taken together, li and ch’i provide the compo-
nent aspects of any given element. In the Monadology no. 63,
Leibniz reaffirms the relationship set forth in his letter to De
Volder: “The body [i.e., primitive passive force] belonging to a
monad which is its entelechy or its soul constitutes, together with
this entelechy [i.e., primitive active force] what may be called a liv-
ing unit and together with this soul what may be called an animal.”
In comparing li to the monadic level and ch’i to the phenome-
nal level, or primitive passive force and primitive active force and
their observable derivations, one need not say that the Leibniz-
ian concept of reality necessarily conflicts with the Neo-Confucian
notion. Admittedly, while li is abstract and logically precedes ch’i,
which is phenomenal, the notion of Neo-Confucian organicism pro-
vides only an implicit parallel to phenomenal and real realms in
Leibnizian notions of preestablished harmony and “well-founding”;
that is, the appearances of the phenomenal realm are derivative
from the more real monadic realm.43 Furthermore, the Neo-Con-
fucian analysis of ch’i stops short of that found in the Leibnizian
scheme of the phenomenal level. Yet Leibniz himself thought there
were considerable similarities.
The obstacles to coming to a firm conclusion on the degree
of similarity or dissimilarity between Neo-Confucianism and Leib-
niz’ philosophy bring us to the problem of different directions in
philosophical development. From the Neo-Confucian point of view,
intellectual analysis was prerequisite to spiritual cultivation and
such analysis would be evaluated in terms of its degree of contri-
bution to the advancement of the practitioner’s spiritual, moral,
and social cultivation.
It is in this area that the cultivation of reality appears as a flux in
which the fluid etherlike nature of ch’i as a phenomenal essence has
a metaphysical parallel in the vital and changing organic conception
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of li. But the flux is also experiential. The natural metaphors of the
venation in li and the pliable bamboo as both social and artistic par-
adigms represent a coherent experience in which one divines with
the Book of Changes in a manner more introspective than that of go-
ing to a fortune-teller to hear what the future will bring.
Actually, the fixed answers associated with the limited number
of divinable hexagram possibilities may not tell the questioner any-
thing. The process demands intense introspection. The responsive-
ness of the answer in the Book of Changes will vary with the depth
of the question asked, although at times the particular hexagram
form will involve an extensive reply. One divines for oneself in or-
der to better discern the direction of events (that is, the conflux
of ch’i and li) and slide more smoothly into that particular flow.
The content of the divination’s answer is far less significant than
the manner in which one harmonizes oneself with the direction
of the flow. The Confucian gentleman does not rage against his
fate. Nor does he passively accept it. The process of harmoniz-
ing one’s body and will with the direction of one’s fate requires
an intensive personal and spiritual cultivation. Ideally, one’s ex-
terior should in the process emanate a certain tranquillity, which
is frequently mistaken for passivity. Such is hardly the case, even
though the concentration of activity in such a situation tends to be
far more interior than exterior.
This is a philosophy of delicate balance and far-reaching com-
plexity, even though it may be quite different from that practiced by
Leibniz. Since the respective philosophies involve different methods
and aims, the differences in results are quite understandable. These
results do not in themselves reflect differences in quality, but the de-
gree to which they accomplish the aims of the particular philosophy
invites comparison in terms of their respective successes.
The One and the Many
Of equal significance to Leibniz’ own philosophy is his emphasis on
passages from Neo-Confucian texts that describe the dual aspect
of li as both universal and particular, of both one and many. This
aspect can be signified as the Li (universal)–li (particular) relation-
ship. In the Discourse 21–2244, Leibniz cites the Chinese statement
that “All things are one,” and in the Discourse 2645 he refers to the
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Li-li relationship, drawing upon Longobardi’s interpretation (Reli-
gion Treatise 13:10) of a passage in the Compendium (bk. 26, pp.
1b-2a). Longobardi is generally accurate in paraphrasing the pas-
sage in terms of the dual aspect of li or t’ai-chi. Li is manifested as
both one thing and many parts—that is, having a universal as well
as a particular aspect. The t’ai-chi is also described as both a sub-
stance and a universal spirit of everything as well as a substance
and particular spirit of each thing.
Leibniz rejects interpreting the Compendium passage as mean-
ing that the li literally has parts, on the grounds that a thing com-
posed of parts does not constitute a true unity. Rather, as a pile of
sand or an army, it has only the semblance of unity. Leibniz holds
that the reference to the parts of the t’ai-chi can only be a figurative
manner of speaking, in the same way we may say that souls would
be “parts” of the Divinity. Here we see the concern that led Leibniz
to reject the notion of atoms (discrete and uniform material units) in
favor of monads (organically connected and unique spiritual units).
Leibniz’ interpretation of this Chinese notion of a universal-
particular relationship is an essential part of the Leibnizian philos-
ophy and appears in the Monadology no. 13:
This particular [trait of what is changing] must comprehend a
multiplicity in the unity, that is, in the simple. For since all natural
change proceeds by degrees, something changes and something
remains. Consequently, there must be in the simple substance a
plurality of affections and relations, though it has no parts.
Further, Monadology no.62 states:
Thus, every created monad represents the whole universe; never-
theless, it represents more distinctly the body which is particularly
attached to it and of which it is the entelechy. And since this body
expresses the whole universe through the interconnection of all the
matter in the plenum, the soul, too, represents the whole universe
by representing this body which in a particular manner belongs to it.
Leibniz says that there is a connection between the more ex-
terior element of body and the more interior element of monad
by which the latter represents the body. Insofar as the body is
particular, the monad represents the body. But since the body is
connected with all other bodies, the monad also represents all
other bodies or mirrors the universe. In its role as entelechy or ac-
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tualizer of this potential body, the monad must be the source for
representing these particular and universal aspects and therefore
it must itself bear particular and universal relationships to other
monads. Leibniz insists that parts do not exist, so the relationship
must be an organic hierarchy of monads leading up to the supreme
monad, which is sometimes referred to as God.
We have here a description that could be equally applied to
the Neo-Confucian notion of li, which bears both particular and
universal aspects in ordering, and consequently, in actualizing the
material force, ch’i. The particular li relates to a universal Li,
which in cosmological manifestations is referred to as t’ai-chi and
in moral manifestations as the tao. Yet these similarities do not
guarantee an accord that carries down into the deeper levels of
Leibniz’ monads and the Neo-Confucian li-ch’i relationship. In all,
given the secondary and imcomplete nature of Leibniz’ sources
of Chinese philosophy, we are faced with the remarkable degree
of similarity he was able to postulate. How does one explain it?
Leibniz felt that such similarities were spontaneously generated.
We cannot ignore the fact that his interpretations of similarities
between li and the monads, of elements of natural religion com-
mon to Europe and China, and of the binary basis of the Book of
Changes all contain errors, some of which are apparent to even
a novice of modern sinology. Yet these errors do not diminish the
validity of Leibniz’ other perceptions of similarities, which will be
presented and summarized in course. Nor do they diminish the
possibility that something in the nature of man or his situation de-
termined the emergence of these similarities.
The Primal Pair: Li and Ch’i
Leibniz in the Discourse 15–1746 disputes Longobardi’s identifica-
tion of li with the European scholastics’ formless prime matter.
First, he believes that the classical passages presented by
Longobardi define li as a source, spiritual in essence, from which
all things and activities of the world emanate. Leibniz considers
Longobardi’s attempt to prove his identification of li with prime
matter to involve a forced list of reasons (found in the Religion
Treatise 14:19) that conflict with the Chinese textual passages.
Longobardi begins the list by arguing that li cannot be truly spiri-
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tual since it cannot subsist by itself but has need of “primeval air”
(ch’i) and compares this to the term coava. The reference here is
probably to the Latin term caelum, which is connected with the
Latin cavus (hollow) and means the air associated with the sky
or heaven. In the Discourse 1547‚ Leibniz expresses doubt over
whether the Chinese formally state that li cannot subsist without
“primeval air.” Instead, he explains their meaning by saying that
the need for “primeval air” or prime matter refers to the times
when li manifests itself among things, that li cannot be its own
agent but has need of prime matter for its actualization. The Neo-
Confucian texts refer to this prime matter as ch’i, which would be
more accurately translated as “material force.”
Actually the Neo-Confucian texts do state that li and ch’i are
unable to function separately. Yet they also speak of li as prior
in a logical, rather than temporal, sense.48 Since he makes no
reference to other textual sources, Leibniz would appear to base
his explanation of the need of li for ch’i on his own conception
of how the interior (that is, rational) realms of the monads have
need of force in order to express the monads’ temporally simul-
taneous origin of li for ch’i. In doing this, however, he neglects
the logical priority of li. It must be admitted that Leibniz carries
this priority further than most contemporary interpreters of Neo-
Confucianism, but the unsatisfactory nature of such contemporary
explanations may stem from an unresolved tension in Chu Hsi’s
own philosophy—that is his expression of a temporal co-origin of li
and ch’i on the one hand and the logical priority of li on the other.
This tension is clearly expressed in the Mission Treatise (pp.
80–81), where Sainte-Marie cites the Compendium (bk. 26, pp.
8b–9a) to the effect that li and t’ai-chi have a priority over ch’i
that consists of “nature or of origin” and not of time. Sainte-Marie
compares this distinction to the one made by St. Augustine in
the Confessions 12:19 between the first form and unformed or
prime matter. However, a look at this Compendium passage will
show that Sainte-Marie’s comparision of li and ch’i to the Augus-
tinian distinctions between form and the formless and the mutable
and immutable is invalid. Augustine’s passage in the Confessions
quite clearly refers to God’s direction of the relationship between
form and matter. In comparing this to li and ch’i, Sainte-Marie
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omits the directional component provided by God and correlates
form and matter with li and ch’i. But this omission makes for
an unsatisfactory comparison since the Chinese clearly include a
guiding principle in li. Furthermore, Leibniz is not arguing that
there is a Chinese concept of God in addition to li and ch’i, as
Sainte-Marie’s Augustinian comparison would seem to imply. He is
saying that li contains a type of priority that enables its universal,
as opposed to its particular, aspect to be equated with God.
The Compendium itself (bk. 26, p. 8b) contains a terse ref-
erence to the priority of li: “Before there is Heaven and Earth
and the myriad things, there first is li. But this li cannot be sus-
pended in midair in the middle of something.” In effect, li has
a type of priority, but it needs some material force (i.e., ch’i) in
which to be realized. Consequently, there follows a strong em-
phasis on the lack of any priority between the two. Rather, Chou
Tun-i’s “Diagram of the t’ai-chi” is quoted to the effect that li and
ch’i are held to be prior and posterior in the way that movement
and quiescence or yang and yin are prior and posterior; that is,
they function in a reciprocal manner. Motion precedes quiescence,
which in turn precedes motion, which in turn precedes quies-
cence, and so forth. In sum, we come to know from this passage
far more about li’s coequal status with ch’i than about li’s prior
aspect over ch’i. In other texts, Chu Hsi speaks more extensively
on the priority of li, yet the nature of the priority seems always to
express a certain ambiguity, perhaps reflecting a certain irresolu-
tion in Chu Hsi’s own mind.
Longobardi’s second argument in the Religion Treatise 14:19
for saying that li is equivalent to prime matter is that li considered
by itself is inanimate, lifeless, without determination, and without
intelligence. Sainte-Marie in the Mission Treatise (pp. 81–82) con-
curs in this view of Longobardi’s and for support cites the Analects
15:28, where it states that the tao—tao being taken as equivalent
to li—is incapable of knowing man, but man is capable of knowing
the tao.49 The tendency to equate tao with li was a forced identity
that resulted from an incomplete understanding of these Chinese
terms. Tao has a long history, which predates li, and has many
different applications in Chinese philosophy. One may go only as
far as saying that in the Neo-Confucian context tao and li may
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represent different manifestations of the same Absolute. It is this
Neo-Confucian concept of the proximity of the two terms that
Western missionaries and interpreters such as Leibniz seized on
and emphasized. In so doing, they indiscriminately mixed non-Neo-
Confucian with Neo-Confucian passages in a manner that would
make a modern scholar blush.
But there is more to be said on the notion taken from Analects
15:28 that while tao cannot know man, man can know tao. Eager to
participate in the authority of Matteo Ricci’s views, which he man-
ages to do at several points in the Mission Treatise, Sainte-Marie
refers to Ricci’s citation of this Analects passage and the view that
while man can comprehend li, li cannot comprehend man, though
it would be capable of doing so were it equivalent to God and the
Creator.
Although giving no evidence of other access to the Analects,50
Leibniz in the Discourse 1651 expresses doubts about the precision
of Sainte-Marie’s interpretation of this passage. Specifically, Leib-
niz wishes to know more precisely of what Confucius was speak-
ing—first principles? laws in the abstract?—and he suggests that
if it is the latter, the meaning may be that the law being abstract
and universal in its application knows no individual man. Modern
translators such as James Legge and Arthur Waley have inter-
preted this passage more literally than the early missionaries and
have spoken of man as being capable of enlarging the tao (Wa-
ley: “Way”; Legge: “Principles which he follows”) but of the tao
as being incapable of enlarging man. Chu Hsi’s commentary on
this passage in his Lun-yü chi-chu (Collected commentaries on the
Analects) does not contradict the more modern interpretation, but
it does support the fathers’ rendering by quoting Chang Tsai as
saying: “The mind is capable of exhaustively investigating human
nature. Man is able to enlarge [his knowledge of] the tao. But hu-
man nature does not know how to investigate the mind. So the
tao cannot enlarge man.”52 The reference is not simply to know-
ing, but to a type of knowing that leads to moral action. As such,
it is a type of knowing unique to man and could hardly be applied
to a supreme conception—whether the context be Confucianism
or Christianity. Consequently, it would seem that Sainte-Marie has
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misinterpreted the passage or perhaps followed a misinterpreta-
tion by Ricci.
Space and the Great Void
In the Discourse 753, Leibniz draws upon Longobardi’s interpreta-
tion of li to relate the Chinese concept of space to his own view.
In the latter, which is well defined in Leibniz’ correspondence with
the Newtonian apologist Samuel Clarke, space is treated not as a
substance but as an order.54 To support this interpretation, Leibniz
borrows from a list of attributes in the Religion Treatise 14:1–20,
in which Longobardi calls the Chinese first principle (li) a great
vacuum or space in the sense of an immense capacity, as well
as a sovereign plenitude that contains everything and excludes a
vacuum. Among Longobardi’s long list of attributes of the Chinese
first principle is a claim in the Religion Treatise 14:4 that the Chi-
nese call their first principle a “great vacuum (or void) and an
immense capacity because in this universal essence all the par-
ticular essences are contained.” This containment is compared to
the water of many rivers being contained in and receiving their
force from one spring or to the fruit, flowers, branches, and trunk
of a tree that are contained in the root. Further, in the Religion
Treatise 14:8, Longobardi states that the Chinese call their first
principle a great vacuum “because it can receive in itself all things,
and that there would be nothing beyond its limits.” But in the Re-
ligion Treatise 14:14, Longobardi describes the Chinese as calling
this first principle a “sovereign solidity of plenitude because the
nature and universal entity fills everything and is the same be-
ing with all things.” Longobardi maintains that The Mean (chaps.
20–25) supports this claim and holds that the “universal matter”
of the first principle pervades both within and without the uni-
verse bestowing being of both a physical and moral nature upon
all things.
The distinction Leibniz draws here seems to be between the
potential and the actual. He refers to capacity for manifestation
versus manifestation of the plenitude, yet he also speaks of the
containment of particular essences within a universal essence.
Leibniz proceeds to relate this interpretation to an explanation of
the immensity of God as being without, as well as within something
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and cites the inventor of the vacuum machine, a “M. Guerike,” who
believed that space appertained to God.
With the mention of Otto von Guericke of Magdeburg
(1602–1686), who invented the air pump in 1645, Leibniz refers
to his physical theories. In his fifth letter (18 August 1716) no. 33
of the correspondence with Clarke, which incidentally was writ-
ten during the same year as the Discourse, Leibniz rejects the
Newtonian assumption of Clarke that time and space bear an ab-
solute reality and asserts instead that they are ideal constructions
of the mind.55 Similarly, in no. 34 of the same letter, Leibniz re-
jects the notion of Clarke’s construction of Guericke’s air pump
as representing the creation of a perfect vacuum or space with-
out matter. (Leibniz is said to have corresponded with Guericke on
the air pump in 1671 and 1672.56) In this, he aligns himself with
the Aristotelians and Cartesians who also reject a true vacuum,
as they rejected the work attributed to Galileo’s pupil Torricelli
(1608–1647), who used mercury to empty the air from a glass
tube. Rather, Leibniz interprets Guericke’s pumping of air out of
the receiver as having created not a total absence of matter in
space but a “more subtle” air within the receiver than existed in
the surrounding air of the room. In a manner typical of Leibniz’
tendency toward infinite continua of gradation, he has attempted
here to transform a postulated absolute absence into an absence
of degree.
Leibniz’ rejection of a vacuum is related to his rejection of the
Newtonian claim, made through Clarke, of space as absolute and
real. Leibniz cannot accept this claim and its close counterpart
of treating space as an attribute of God. (Newton had referred to
space as the “Sensorium of God.”) In his third letter to Clarke (25
February 1716), nos. 2–3, he rejects both claims as contrary to
his Principle of Sufficient Reason, to which Clarke presumably as-
sented. Leibniz argues that since space is said to consist of parts,
it cannot belong to God, who has no parts.57 Leibniz returns to the
notion of space having parts in his fifth letter, no. 52, where he in-
terprets change, which both Leibniz and Clarke agree is necessary
to Design.58 Whereas Clarke views change as the movement of a
finite material universe in real space, Leibniz thinks the universe
must be infinite and treats change as an alteration among relation-
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ships in which space is an order of relations rather than absolute
reality. In no. 54 of the same letter, Leibniz answers an objection
that his views are not amenable to treatment by mathematics, an
essential tool of the new natural philosophy by saying that time
and space mean situation and order, that is, relations, and that re-
lations may be treated quantitatively.
Leibniz uses an explanation in the Discourse 759 similar to the
one that appears in the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence. He sug-
gests viewing space not in terms of substance, with parts existing
external to other parts, but as the order of things emerging from
God with everything belonging to any given moment. The Leibni-
zian parallel is the notion of connection as unique monadic units,
each occupying slightly different positions in a continuum or or-
der. With regard to this view of time, consider Leibniz’ rejection
of absolute time in the fifth letter to Clarke, no. 55, where Leibniz
dismisses any talk of the world being created sooner than it was as
nonsensical. Such a view makes time “absolute, independent upon
God; whereas time does only coexist with creatures, and is only
conceived by the order and quantity of their changes.”60
From the preceding discussion it becomes clear that Leibniz
cannot interpret the Chinese vacuum to be a perfect vacuum in
the sense of being totally devoid of matter. For Leibniz, there can
be no such thing as a perfect vacuum. But the reference to the
vacuum seems to have some meaning acceptable to Leibniz, and
perhaps the key to it lies in the relationship of the vacuum to the
complementary notion of sovereign plenitude. The Mean (chaps.
20–25) is cited by Longobardi (Religion Treatise 14:14) in refer-
ence to explaining this notion of plenitude. And even limited to
plenitude, they seem only implicitly supportive. The Mean pas-
sages refer not to li but to tao, which Leibniz’ interpreters regard
as an acceptable equivalent of the first principle. (It is doubtful
whether the Chinese themselves would have agreed to this degree
of equating tao with li.)
Chu Hsi’s commentary in his Chung-yung chang-chü
(Commentary on The Mean)61 on these passages from The Mean
refers to li several times, although the context is somewhat differ-
ent. The Mean text emphasizes the process of spiritual cultivation
involving Sincerity and the related distinctions between hsing (in-
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herent nature) and chiao (teaching), between the Way of Heaven
and the Way of man. Longobardi’s reference to the bestowal of
physical and moral being is supported in The Mean (chaps. 22)
where a progression, common in School of Principle writings, is
outlined. In this progression, one moves from one stage to an-
other: from attaining Sincerity to comprehension of one’s personal
nature, to comprehension of human nature, to comprehension of
the nature of things, to the ability to aid in the transformations of
Heaven and Earth, and finally, to the formation of a trinity with
Heaven and Earth. Moral knowledge and physical knowledge are
mutually absorbed by this advance toward wisdom.
Longobardi’s interpretation of the first principle as a natural
and universal entity filling the universe, both within and without,
is partially supported by The Mean (chap. 25) where Sincerity is
described as the completion of things as well as the completion of
the self. Completing the self is referred to as Humanity (jenb) and
completing things as Knowledge. By means of these virtues of in-
herent nature, the tao without is harmonized with the tao within.
Chu Hsi’s commentary emphasizes this external-internal aspect by
holding that Sincerity is the completion of the self and things. Hu-
manity (jenb) is the preservation of substance, and Knowledge is
the manifestation of function. Chu Hsi holds that these elements all
have a firm existence in one’s inherent nature and lack any distinc-
tion between inner and outer in the sense that inner attainments
are necessarily manifested in external phenomena. The implication
here is not simply that inner experience is manifested outwardly,
but that morality has both an inner and exterior dimension that can
be transformed into a harmony between man and the cosmos.
The most direct support for Longobardi’s interpretation comes
from The Mean (chap. 25). This chapter emphasizes the connec-
tion between the moral quality of Sincerity and the physical quality
of material generation and cosmic extension. The Way of Heaven
and Earth is summarized as being without duplication in the gen-
eration of multiplicity and suggests a parallel to Leibniz’ identity
of indiscernibles in which he infers from the Principle of Sufficient
Reason that “there cannot be in nature two real beings absolutely
indiscernible because if there were, God and nature would go
against reason, in treating the one otherwise than the other. And
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so God does not produce two portions of matter perfectly equal
and similar.”62 The chapter states that what concentrates before
our eyes is the singleness of a bright light that generates and ex-
tends as all the forms of light in the world and beyond the world
as sun, moon, stars, and so forth. What concentrates before us as
the singleness of a clump of earth generates and extends to bear
the weight of mountains and contain rivers and seas. What concen-
trates as a stone generates and extends as the products of grass
and trees, the abode of animals, and storehouse of gems. What
concentrates as a cup of water generates and extends to encom-
pass all forms of aquatic life and articles of value.
But while these passages from The Mean may support the
notion of a sovereign plenitude, they only imply the notion of
a complementary relationship between a vacuum and plenitude.
The implicit nature of such a complementary in The Mean could
help explain its popularity as a Neo-Confucian text in that such
a complementary began to be emphasized with the rise of Neo-
Confucianism in the early part of the Sung dynasty (960–1280).
Consequently, explicit support might be found in the extensive
passages of the Compendium. The evidence at hand does not con-
firm that Leibniz found it there through his indirect sources, but
whether he was relying on secondary sources or primarily project-
ing its existence into Chinese philosophy from his own philosophy,
the evidence for the existence of a complementary relationship be-
tween a vacuum and plenitude in Sung Neo-Confucian thinkers is
quite firm.
The notion of a sovereign plenitude is found in Chou Tun-i’s
“diagram of the t’ai-chi” (T’ai-chi t’u-shuo), which is quoted in
the Compendium. The first sentence is “Wu-chi erh t’ai-chi” or
“Under the circumstances of there being wu-chi (maximization of
nothingness), there is t’ai-chi (maximization of everything).” The
statement presents two maximized situations that exist simulta-
neously; hence, the diagram symbolizes the statement with a circle
(see Diagram 2). But both the circle and Chou’s explanation imply
something more than simply simultaneous existence. Rather, they
seem to describe two different representations of some underlying
unity.
For elucidation, one might turn to the other elements in Chou’s
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Diagram 2. Diagram of the
t’ai-chi (t’ai-chi t’u-shuo).
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explanation of the diagram of the t’ai-chi. Other component com-
plementaries include yin and yang, ch’ing (quiescence) and tung
(motion), ch’ien (the first hexagram or creative force) and k’un
(the second hexagram or receptive force), male and female.
Though citing polar extremes, Chou is concerned with the whole
and connects these extremes as elements in a type of organic
tension. The point of connection is associated with the term chi,
which refers to the ridgepole in a house or the celestial pole con-
necting the emperor’s throne with the pole star. In both cases,
the pole represents the center of focus, a point into which all
forces—whether of a house or a universe—converge and from
which they emerge. Viewed as the point of convergence, the point
represents the supreme nadir or maximization of nothingness for
all universal process, that is, wu-chi. But viewed as the point of
emergence, this same point represents the supreme source of po-
tential or the maximization of everything, t’ai-chi. Viewed from
the perspective of potential development, the point of initial emer-
gence represents the point of maximal unfolding.
One of the reasons why Chou Tun-i and his contemporary Shao
Yung are associated with the same Neo-Confucian school is be-
cause of their agreement on the wu-chi-t’ai-chi complementarity.
Though Shao substitutes t’ai-hsü for t’ai-chi, Shao’s complemen-
tarity seems to duplicate the relationship of Chou’s wu-chi-t’ai-
chi. For example, Shao states: “With the t’ai-hsü (supreme or
maximized potential), there mutually acts the wu-chi (minimized
potential or maximized actuality); therefore, Heaven cannot be ex-
hausted.”63
As with Chou’s wu-chi and t’ai-chi, Shao’s wu-chi and t’ai-hsü
represent two ways of looking at the same point—that is, from
the perspective of convergence (wu-chi) or emergence (t’ai-hsü).
While wu-chi represents the absence or exhaustion of potential,
t’ai-hsü represents the maximized potential. The term hsü means
vacuous or empty of actuality but pregnant with potential yet to
be actualized. To emphasize its specific kind of emptiness, hsü is
contrasted with k’ung, which refers to emptiness of both actuality
and potentiality. Shao states that “the Book of Changes speaks of
hsü [empty of actuality], but does not speak of wu [nonbeing]. It
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speaks of concealment, but does not speak of k’ung [empty of both
actuality and potentiality].”64
Chang Tsai (1020–1077), another Neo-Confucian philosopher
frequently quoted in the Compendium, appears to have a more so-
phisticated conception of a vacuum-plenitude complementarity in
which the vacuum or void (hsü) is identified with Chang’s concep-
tion of material force (ch’i). In making a point that bears upon
this discussion, the contemporary scholar T’ang Chün-i holds that
Chang Tsai rejects the Newtonian position of matter in an infinite
vacuum and instead agrees that Chang sees the void of a thing
as lying within the thing itself rather than without. Employing the
continual flux of process, as opposed to inert matter, the concrete
materiality of ch’i of one thing makes contact with another by
means of this void within (i.e. potential aspect) enabling it to tran-
scend its corporeal limits (i.e., actualized aspect) and interact and
consequently transform itself into something else.65
It is worth noting that the early Sung Neo-Confucianists such
as Chou Tun-i, Shao Yung, and Chang Tsai were more influenced
by Taoism than was Chu Hsi. The notion of a void is quite prevalent
in each of their philosophies. The term wu-chi was probably taken
from chapter 28 of the Lao Tzu. Chu Hsi sought to minimize the
Taoist influence and so made certain reinterpretations and addi-
tions to Chou Tun-i’s explanation of the t’ai-chi diagram. Primary
among these was his emphasis on the term t’ai-chi over that of
wu-chi and his consequent identification of li (principle) with t’ai-
chi. This identification is not present in Chou Tun-i’s philosophy.66
We have already noted Leibniz’ rejection of Cartesian exten-
sion as overly inert and his emphasis upon treating matter as re-
ducible not to discrete, inert atomic units of matter but to units of
force called monads. Yet while the monad may be defined as force,
monads do not manifest themselves in the phenomenal world.
Rather, they are interior, not in the sense of being physically inside
but in the sense that Chang Tsai’s void exists inside the actualized
manifestation of ch’i as potential. Where Leibniz appears to differ
from the Chinese concept is in his emphasis on the predetermined
aspect of the monads. The absence of an equivalent logical inter-
est in China, combined with the presence of a highly developed
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tradition of spiritual cultivation that had no such highly developed
counterpart in Europe, contributed to this difference. While the
techniques of logic work to isolate and freeze certain elements,
those of spiritual cultivation must deal with the continual flux and
vicissitudes of the human experience.
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5
The Discourse on Chinese
Philosophy: Part II
Spiritual Substances
The Discourse on the Natural Theology of The Chinese presents
the Chinese doctrine on spiritual substances as a subject of
fundamental importance and intimately related to the doctrine of
li. Leibniz does not view the Chinese doctrine on spirits as a sep-
arate theological matter, but as part of the philosophical doctrine.
As with Leibniz’ treatment of so many Chinese matters, we have
here an interpretation of Chinese philosophy that parallels his own
approach to Western philosophy. A fundamental question is: How
valid are these similarities that Leibniz perceived?
Contrary to some opinions,1 I do not see the evidence to sup-
port the view that Chinese philosophy was influential in shaping
Leibniz’ own philosophy. Leibniz’ early correspondence with
Grimaldi shows just how undeveloped his knowledge of China was
in the year 1689, and this was three or more years after the first
formulation of his mature philosophy in the Discourse on Meta-
physics (1686). The initiation of the correspondence with Bouvet in
1697, following the writing of the Novissima Sinica, marks the be-
ginning of a deeper knowledge of China. By this time, Leibniz was
moving outward toward an application of his system with practical
consequences. In the relationship with China, he saw a chance for
such an application.
It is too simple to say that his motivation, whether philo-
sophical, political, or religious, predetermined the nature of his
interpretation of Chinese philosophy. The motivation was there
and forms part of the picture, but it is not dominant. The purer
forms of objectivity do not always aid an investigation to the de-
gree that is often assumed. While more superficial predisposing
molds of thought usually hinder the process, predisposing forms
of thought of a more profound level of awareness can aid an in-
vestigation. This, of course, assumes that truth is not infinitely
malleable and that Leibniz brought a depth of awareness to his in-
vestigation of Chinese philosophy that gave him insights he might
otherwise not have seen. In short, the fact that Leibniz carried
a relatively mature conception of his own thought into his study
of China both distorted and deepened his interpretation of Chi-
nese philosophy. Had the positive motivation—one could call it
prejudicial in terms of its subjectivity—not been present, he would
probably not have become involved with interpreting Chinese phi-
losophy.
Leibniz is aware of the problematic nature of the question of
whether the Chinese recognize spiritual substances. After giving
the matter a great deal of thought, he states in the Discourse 22
that the Chinese have recognized spiritual substances; however,
they do not usually separate spiritual substances from matter.
Leibniz recognizes that even though this notion differs from the
dominant Christian view of his day that separates spiritual sub-
stance from matter, it is a fact that several ancient church fathers
believed that angels have bodies. Furthermore, Leibniz himself
believes that “the rational soul is never entirely stripped of all mat-
ter.” This view is part of Leibniz’ conception of reality approached,
as described in the previous chapter, from different levels. On the
metaphysical level, there are monads; on the abstract phenomenal
level are forces; on the observed phenomenal level are bodies. The
notion of force is the link between the monad and the body and is
not unlike the connection between the Neo-Confucian ch’i (mater-
ial force) and li. Ch’i is logically subordinate to li just as force and
body are in some sense logically subordinate to the monad.
Leibniz is aware of the pertinence of li and ch’i to the argu-
ment and cites the Neo-Confucian concept as definitive in setting
forth the view of the Chinese link between God, as the soul of the
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world, and matter. Nevertheless, he again demonstrates his con-
fusion of later Neo-Confucian philosophy with the classical and
ancient Chinese philosophies by attributing the concept of li as
first principle and ch’i as its production to the “most ancient au-
thors of China.” Clearly, the full conception of li and ch’i was not
explicitly developed until the eleventh and twelfth centuries A.D.,
even though much of the theory may have been implicit in earlier
Chinese notions.
Leibniz describes the Chinese tendency to link matter with
spiritual substance by citing their attribution of spirits to ele-
ments, streams, and mountains. He explains that by means of
this attribution, the Chinese bestow the force of action—Leibniz
interprets li as the First Action—upon these things. Leibniz com-
pares this to the attribution by the ancient Christian fathers of
“subtle and ethereal bodies” to genies and angels. While Leibniz
recognizes that this attribution is probably erroneous, it would
not subvert an acceptance of Christianity. Leibniz notes that the
scholastic influence has led some to concur with Aristotle that cer-
tain intelligences govern the celestial spheres, and he compares
this to the Chinese view that their ancestors and great men are
among these types of spirits and are similar to angels. Among
those who have held such views, both in China and in Europe,
the attribution of bodies to these genies or angels by no means
excludes the attribution of spiritual substances, or rational souls.
Consequently, Leibniz concludes the Discourse 23 by denying the
position of Longobardi and Sainte-Marie that the Chinese attribu-
tion of bodies to their spirits means that they deny the existence of
spiritual substances.
In the Discourse 144, Leibniz draws from Longobardi’s inter-
pretation (Religion Treatise 12:7–8) of the Compendium (bk. 28,
pp. 2b–3a) to discuss the relationship of Chinese spirits to li.5
Though Longobardi’s translation appears to be adequate, some-
thing should be said here of the highly controversial nature of
certain Chinese terms in translation. Since some of the terms
Longobardi is translating remain problematical in meaning, any
translation represents an interpretation as well as a translation.
For instance, a fairly literal translation of the passage at hand
might be: “Someone asked whether spirits are simply material
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force (ch’i). And Chu Hsi answered that within this material force
there is something akin to spiritual substance (shen-ling). Longo-
bardi translates the same passage as: “Someone asks: Are spirits
air [ch’i]? And he [Chu Hsi] answers that it would seem perhaps
that they are force, vigor and activity [shen-ling] which is in the air
rather than the air itself.” In sum, Longobardi’s rendering repre-
sents a debatable possibility.
Chu-tzu (that is, Chu Hsi) is said to claim that spirits are called
li; however, Leibniz recognizes an ambiguity by which li is some-
times grasped by the supreme spirit and sometimes through all
the spirit, that is, spiritual substance. Leibniz suggests that etymo-
logically li signifies “reason” or “rule,” which is, in fact, somewhat
similar to the etymological interpretation of “patterning” that the
Chinese attribute to li. Continuing with Longobardi’s rendering of
the Chinese text, Leibniz deduces that all spirits are species of li in
the sense that li constitutes the substance and universal activity of
all things. Leibniz notes that the Chinese distinguish the li of the
air from the matter of the air, in which circumstance li signifies not
prime spiritual substance, but spiritual substance in general. Leib-
niz equates this spiritual substance with “Entelechy, that is, that
this is endowed with the activity and perception or rule of action
like Souls.” Both the term “entelechy” and the definition corres-
pond to one form of the Leibnizian monad.6
This identification with the monad is further strengthened
when Leibniz goes on to interpret the Chinese passage in the
Compendium (bk. 28, p. 3a) that treats differences as a matter of
relative degree of grossness or extension of the material. He ex-
plains this in terms of a scale of perfection in which li or spirit
is joined to matter of varying degrees of grossness and extension.
Leibniz judges that the Chinese author, in seeking to explain dif-
ferences in spirits in terms of the medium of matter, its degree
of grossness or extension, shows that he has not sufficiently pen-
etrated the issue. In this respect, the Chinese author shows a
certain similarity to many European philosophers. Leibniz believes
that the failure is one of not perceiving the preestablished har-
mony of all things. The attempt to find differences in varying
degrees of grossness or extension, although not incorrect in itself,
fails to penetrate far enough.
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In Leibniz’ view, the real differences emerge from an interior
dimension, which the degree of grossness or extension of matter
merely reflects. This interior dimension structures things into a
hierarchy in which they are graded according to their degree of
perception and consciousness. At the bottom of the hierarchy are
inert objects to which we might attribute “bare monads.” Moving
up the scale to plants and animals, we have a dominant monad that
reflects an increase in psychological, perceptional, and conscious
powers and is called a “soul.” With man and other higher intelli-
gences, the dominant monad increases its ability to the point of
being able to reason and consequently acquire a sense of morality.
These dominant monads are called “spirits.”7 Finally, God repre-
sents the supreme monad. Not all Leibniz scholars accept the view
that God is a monad.8 In Leibniz’ interpretation of the Chinese con-
cept of spirits, he implies an equation between the supreme li and
the supreme monad and calls both of them God. So without specif-
ically saying that God is a supreme monad, Leibniz’ argument in
the Discourse supports such a view.
Spirits and Sacrifice
The connection between li and sacrifice is brought out when Leib-
niz (Discourse 549) cites Longobardi’s translation (Religion Trea-
tise 12:2–3) of the Compendium (bk. 28, pp. 37a–37b). In the
passage, the Neo-Confucian philosopher Ch’eng I rejects as highly
ignorant any appeal to the temple idols of the forest and earth for
rain on the grounds that reason and observation of the relations
and proportions of things will show it is the vapors of mountains
and streams that produce rain and consequently it is the spirits of
the mountains and streams to which one should direct his appeals.
Only in this way will there be an accord with the spirits or uni-
versal spirit shang-ti or li, the supreme reason governing all. This
represents a critical reference by Ch’eng I to Chinese folk religion,
possibly intermingled with traces of Taoism and Buddhism.
Most Neo-Confucianists professed, as did Ricci, a highly crit-
ical attitude toward Buddhism. But several of these same Neo-
Confucianists, for example, Chu Hsi and Chang Tsai, understood
and admired a great deal in Buddhism. The contradiction in their
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outlook was partially stimulated by their perception of Buddhism
as a form of competition for their own beliefs. In their tendency
to be stimulated into criticism of Buddhism out of a sense of com-
petition, they seem to have been joined by Matteo Ricci. Leibniz
accepts this rendering by Longobardi, up to the point where Lon-
gobardi holds that the Chinese would regard the spirits of the
mountains and streams as consisting not of a spiritual substance
but of material air (ch’i). Leibniz seems quite justified in rejecting
Longobardi’s position. In the Neo-Confucian view, ch’i nearly al-
ways requires the concomitant presence of li.
Longobardi’s skill as a translator is demonstrated in a long
paragraph translated from the Compendium (bk. 28, p. 38b) in
the Religion Treatise 12:9 and cited by Leibniz in the Discourse
51.10 (Sainte-Marie gives a loose paraphrase of this passage in the
Mission Treatise, p. 30.) While Longobardi uses the passage to
reemphasize his view of the ultimately material basis of Chinese
spirits, Leibniz uses the passage to confirm the existence of a Chi-
nese concept of spirits as ultimately spiritual. The passage is a
quotation from Chu Hsi, who holds that were there no spirits, the
ancients would not have carried out the seven days of sexual ab-
stinence and the three days of fasting prior to certain types of
sacrifices. In assigning particular objects of sacrifice to different
levels of society, Chu Hsi may have struck a chord sympathetic to
Leibniz’ hierarchic but organic monadic scheme. The emperor sac-
rifices to Heaven and Earth, the feudal lords (Longobardi: “princes
and dukes”) to the mountains and streams, and the great ministers
(Longobardi: “lords”) to the five sacrifices (i.e., various household
spirits). Further on in this section of the Compendium, schools and
universities are said to sacrifice to Confucius, and there is an enu-
meration of other groups and their objects of sacrifice, down to the
sacrifices of the common people to their ancestors.11
Longobardi draws from this same section of the Compendium
to show a certain depth of appreciation, which while not equal
to that of Ricci or other Jesuits, is considerably above that of
Sainte-Marie. The latter’s Mission Treatise frequently reads like a
detailed travel journal in which his observations of Chinese reli-
gious practices, including sacrifice, have been carefully recorded.
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But his appreciation of the inner aspects of Confucian rites is so
meager and unsympathetic that his accounts suffer to the point of
being mere records of external detail that fail to grasp the inner
significance and frequently mislead. On the other hand, his trans-
lations of Chinese texts have a certain accuracy. Longobardi, who
is more familiar than Sainte-Marie with the classical texts—the
core of the Confucian tradition—shows some awareness of this in-
ner dimension. This awareness is reflected in the Compendium
(bk. 28, pp. 38b–39a), translated by Longobardi in the Religion
Treatise 12:10 and cited by Leibniz in the Discourse 5212.
In this passage, a disciple asks Chu Hsi whether one sacrifices
in order to demonstrate the proper inner state of reverence or be-
cause ch’i (“air”) comes to receive the offering. In answering, Chu
Hsi attempts a middle path that will encourage people to sacri-
fice and yet show that the nature of spirits cannot be depicted by
the imagination. Consequently, he says that if nothing comes to re-
ceive the sacrifice, there is no reason to sacrifice, yet credulity is
strained by any notion of an ethereal carriage descending to re-
ceive the sacrifice. It is quite possible that Longobardi’s treatment
of spirits as material was strengthened by Chu Hsi’s reference to
the spirits by the term ch’i. But, as is made clear many times in
the texts by Chu Hsi, ch’i never stands without li, except in the ab-
stract, and Chu Hsi must have been using the term ch’i in a looser
sense than as the complementary to li.
There is, however, another thing about Chu Hsi’s answer that
is atypical of both classical Confucianism and Neo-Confucian-
ism—the lack of emphasis on the cultivation of inner reverence.
Such a cultivation was present, for example, in the previously
cited passage from the Compendium in which several days of
sexual abstinence and fasting prepared the inner state of the
person for the sacrifice. This imbalance is partially rectified in
the Compendium (bk. 28, pp. 39a–39b), from which passages are
translated in the Religion Treatise 12:12 and described in the
Mission Treatise (pp. 30–32), where a certain necessity of accord
between the “air” of the sacrificer and the object of the sacrifice
is discussed. The tendency to become entangled in investigation
of the nature of spirits and the consequent detraction from the
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cultivation of inner reverence and morally informed action were a
great concern expressed by Confucius in the Analects. Perhaps we
should now turn to Confucius’ view of spirits.
Confucius’ View of Spirits
In the Discourse 4813, Leibniz takes up the famous sinological
question of whether Confucius was agnostic, along with the very
terse evidence given in the Analects. Leibniz detects a division be-
tween the Chinese literati who seek to explain the ways of Heaven
and Earth completely in terms of natural causes and the general
populace who explain their world in terms of the supernatural,
and spirits that act as variations of a deus ex machina. Leibniz
believes that the literati’s path would better enable them to under-
stand recent European advances reducing natural phenomena to
mathematical causes and distinguishing between macrocosm and
microcosm. But such causes would not be understood as emanat-
ing from any sort of supernatural machine.
This view is consistent with Leibniz’ conviction that the ad-
vances of European natural philosophy are reconcilable with a
Christian, though not necessarily with any Christian, concept of
God. While God was not fully intelligible to man, he was partially
open to man’s understanding, and open to the extent that worldly
phenomena could be comprehended without resorting to any su-
pernatural device. (One of Leibniz’ reasons for rejecting Newton’s
theory of gravitation was that he thought the theory would require
the perpetual miracle—that is, the unexplained force—of action at
a distance.) Nevertheless, the difficulties of such comprehension
were great, and Leibniz believes that Confucius’ reticence on the
subject of spirits can be traced to his concern that only those suf-
ficiently advanced in wisdom could comprehend such matters.
In such a way, Leibniz explains Confucius’ reluctance as
described in the Analects 5:12,14 where the disciple Tzu-kung
complains of his failure to get the master to speak on human na-
ture and the “natural state” of Heaven. Leibniz then paraphrases
the Analects 6:20, stating that the good manner of governing
the people is by doing so in a way that honors the spirits while
maintaining a distance from them. Leibniz next cites the Analects
7:20, where Confucius is said to have affected a great silence on
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four things—one of which was spirit(s). Finally, Leibniz cites the
Analects 11:11 and interprets it to mean that Confucius sought
to free himself from the constant questioning of his disciples on
matters of the spirits, the rational soul, and life after death by for-
mulating a general rule confining them to affairs of this life while
restricting them from matters of spirits and the dead.
Longobardi provides Leibniz with accurate translations or para-
phrases of the Analects passages cited above. Yet Longobardi offers
no compelling reasons for Confucius’ reticence on matters of spirits,
the rational soul, and life after death. Lonogbardi’s suggestion that
Confucius’ reticence was due to the secrecy of an esoteric doctrine
is an insufficient motive. In the Discourse 49,15 Leibniz briefly raises
the possibility that Confucius was ignorant of spiritual matters, but
he does not appear to regard the suggestion very seriously. In the
Discourse 50,16 however, he regards more seriously the possibility
that Confucius’ silence on spiritual matters may have been similar
to that of authors who urge that God and the spiritual realm be
revered without discussing and disputing their nature and manner
of operation. This notion would represent an emphasis on spiritual
cultivation that operates in the immediate present. As such, the
emphasis on this life is dictated not by agnosticism but by the func-
tional needs of the process of spiritual cultivation beginning with the
present moment, with the now of experience. Given such a need,
speculations about spirits and life after death represent intellectual
distractions from the immediate path. This is an essential point to
which I return in the concluding chapter.
In the Discourse 2917, Leibniz discusses the Chinese association
of li with t’ien (Heaven). Leibniz argues that Heaven should not be
understood in its physical sense, but in the sense of a supreme de-
ity as described in the Mission Treatise (pp. 12–13). In this work,
Sainte-Marie links the Chinese Heaven with the same place where
European pagans used to locate their supreme deity Jupiter, and he
stresses Heaven as the absolute deity for the Chinese. Leibniz cites
Longobardi who, in listing the attributes of the first principle of the
Chinese, says that they call it li (Religion Treatise 14:1) and locate
it in Heaven (Religion Treatise 14:10) because the sky is qualita-
tively the best part of the universe. Leibniz presses the association
between li and Heaven by drawing from the description attributed to
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the Analects 2:5 praising both li and Heaven as principles of incom-
parable essence and without equal in the universe.
Though Leibniz does not cite it as such, the source of his refer-
ence to the Analects is probably the Religion Treatise 14:17, where
Longobardi discusses the Chinese use of shang-ti (King-on-high),
t’ien (Heaven), and li as near-synonyms. In contrast to Leibniz,
however, Longobardi specifies in the following section that the
similarities between these synonyms and the Christian God are
only apparent and dissolve when li is seen in its true essence as
prime matter. There is, however, a textual problem in that the ref-
erences by both Longobardi and Leibniz to the Analects 2:5 appear
in error since this passage contains no reference to t’ien, li, or
shang-ti. Though the passage does contain a reference to another
lid (Propriety, Ritual), which Chu Hsi’s commentary treats as the
li (principles) of externals, the contents seem clearly unrelated to
the point Longobardi makes.
Rather than Analects 2:5, a possible source of the reference is
Analects 5:12, where the term t’ien-tao appears in the text.18 This
term is a binomial composed of “Heaven” and the “Way” and may
be rendered as the “Heavenly Way”; however, Longobardi may
have inferred, not without some basis, that such a juxtaposition
implies some sense of identity between the two terms. Since tao
has been used elsewhere by Longobardi as a synonym for li and
since Chu Hsi’s commentary on this passage—to which Longobardi
was quite possibly exposed—defines t’ien-tao as “the natural basic
substance of Heavenly Principle,”19 the result may have been a de-
rivation on Longobardi’s part of a close association between li and
Heaven.
But there is an additional complication. As with the Analects
15:28, in which there were differences between missionary and
modern translations, there would seem to be differences in the in-
terpretation of 5:12. In his translation notes, James Legge points
out the difficulties involved in both passages. Both Chu Hsi and
modern interpreters treat the passage as referring to Confucius’
willingness to speak on personal manifestations of goodness but
reticence to discuss man’s nature and the Way of Heaven. Could
the missionaries have interpreted this reticence as a manifestation
of respect and reverence? (A similar interpretation is possible for
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the Analects 6:20, where Confucius speaks of revering the spirits
while keeping one’s distance from them.) Could this reticence in
some way represent praise toward matters of Heaven, tao, and li,
as well as toward human nature?
The Chinese Concept of Soul
In the Discourse 2020, Leibniz criticizes Longobardi in the Religion
Treatise 14:19 for interpreting the Compendium (bks. 26 and 34)
as evidence for the belief that the world contains nothing really
spiritual, but that all is ultimately material.21 Since specific pas-
sages from the Compendium are not cited, it is difficult to check
the direct accuracy of Leibniz’ interpretation, but there seems to
be an organic basis in Neo-Confucian cosmology for his claim that
particular souls are not reducible to discrete elements of matter,
that is, material atoms, but are “all united of body.” Knowingly
or unknowingly, Leibniz also interprets the Chinese view in accor-
dance with his own view when he claims that the Chinese hold
that the soul after death would not be stripped of all “organized
matter” or “fashioning air.” The notion that death represents mere
diminution of growth for the soul, and birth a hastening of growth,
can be found in the Monadology no. 73.
The distinction between a lighter and heavier soul is promi-
nent in Chinese religion. In the Discourse 5922 Leibniz describes
the death of the legendary King Yao in terms of the separation of
a lighter from a heavier soul. The source is traced back through
the Religion Treatise 15:4 to the Book of History (“bk. 1, p. 16”),
but the closest equivalent is found in the Book of History II, i, III,
13, which speaks of the death of King Yao but does not support
Leibniz’ description of higher and lower souls. However, Legge’s
commentary on this passage cites Chu Hsi as making such a dis-
tinction. There are other bases on which to make this distinction,
and Longobardi cites two of them in the Religion Treatise 15. First,
in the Religion Treatise 15:5, he refers to the Compendium (bk.
28, p. 41a), where Ch’eng I is loosely quoted as saying that when
a man dies, the heaven and earth separate; the pure air, which is
the human entity, returns to heaven and the corporeality, or the
earthly entity, returns to earth. The other basis of support comes
from the Book of Odes III, 1, i, 1 (“bk. 6, p.1”), cited twice by
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Leibniz, who draws from both Longobardi and Sainte-Marie and
presents King Wen, rather than Yao, in such a situation.
In the Discourse 5823, Leibniz raises the difficult problem of
communicating to the Chinese the true meaning of the Christian
soul. As is often the case in cultural transmission, certain in-
digenous terms were used to ease the entry of foreign concepts
into the native tongue. The initial usefulness of such native terms
fades, however, as the secondary stages of the transmission ap-
proach and demand a precision and clarity in terminology for
which the native near-equivalents no longer suffice. A similar situ-
ation occurred with the introduction of Buddhism to China in the
early centuries of the first millennium A.D., when the ko-i method
of seeking native Chinese equivalents for Buddhist terminology
lost its initial effectiveness and was eventually rejected with a
growth in linguistic, doctrinal, and spiritual knowledge.
Leibniz offers Longobardi’s citation of “Dr. Paul’s” (Hsü’s) ex-
pression of confusion in regard to Chinese near-equivalents of
the Christian soul, such as ling-hun (that which subsists after the
death of the body) and yu-hun (wandering soul). The term ling-
hun is associated with the Book of Odes III, 1, i, 1, where the
ancient founder of the Chou dynasty, King Wen, is said to have
received the Mandate of Heaven for the new dynasty and is de-
scribed as rising and descending at the left and right sides of
God (ti). Leibniz’ source is the Religion Treatise 15:5–7, where we
find the above-cited reference to the Compendium (bk. 28, p. 41a)
describing the separation of celestial and earthly components at
death and Longobardi’s attempts to distinguish between “air” and
the soul, two elements frequently confused by the Chinese. Longo-
bardi does this by citing the Book of Odes III, 1, i, 1, where it is
said that King Wen rises and descends at the side of the King-on-
high. He holds that it is not a soul that rises (i.e., lives after death)
but rather a manifestation of “celestial air” that persists after the
death of the person. Longobardi explains the description of rising
and falling near the King-on-high as a reference to the unordered
and random movement of this air that pervades the universe. It
may be an indication of his materialistic interpretation that Longo-
bardi refers to the soul which separates from the body as yu-hun
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(wandering soul or ghost) and omits mention of ling-hun (spiritual
soul), which Leibniz uses in describing this passage.
Following a materialistic interpretation, Longobardi holds that
this chaotic air associated with the “soul” is governed by the body
and the chaotic air of heaven is ordered by heavenly bodies. Lon-
gobardi reasserts that the Chinese attribute immortality only to li
(universal substance), which both pervades and follows after all
passing phenomena. All this li is in Longobardi’s view, of course,
not spiritual but consists of prime matter.
In the Discourse 6524, Leibniz again discusses the Book of
Odes III, 1, i, 1; but in this instance he draws upon Sainte-Marie’s
interpretation of the passage in the Mission Treatise (p. 27). In ar-
guing that the ancient Chinese professed the immortality of the
soul, Leibniz holds that the ancient doctrine speaks of souls re-
ceiving rewards and punishment after death. Furthermore, Leibniz
argues that even though contemporary Confucianists tend to mock
notions of an afterlife—they in fact treat them as Buddhist vulgari-
ties—these same Chinese recognize a supreme source of wisdom
and justice which, Leibniz feels, logically extends to the world of
spirits and souls. Leibniz argues that this system of a cosmic mon-
arch would, like that of the monarch of man, require rewards and
punishment for the preservation of order. Leibniz sees the ancient
Chinese making the same recognition and casting shang-ti as a
dispenser of justice. Leibniz cites Sainte-Marie’s description of the
Book of Odes III, 1, i, 1 in the Mission Treatise (p. 27), setting forth
the rewards of virtuous kings who after their death rise to assist
the King-on-high. Further, Leibniz argues that the same passage
describes kings rising to Heaven and descending to Earth, and he
interprets this in a manner similar to Sainte-Marie—namely, that
this represents the process by which kings can aid the living.
Metaphysics versus Spiritual Cultivation
In the Mission Treatise (pp. 69–70), Sainte-Marie cites Confucius
as saying in The Mean that t’ien-tao, which Sainte-Marie equates
with li, certainly governs Heaven in its courses and natural opera-
tions and, furthermore, that li constitutes its own truth, its own
law, and infallible regularity. Leibniz in the Discourse 2925 accepts
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this explanation of t’ien-tao (Heavenly Tao, principle), in part, on
the basis of Sainte-Marie’s attribution of such a definition to Con-
fucius in The Mean.
As with most of Leibniz’ judgments of the validity of a partic-
ular secondary interpretation by Sainte-Marie or Longobardi, the
acceptance or rejection is made not so much on external famil-
iarity with the original text as on grounds of logic and internal
consistency. When Leibniz does make a positive judgment, how-
ever, he feels that the text will support him. Examination shows
that such support is not always clear-cut, even though in this case
Leibniz’ acceptance of Sainte-Marie’s interpretation appears to be
on consistent grounds.26
If Sainte-Marie’s reference to t’ien-tao may be taken as a very
loose paraphrase rather than a close translation, then a possible
source is The Mean (chap. 20) in conjunction with Chu Hsi’s com-
mentary on this passage. The Mean text reads:
Sincerity is the Way of Heaven (t’ien chih tao). The process of be-
coming sincere is the Way of man. Sincerity does not strive and
yet is at the Mean. It is not conscious and yet succeeds. It follows
and is enveloped in the Way. This is sagehood. In the process of
becoming Sincere, one grasps the good and firmly holds on to it.
Chu Hsi comments on this passage as follows:
The above passage presents and discusses the Sincere person.
Sincerity as genuine reality and lack of deception is what is meant
by the natural condition of Heavenly Principle (t’ien-li). The
process of becoming sincere implies that though one has not yet
reached the stage of being genuinely real and without deception,
yet he has the desire to be so. This is what is meant by the proper
condition of human affairs. The power-virtue of sagehood is the
fulfillment of Heavenly Principle. If one who is genuinely real and
without deception does not wait for conscious deliberation, but
follows and is enveloped in the Way, this then is the Way of Heaven
(t’ien chih tao).27
This commentary provides a foundation on which to associate
t’ien-tao with li as well as some basis for Sainte-Marie’s descrip-
tion of li, which Leibniz accepts. But if this is the textual basis
for Sainte-Marie’s reference, to the extent that he fails to refer to
Sincerity he misses the essential meaning and essential religious
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aspect of Confucianism. Consequently, he continues to be limited
to the outer manifestation of the Confucian rites as well as be-
ing limited in the depth of knowledge of Chinese religion he is
able to communicate to Leibniz. While Leibniz seems to have had
some remarkable insights into the metaphysical nature of Neo-
Confucian philosophy, the highly developed spiritual cultivation of
classical Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism largely eluded him.
The notion of Sincerity appears in reference to Leibniz’ use
of The Mean. In discussing spirits (Discourse 4328), Leibniz main-
tains that Sainte-Marie had misunderstood Confucius’ meaning on
the connection between spirits and things. The separation of the
two elements occurs not, as Sainte-Marie holds, because the Chi-
nese believe that spirits disintegrate but because things perish, a
fact that Longobardi seems to have grasped. Leibniz demonstrates
Longobardi’s comprehension of this point by citing the latter’s in-
terpretation of The Mean (chap. 16), where according to Leibniz it
is held that spirits constitute part of the being of things from which
they are separated only when the things—not the spirits—are de-
stroyed.29
Leibniz then gives his own interpretation that Confucius’ use
of spirits as parts of things does not include all spirits and further
that the notion of “part” as related to spirits refers to something
internal to a thing and “requisite to its substance or conservation.”
This is similar to the notion of connection that appears in Leibniz’
conception of monadic parts. In the latter, unique monadic units
are connected by a preestablished inner harmony by which each
monad reflects all other monads. The Chinese “things” to which
the spirit is necessarily connected assumes a yang and then a
yin stage, moves and then is quiet, flows and then ebbs, and
then repeats the entire process. The Leibnizian parallel is the
monad’s material manifestation whose flow and ebb is defined
as an increase (commonly associated with birth) and diminution
(commonly associated with death).
In one of Leibniz’ sources of interpretation of The Mean (chap.
16), Longobardi (Religion Treatise 11:17) poses and answers the
question as to whether the sacrificer directs his actions toward
the spiritual component of something or to the thing itself. First
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of all, Longobardi correctly stresses that there is a great amount
of tradition involved and the emphasis on authority has blurred
the consciousness of the situation. The sacrifices involve customs
handed down from antiquity, and their value is, to a great extent,
derived from this transmission. Longobardi then notes that most
capable scholars see li and ch’i in the objects of their sacrifice.
Here Longobardi cites The Mean (chap. 16), where he holds that
Confucius explained spirits as parts composing the being of a
thing, the objects of great inner and external forms of reverence.
Leibniz, however, diverges from Longobardi when the latter ex-
plains in the Religion Treatise 10:3 that the being of the thing
constituting spirit refers to the essence of the material rather
than to its spiritual nature. Picking up on The Mean (chap. 16)
treatment of kuei-shan as two different manifestations of ch’i, Lon-
gobardi concludes that the Chinese concept of spirits does not
fully qualify as a spiritual concept familiar to the West but is insep-
arable from the materiality associated with ch’i.30
As for the text of The Mean (chap. 16), it is a short chapter that
emphasizes the subtlety of kuei-shen (spirits) and the difficulty of
perceiving them and, by implication, the difficulty of distinguish-
ing them from things.31 Their subtle nature requires caution in
one’s treatment of them. Fasting, sexual abstinence, and careful
observance of dress are employed in cultivating the proper atti-
tude toward spirits. Sincerity is meant to be both the result and
the medium for contact with spirits since it is one of the ways in
which these subtle spiritual elements manifest themselves.
Leibniz’ interpretation of the Chinese concept of spirits seems
a possible derivation from The Mean text and commentary by Chu
Hsi, as passed on to Leibniz by Longobardi. However, the difficulty
of calling it a fully accurate or even probable derivation is com-
plicated by the fact that it is based on lines of development that
the Chinese text and commentary merely infer but never actu-
ally develop. Consequently, evaluation in terms of the accuracy
or inaccuracy of Leibniz’ and, to a certain extent, Longobardi’s
intepretations involves no direct referent, only an implied one.
Leibniz, for instance, interprets the Chinese spirits as an essential
component of the substance of a given thing. The Chinese text and
commentary may imply this, but explicitly the stress is not nearly
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so much metaphysical as experiential. The Confucian concern is
with the perception and understanding of the location of spirits,
or the spiritual, as a step toward making proper contact and at-
taining the fruits of such contact. This should not be interpreted in
such a coarse external sense as Sainte-Marie tends to do. Leibniz’
interest in the Chinese text is intellectual and political, though he
openly professes a religious concern. The Chinese interest, on the
other hand, is a very immediate spiritual concern to which meta-
physics is the handmaiden.
The Discourse 6632 gives an instance of how dependent Leib-
niz can be upon his secondary sources for information on Chinese
practices. In this passage, Leibniz discusses the Chinese cult of an-
cestors, said to have been passed down from the ancient Chinese
of the third millennium B.C. The cult involves the formal expres-
sion of gratitude by the living toward the dead, the recompense
of Heaven, and the stimulation of the living to act in a way that
will gain posterity for them through cultic worship. Leibniz makes
note of an additional theme in ancestor worship whereby the spir-
its of virtuous ancestors acquire access to the “Monarch of the
Universe” (i.e. God) and consequently the power to reward their
descendants.
Leibniz refers to Confucius’ honoring of Shun (legendary
reign: 2255–2204 B.C.) as the founder of the cult of ancestors
and to his tracing of the prosperity of the realm to this cult. (Ac-
cording to traditional Chinese legendary sources, Shun is said to
have passed his authority on to Yü who by passing it on to his
own son initiated a genealogical line that became the first Chi-
nese dynasty, the Hsia.) Leibniz describes Confucius as praising
the ancient kings (Yao, Shun, and Yü) as models for posterity and
asserting that he who would completely comprehend the cult of
Heaven and Earth and the reasons for sacrifices to one’s ancestors
will achieve peace, prosperity, and good government.
As sources for this information, Leibniz cites chapters from
The Mean.33 He apparently relied upon Sainte-Marie, who in the
Mission Treatise (pp. 21–24) presents an almost direct and gen-
erally accurate translation of The Mean (chaps. 17–19). But in
his interpretive summary of these chapters, Sainte-Marie errs by
stressing Confucius’ belief in the happiness of the realm as depen-
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dent on the external element of ancestral protection, whereas the
Confucian emphasis was in fact on the inner element of reverence
and its connection to external action informed by this reverence.
Correspondences between Western and Chinese Philosophy
Central to Leibniz’ ecumenical plan was the belief in the existence
of correspondences between Western and ancient Chinese cul-
tures, of which he hypothesized the following:
1. That there are correspondences between the diagrams of
the Book of Changes and Leibniz’ binary mathematics.
2. That Confucian and Leibnizian philosophy express a similar
relationship between interior and exterior dimensions. (This rela-
tionship could be described as between the dimensions of the Chi-
nese li and phenomena and between the dimensions of Leibnizian
monads and phenomena, of which the essential intermediaries are
ch’i and vis viva, respectively, both involving the notion of physical
force.)
3. That the metaphysical connection between li and the mon-
ads participates in an organic whole that connects unique units
but is without separable parts.
4. That part of this connection is accomplished through a
mirroring process.
5. That li and the monads are each of a particular and a uni-
versal variety, the latter denoted by t’ai-chi and God, respectively.
6. That li and the monads are both ultimately rational and spir-
itual in essence and that both bear a type of logical priority toward
their phenomenal representations.
7. That t’ai-chi represents an immense capacity that, trans-
lated from a metaphysical to a physical level, contains all elements
and excludes the possibility of a vacuum.
8. That t’ai-chi most essentially represents an order of rela-
tions and that this compares to the Leibnizian notion of space,
which rejects a vacuum, or any notion of space or time, as ab-
solutely real. T’ai-chi instead represents, on its most basic level,
an order of relations.
9. That there is an affinity between Chinese and Christian con-
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cepts of spirituality and that the Chinese sacrifices reflect in their
order and hierarchy a rationality similar to that of Christianity.
10. That shang-ti, t’ien, and li are near-equivalents of the
Christian concept of God and that t’ai-chi, li, and ch’i, taken to-
gether, correspond to the Christian Trinity.
11. That the Chinese have a notion of an ethereal soul as dis-
tinct from a material soul and that this ethereal soul, sometimes
called ling-hun, is close to the notion of a spiritual soul in Chris-
tianity.
12. That the Chinese have a doctrine of reward and punish-
ment after death in which shang-ti is the dispenser of justice and
that this implies both the Christian concept of the immortality of
the soul and divine justice.
This is a substantial list of correspondences and contains con-
siderable validity. Yet it failed to establish a lasting basis for ac-
cord. The effort was hindered not so much by the lack of potential
bases for ecumenical accord as by a certain predisposing motiva-
tion present in the ecumenical outlook of Leibniz himself. This
failure is pursued in the next two chapters.
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The Failure of Leibniz’ Philosophy
Failure in Both China and Europe
Jesuit maneuvering and the growth of anti-Jesuit feeling in Europe
fed the Rites Controversy to the point that the European debate in-
terfered with the functioning of the missionaries in China. Prior to
the mission of the papal legate, Charles de Tournon, to China in
1704–1710, the debate over the Chinese rites had been only a mod-
erate obstacle to the work of the mission. But after the disastrous
encounter of the K’ang-hsi emperor with Tournon and his supporter
Maigrot in 1706, the fortunes of the mission deteriorated.
A letter to Des Bosses of 17101 shows that Leibniz was critical
both of Tournon’s lack of circumspection and reverence for the
K’ang-hsi emperor and also of the “two decrees” that Tournon for-
mally released. Leibniz’ reference here is probably to the Decree
of 1704 issued by the Roman Inquisition and confirmed by Pope
Clement XI (20 November 1704). This decree forbade shang-ti and
t’ien and approved t’ien-chu; it forbade church tablets with the
term ching t’ien and forbade Christians any role in the sacrifices
to ancestors or to Confucius; moreover, it proscribed ancestral
tablets with characters calling the throne the seat of the spirit of
the deceased, allowing only a tablet with the name of the dead.
The second decree Leibniz refers to is probably Tournon’s
“Decree of Nanking” (7 February 1707), which was promulgated
largely in response to the K’ang-hsi emperor’s decree of December
1706. The emperor’s decree had ordered Maigrot and other mis-
sionaries banned from the empire and had punished several Chi-
nese associated with the Tournon legation. Furthermore, the
K’ang-hsi emperor had ordered that all missionaries be required
to obtain an imperial piao (permit), which would be issued only on
the condition that they promised to abide by the practices of Mat-
teo Ricci. Tournon’s decree reaffirmed the condemnations of the
Decree of 1704, in addition to taking the extreme step of threaten-
ing violators with excommunication.
The papal bulls Ex illa die (1715) and Ex quo singulari (1742)
officially ended the controversy and left the Chinese offended by
the pagan status to which Rome had relegated them. In 1724, the
Yung Cheng emperor (r. 1723–1735) revoked the Toleration Edict
of 1692 and broadened the recent edicts against Christianity made
by his late father, the K’ang-hsi emperor.2 The attempted worldwide
suppression of the Society of Jesus in 1773 further crippled the mis-
sionary effort in China until its resurgence in the nineteenth century
under primarily Protestant auspices. The decline of the China mis-
sion contributed to the decline of Leibniz’ hopes for accord.
In addition to the attention directed toward China, Leibniz’
irenics involved an active and prolific correspondence within Eu-
rope. But the auspicious beginnings for the ecumenical cause that
Leibniz had experienced soon after his arrival at Hanover in 1677
gradually gave way to impasses in negotiations. From 1680 to
1693 Leibniz corresponded with Ernst, landgrave of Hessen-Rhe-
infels, and from 1690 to 1693 with Mons. Paul Pellison, court
historian to Louis XIV, both men Roman Catholic converts from
Calvinism. The results were no more fruitful, however, than those
from the correspondence with Bossuet, bishop of Meaux, carried
on in 1678–1693 and again in 1699–1702.
The Leibniz-Bossuet correspondence has been viewed as a
classic debate that recapitulates more than a century of irenic
discussion. In it, the learned and renowned theologian Bossuet de-
fended the positions of the Council of Trent against those of the
Augsburg Confession. The arguments for the Augsburg Confes-
sion were offered by the brilliant but youthful Leibniz, who had
access to the splendid library at Hanover, which included a Bible
with Luther’s own annotations.3 Increasingly, an awareness of the
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width of the chasm separating them was heightened by the wors-
ening of Protestant-Catholic relations following the revocation of
the Edict of Nantes in 1685. It would be inadequate, however, to
say that events of history were the primary cause of the failure
of Leibnizian ecumenism. Fundamental and perhaps irreconcilable
differences in principles were also involved. And, at least in re-
gard to Leibniz’ hopes for China, a full explanation requires that
one look into elements in Leibniz’ own philosophy and perspective,
views that were shared by certain Jesuits and contributed to the
failure of philosophical religion as a basis for accord.
The Tension in Leibniz’ Philosophy
Ironically, Leibniz’ attempts to reconcile the increasing divorce of
reason from faith led to a synthesis so completely rational and
lacking in direct spiritual practice that his ultimate contribution
was to the further secularization of European thought.4 Here we
encounter an irresolvable tension within Leibnizian philosophy. In
one direction there is a search for union between China and Eu-
rope, and between Catholicism and Protestantism, in a medium
that seems fully religious. Simultaneously, in another direction, the
tendency toward reducing religious actions to intellectual func-
tions works to exclude a vital element of religion. This tension,
intrinsic in Leibniz’ philosophy, was a fundamental cause of the
failure of his ecumenism.
Nicholas Rescher’s generally commendable study of Leibniz’
philosophy refers to the tension within Leibnizian ethics, which
was on the one hand “apparently theocentric” in origin and on
the other directed toward completely secular aims.5 Rescher at-
tempts to resolve the tension by treating the doing of God’s will as
a fully humanistic enterprise to the point that any active concern
for God can be left behind in the pursuit of secular goals. Good-
ness becomes a function of knowledge since it is right action that
best serves man and knowledge, rather than “faith, inspiration, or
goodwill” that best fosters the right sort of action.
Such a severe separation of religious components from knowl-
edge treats religion as highly impractical. This position conflicts
with the utilitarian character that is part of nearly every vital reli-
gion and in which transcendental elements are normally goals but
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rarely the immediate means to be applied. Leibniz neglects—a
neglect that Rescher is competent in reproducing—the recognition
that the sick are best served by a knowledge that is at one with
the spirit. But does Leibniz neglect this connection as fully as it
would appear? In regard to a tension involving forces pushing in
opposing directions, Rescher describes the force in Leibnizian phi-
losophy that is pushing toward secularity, but he tells us very little
about the force that seeks to foster a strong spiritual faith and
bond with God.
Since there are few radical breaks in Leibniz’ writings or in the
methods by which he comes to the conclusions those writings ex-
press, we may be justified in looking to the early years of Leibniz’
studies for evidence of this emerging tension. One suggestion
traces a definite tension between Aristotelian and Platonic-
Pythagorean influences back to his student days at Leipzig. The
Aristotelian influence is reflected in his De principio individui
(Principle of individuation) (1663) and the Platonic-Pythagorean in-
fluence in De arte combinatoria—also known as Ars combinatoria
(Combinatory art) (1666).6 But this suggestion must be tempered
by the possibility that De principio individui, as his bachelor’s the-
sis, may have reflected academic demands as well as an inclination
on Leibniz’ part toward Aristotelianism. Furthermore, De arte com-
binatoria is a considerably more substantial work than his thesis.
It is generally recognized that Pythagoreanism sought to dis-
cern the harmonic mathematical relations existing in the external
world, but it is insufficiently stressed that Pythagoreanism origi-
nally involved a brotherhood and that this outer discernment was
to be related to an inner discernment in an attempt to create a
spiritual harmony between the two, with geometry and mathe-
matics as merging instruments.7 Leibniz was introduced to this
influence after 1663 by Erhard Weigel of Jena, who opened a
private school of Youth and Virtue (Jugend und Tugenschule) to
confirm the practical role of mathematics. As part of the curricu-
lum, Weigel taught calculus as a moral discipline.8
Through Weigel, Leibniz was introduced to the combinatory
art of Raymond Lull, which involved a series of nine concepts
and questions placed on a wheel of seven concentric disks and
mechanically manipulated to yield answers. Lull’s answers were
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far less influential than his method, which affected Gassendi, Gior-
dano Bruno, Thomas Hobbes, and eventually Leibniz.9 Leibniz
refers to Lull’s work and its connection with that of Gassendi,
Bruno, Kircher, and Hobbes in De arte combinatoria.10 Yet the ten-
sion between philosophical and religious concerns in Leibniz is
such that a contemporary study of Leibniz’ De arte combinatoria
can treat Weigel purely in terms of his intellectual achievements
as a rather mediocre mathematician while avoiding significant ref-
erence to his Platonic-Pythagorean tendencies and the work of
Raymond Lull.11
In formulating his later notion of universal science based upon
an art of characteristic symbols in Scientia Generalis. Charac-
teristica (A universal science: characteristic), Leibniz recalls how
he anticipated the discovery of his youthful De arte combinatoria
and compares this Universal Characteristic or calculus of symbols
to a Cabala of mystical words or arithmetic of Pythagorean num-
bers.12 Leibniz confirms the persistence of Pythagoreanism in his
mature work and its connection with his religious motives in sev-
eral passages in the Theodicy.
In Theodicy no. 181, he speaks of ethical virtues, for example,
piety, sobriety, justice, and chastity, and how they were virtues
prior to God’s choosing to bring them from the status of a possible
to an actual world. Virtues are so because the nature of rational
creatures guarantees their constitution prior to any choice by
God. Leibniz compares this situation to the Pythagorean notions
of proportion and harmony inherent in the ideal state of music
and therefore already determined prior to their actualization in
the playing of music.13 In Theodicy no. 208, Leibniz refers to
the Pythagorean characteristics of simplicity and harmony while
describing the basis on which God chooses to actualize possible el-
ements. God’s choice is made on the basis of what is conducive to
the greatest harmony, to that quality which is “the most productive
in proportion to the simplicity of ways and means.”
An additional confirmation of Leibniz’ connecting Pythagorean
elements with religion comes in reference to his discussion of the
Chinese in his preface to the Novissima Sinica. Leibniz attributes
the Chinese failure to attain the Western equivalent of success in
certain areas of the sciences to the absence of what he calls the
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“two eyes” of Europeans. The first is geometry, in which the K’ang-
hsi emperor’s children and, to a lesser extent, the emperor himself
were being instructed by Bouvet. The Pythagorean elements are
clearly present in Leibniz’ declaration that geometry is what Plato
taught as the only entry into “the mysteries of the sciences.” The
second eye was “First Philosophy,” by which Leibniz means the
science that leads to an understanding of the spirit, or the “true
religion.”14
It would be restrictive to say that Leibniz proposed no forms
of religious practice. Like Weigel, Leibniz treats mathematical and
intellectual pursuits as moral exercises. He could do so because all
knowledge was a knowledge of God and his methods. Men could
know in the same way that God knew, except in a much more
limited way: God could perform the infinite analysis required of
factual truths, while man could not. Consequently, truth in the
Leibnizian view acquires a moral tone. For Leibniz, knowing was
accompanied by a certain religious awe and possibly a feeling of
transcendence. This notion bears a certain similarity to the Chi-
nese linking of knowledge and morality.
But Leibniz gives little evidence of accepting the basic premise
in religious practice that the intellect is not identical with the
spirit. This premise maintains that the intellect, like the body and
emotions, has its separate relationship to the spirit, at least un-
til one reaches the higher stages of spiritual advancement, where
there is a unification of previously separate elements and a greater
sense of wholeness. We cannot doubt that Leibniz manifests a
strong element of unity in his views, and to the extent that such
unifying tendencies are associated with religious motives, Leibniz
was deeply religious. But when we come to the religious motive of
dissolving subject and object distinctions to form the unity of the
One, we are confronted with a fundamental position of logic in the
Leibnizian philosophy.
The distinction between subject and object or between “I” and
“thou” is bred of discrimination, which is a tool of the intellect.
The distinction cannot be dissolved by merely intellectual means,
which in this case can be partially identified with individual means.
Rather, the dissolution must be accomplished by methods whose
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aim is to transform the normally hostile condition between reason
and emotion into a harmony between wisdom and compassion.
These methods involve breaking down the barriers of ego by ad-
vancing in a particular form of spiritual cultivation in which disci-
pline is essential. The disciplinary method may involve meditation,
prayer, fasting, abstinence, regularity, tranquillity, charity, self-fla-
gellation, manual labor, or some other form of daily practice. All
involve cultivation of a less discursive type of knowledge.
The literate mind often goes astray in its analysis of such prac-
tices when it regards them as nonintellectual and therefore unable
to attain a high degree of inner consistency. Yet progress in spir-
itual discipline normally involves progressive stages of coherency
holding between a vast array of seemingly unrelated elements.
The ability of these nondiscursive forms of knowledge to deal with
complexity is comparable to that of discursive knowledge. How-
ever, the emphasis upon the qualities of simplicity and harmony,
connected in the preceding discussion with Pythagoreanism, is
even greater than in the discursive forms.
Perhaps what distinguishes Leibniz’ interest in simplicity and
harmony from a more religious concern centers on the differing
natures of the respective approaches. Even if Leibniz’ particular
form of subject-predicate logic is not the essential ingredient of
Leibnizian philosophy to the degree that Couturat and Russell
have maintained, this logic is nevertheless an important ingredi-
ent.15 A view of the world that derives from a breakdown into
subject and predicate would seem to be more discriminating than
unifying. Yet the existence of logic did not necessarily lead to
the degeneration of spiritual cultivation in Buddhism.16 Buddhism
contains a large number of deeply cultivated spiritual disciplines.
Leibnizian philosophy does not.
In all fairness, we must go back to the Christian tradition,
from which Leibniz draws. In comparison with Buddhism or other
Chinese philosophies, the mainstream of the Christian tradition
contained a far less developed meditative discipline, leaving the
realm of meditation to the informal and individual approaches of
the Christian mystics. On the other hand, meditation and con-
templation are not the sole paths of spiritual cultivation, and we
cannot say that Leibniz’ religious motives were impractical, for
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his ecumenism was intended to serve a very real spiritual need in
seventeenth-and eighteenth-century Europe.
Leibniz’ Spiritual Understanding
It is tempting to criticize modern interpreters of Leibnizian phi-
losophy who regard his religious elements as incidental, but one
cause for such interpretations can be traced to Leibniz himself. He
was unquestionably concerned with God and with constructing a
theodicy (i.e., a justification for God’s tolerance of evil), but his
concern was so dominated by rationality that the truly spiritual
elements may have been smothered. It is typical of Leibniz that
his youthful plan for a Christian apologia entitled Demonstrationes
Catholicae (Catholic demonstrations) sought church reunion and
conversion of the world to Christianity through the primary means
of logical demonstration.17
We know very little about Leibniz’ conventional spiritual prac-
tices. Biographical accounts tell us that by the end of his life,
Leibniz’ infrequent church attendance and rejection of communion
fostered the general view that he was an unbeliever. Such a view
conflicts with what we know of him and yet it may tell us some-
thing about his lack of less intellectually oriented practices. God
was essential for Leibniz because he was the guarantor of truth,
but spiritual cultivation was in Leibniz’ view synonymous with
intellectual cultivation. In the most highly cultivated of religious
people we find a dissolution of what less advanced practitioners
perceive as barriers between the intellect and spirit. We must try
to determine whether Leibniz reflects such a union that may have
been misread by later interpreters, or whether Leibniz himself
read into the essence of religion something overly intellectual.
Some recognize that among the various types of mystical ex-
perience there exists an experience associated with our analytic
powers.18 In this instance, a chain of rational thoughts culminates
in a “contemplative insight.” There is reason to believe that Leib-
niz did experience such contemplative insights, particularly since
his work was directed more toward perceiving similarities than
differences and more toward unity than division. The unifying im-
pulse, of itself, seems to reflect a religious temperament.
It might be just such a contemplative insight that is described
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by R. W. Meyer in reference to Leibniz’ early life. At that time,
Leibniz is said to have had an illumination that strengthened his
faith by making him capable of a new experience of God and a real-
ization that the world is created by the act of the spirit. This insight
was first formulated in Hypothesis physica nova (New physical
hypothesis), written when Leibniz was 25 years of age, and it be-
came a main theme of all his later philosophical writing. Leibniz
compares his insight to something that Platonists undoubtedly ex-
perienced, but unlike Platonists and the mystics of Henry More’s
type who saw the act of the spirit as intuitive and suddenly cre-
ative, Leibniz regarded it as a reflective experience. In Meyer’s
view, Leibniz’ mathematics enabled him to replace the identity of a
mystical and intuitive nature with a new notion of identity in which
systems of relations become representative of one another.19 It
was this notion of correspondence that culminated in the concep-
tion of the monads.
It is possible to see in the development of the Protestant ethos
of activity a link between the change from a practical, discipline-
oriented Christianity to a more occasional Christianity. Instead of
daily life in the service of religion, there emerged an increasing
tendency toward daily life in the service of secular aims or, per-
haps more accurately, daily life in the service of itself. Leibniz
seems to have participated in one strand of that developing secular
ethos. For Leibniz, God’s function was seen not so much in terms
of salvation or spiritual advancement as in terms of truth. While
salvation and spiritual progress both involve truth, in these per-
spectives truth represents only one of several equally important
concerns. But for Leibniz the pursuit and determination of truth
constituted an activity worthy in itself, much as the Protestant
work ethic came eventually to value daily activity and secular suc-
cess for their own sakes.
This high valuation of knowledge and truth can be linked with
a highly rationalized image of God in which the objective nature
of truth is guaranteed by a God constantly thinking these truths.
Leibniz’ adoption of the theological concept of truth (i.e., the no-
tion of truth as divine thought) placed him within a tradition in
Western thought going back to the Platonic doctrine of ideas. The
precision of God’s thought is equivalent to calculation. To the ex-
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tent that we can cultivate precision in our own disciplines and
move toward calculation, we not only approach God but in fact be-
come at one with God. We can never equal God’s capacity to deal
with the infinite analysis of contingent truths, but we can develop
our abilities in certain areas and in those limited areas we will
“calculate” in the same manner as God.
Leibniz’ separation of the realms of physics from metaphysics,
or of extension and organic bodies from forms and souls, is well
summarized in his Animadversiones in partem generalem princi-
piorum Cartesianorum (Critical remarks concerning the general
part of Descartes’ principles) no. 64.20 The separation is the pro-
duct of a brilliant insight and diverts the increasing pressure of
secular questions on the body of Christian theology. With Leibniz’
division, it simply makes no sense to try and answer questions of
the dynamics of organic bodies within the realm of souls, for the
latter is an area of metaphysics and therefore operates by laws of
reason whereas the physical realm functions by laws of necessity.
But in a way Leibniz’ insights were too intellectually brilliant and
proved too restrictive of the realm of souls and spirits. In effect it
isolated this realm while advancing the investigation of the realm
of extension. The advancement of the natural sciences has been
almost entirely within this area, while interest in the realm of the
souls has ebbed because of the seeming lack of practical relevance
such an area might offer. The path of religion was to be increasin-
gly otherworldly.
Leibniz’ admiration for the Jesuit order was instrumental in
leading him to formulate plans for new approaches to truth, which
for him were synonymous with serving the greater glory of God. In
1678, Leibniz proposed the establishment of an order of charity, a
Societas Theophilorum (Society for the learning of God) to engage
in areas of study that the Jesuits had neglected, even while living
in close fraternity with the Jesuits.21 In its avoidance of scholas-
tic elements and emphasis upon studying the mysteries of nature,
free cures for the ill, education of youth, and particularly in the
area of Theologia mystica, Leibniz’ proposal seems really to be for
a study society rather than a spiritual brotherhood.
This emphasis would appear to have been strengthened as
Leibniz transferred his later interests from a religious order to
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the founding of academies, an interest that fell short of immediate
fulfillment in Dresden, St. Petersburg, and Vienna but succeeded
in Berlin. The academy he founded there was geared to serve
the needs of a learning whose advancement depended upon an
international correspondence among scholars. Both the precise
sciences and Leibniz’ intellectual glorification of God involved a
discursive type of knowledge that thrives upon communication, in
contrast to a spiritual discipline more in need of solitude.
The harmony of Leibniz’ philosophy was specifically aimed at
countering the chaos of his time. Yet he was ineffectual in contrib-
uting to the advancement of religion, and this failure has turned
out to be one of the great ironies of Leibnizian philosophy. Perhaps
he was victimized by forces beyond his control, such as the sec-
ularizing tendencies of knowledge. These may have oriented his
view of religious practice toward the pursuit of more precise meth-
ods of knowing, which glorified God. A second possibility is that his
interest was not so much directed toward religion as toward the
political achievement of social peace, in which he saw religion as a
chief means to an end. But this would involve attributing more de-
ception to Leibniz’ discussion of theological principles in his irenic
negotiations than seems justified. Perhaps his legal disposition and
training strengthened his inherent tendencies toward viewing the
world in terms of law.
Another possibility for explaining Leibniz’ failure to advance
the religious cause is that his comprehension of religious experi-
ence was a good deal more shallow than has been thought. The
man was an intellectual giant, but his spiritual sense may have
been the weak counterpart within him. His desire for position
and his tendency toward pettiness, of the sort exhibited in the
Leibniz-Newton dispute over the invention of the calculus, are not
necessarily reflective of Russell’s concept, dividing a man into pub-
lic and private sides.22 Such a division may attribute too much
consciousness on Leibniz’ part and may be too condemning of
something that probably comes closer to mere human weakness.
Using a less critical interpretation than Russell’s, one might see
Leibniz as a man whose moral and spiritual aptitude simply did
not keep pace with his intellectual abilities. Though his intentions
seem sufficiently genuine, he was obviously no religious sage, as
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the failure of the religious side of his philosophy amply confirms.
Yet by most modern Western criteria, he would be judged a ge-
nius. The importance of analyzing this judgment in such detail lies
in the possibility of what it might tell us about ourselves. While
extensive and carefully executed studies may reflect our expertise
in evaluating the intellectual achievements of a man, our inabil-
ity and perhaps our reluctance to judge his spiritual achievements
may reflect our own weaknesses as well as his.
Sin as Intellectual Deprivation
In his religious treatise, the Theodicy no. 20, Leibniz maintains
that evil did not originate in the way the ancients said, namely,
through matter uncreated and independent of God. Rather, evil
originated from an ideal conception of man in which sin exists as
an original imperfection prior to any act of sinning. (Since sin ex-
ists as a deprivation, it has no efficient cause, although its ideal
cause is embodied in the previous.) Leibniz’ conception of sin is
not radically new, but he does give a unique focus to comprehen-
sion of the nature of sin through analysis. In the process, what
suffers is the understanding of sin that comes through experienc-
ing both sin and its converse, goodness. Though Leibniz clearly did
not spend all his time isolated in a remote study, he seems to have
carried with him everywhere a spiritual outlook weakly informed
by practical experience and to have seen the world through con-
sistently analytic eyes.
Leibniz extends this conception of sin as deprivation to cover
malice, error, and ignorance, mental aberrations such as one may
experience in intellectualizing. For instance, the perception from a
distance of a square tower as round involves a privation of the truth
(Theodicy no. 32), for it remains actually a square tower. We may be
able to correct this privation through reflection. In effect, Leibniz
expands the concept of sin as deprivation to include intellectual-
ization and then proceeds to emphasize the intellectualization. If
Leibniz’ intention was consistently practical and oriented toward
resolving the cultural and spiritual anxiety of his age, then his
achievements in mathematics, logic, and metaphysics—however
great in their own right—failed to resolve that anxiety. It is true
that certain of his discoveries did have a practical application—for
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instance, his mathematics and logic.23 But rather than glorifying
God, their application made it easier for men to forget about God.
Discursive versus Spiritual Languages
Leibniz spent a considerable amount of time dealing with the par-
ticularly Christian dilemmas of God and whether he exists, to what
extent his will is arbitrary or dictated by the nature of necessity,
his relationship to truth, and so forth. But I would suggest that
such problems contribute very little to religious practice. On the
contrary, posing such questions reflects a wrongheaded approach
in which one will inevitably end up uncertain and in contradiction
with spiritual truths. Must we know whether God acts arbitrarily
or through necessity? Must we know whether God even exists in
order to pursue a path of spiritual cultivation? Such questions only
arise when one loses the commitment of the spirit and begins to
pursue isolated questions of the mind.
Reliance solely upon discursive methods of knowledge cannot
produce a certainty upon which one can base a religious practice
and faith. The discursive method, characterized by a logically or-
dered progression from premises to conclusions, carries an inher-
ent thrust toward knowledge of an ever more refined and intricate
sort. This method may be used in conjunction with religious prac-
tice to further the ends of both, but as an end in itself it subverts
the formation of a basic commitment to spiritual practice. It does
not foster such fundamentals of spiritual cultivation as tranquillity,
detachment, joyous acceptance of the moment, obedience, action,
compassion, and diminishment of the self. Frequently, it tends to
foster the reverse of these things.
Leibniz did not agree to this separation of the discursive from
the spiritual methods of knowing. But while he maintained that
they are one, the influence of his philosophy has been to advance
the discursive at the expense of the spiritual. Do I misinterpret
Leibniz? We must concede that the unifying element is present and
operative in his philosophy, but is this presence sufficient to con-
stitute a genuine appreciation of the religious path? Or could the
Pythagorean components in Leibnizian philosophy offer an escape
from this sort of criticism?
The Pythagorean impulse is at bottom a religious one because
it seeks through mathematics to reconcile external harmonies with
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internal ones. Leibniz’ Pythagorean affinities appear in an argu-
ment (Theodicy no. 181) that is fundamental to the task of his
theodicy—that is, to show that God’s acts and therefore God’s jus-
tice are not merely dispensed by arbitrary action on God’s part but
by a necessity built into the nature of things. Virtues are chosen
to be realized by God precisely because of the possibility of per-
fection or the prevention of imperfection inherent in the nature of
these elements. This means that their virtuous natures are just as
incapable of being arbitrary as the rules of musical proportion and
harmony may be arbitrary prior to being actualized in a musical
performance. Just as proportion and harmony are part of the ideal
state of music prior to its actualization, so too is the furtherance of
perfection intrinsic in the ideal state of a particular virtue prior to
its actualization by God. Furthermore, Leibniz holds that the vir-
tues of rational creatures are similarly inherent in the ideal state
of such creatures prior to actualization.
From the preceding discussion, we can conclude that just as
with rules of musical harmony and proportion, virtues are arbi-
trary for neither God nor man. The rightness of such elements
resides in their nature and fosters harmony between the inner
and outer realms of experience by removing any relativity associ-
ated with choice. Choice becomes not a matter of choosing from
among a variety of elements but simply a matter of acting or not
acting upon a particular element, depending on the nature of the
particular virtue. By understanding the nature of something—and
Leibniz clearly emphasized this stage of the process—one reduces
the number of choices to these two possibilities and thereby re-
duces the opportunities for dissension and disharmony.
In this light, knowing oneself becomes a religious precept
with a very specific meaning. In the process of knowing oneself,
one comes to understand the necessity of one’s own nature and
thereby directs oneself to the particular path needed to satisfy
this necessity. To this extent, at least, Leibniz did understand
something of the process of spiritual practice, and to this extent
criticism must be tempered.
Leibniz’ Option for a God of Knowledge
When in Theodicy no. 78 Leibniz explains why God created the
world, hubris is quietly passing in the guise of humility. Leibniz
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says that God created the world “solely to manifest and commu-
nicate his perfections in the way that was most efficacious, and
most worthy of his greatness, his wisdom and his goodness.” But
to know God’s motive for creating the world is not essential to
spiritual practice. What is more important to understand is how to
make one’s path. Instead of beginning with the humble self, Leib-
niz attempts to imitate the thought of God—admittedly in a less
extensive manner than God—and to understand what God did and
why he did it. One wonders to what extent the interest in God and
his reality was based upon a human projection, that is, God as the
perfect man, the man who excels in all ways in which man falls
short. From such a perspective, the motive of supreme wisdom
that Leibniz attributes to God is full of hubris and gets around to
compassion in a very abstract and indirect manner.
The fundamental characteristic of Leibniz’ God is not supreme
compassion that waits on the struggle until all men have been
saved. Nor is it the supreme power of a God that, as the Newto-
nians argued, miraculously intervenes to make adjustments in
the world. Rather, Leibniz’ God is fundamentally characterized by
supreme wisdom. God’s compassion becomes inseparably mixed
with his wisdom when he chooses, from among infinite possibili-
ties, the best possible world to actualize. This essentially intel-
lectual choice yields a world with the greatest possible amount
of goodness. The divine attribute of power is similarly overshad-
owed by that of wisdom in that God’s choice is limited to the given
possibilities. His power consists of choosing to actualize one of
these worlds, but it does not extend to creating an even better,
much less a perfect, world. Furthermore, since God foresees all
possibilities and chooses once and for all, Leibniz argues that God
does not intervene in the world’s consequent unfolding.
When Leibniz discusses how God chooses the best possible se-
quence of events for this world only after having compared it with
all other possible sequences, and states that certain men continue
to live in sin and damnation (Theodicy no. 84), he relieves God of
the responsibility for saving all men by emphasizing the necessity
of the reality to which even God is bound. An essential difference
between us as humans and God is that God understands this ne-
cessity, whereas men must remain deluded enough to believe that
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a truly good God would not rest until all men were saved. Leibniz
reemphasizes the dominance of God’s intellect in the Theodicy no.
147 when he describes God’s bestowal of intelligence upon man as
the bestowal of “an image of Divinity.” Men play out their intellec-
tual essence of Divinity as little gods in their microcosmic world.
There is no mention of compassion.
In the Monadology no. 83, Leibniz distinguishes between “or-
dinary souls” and “spirits.” The latter are animals who attain the
rank of human nature in terms of the respective qualities of their
reflecting power. While ordinary souls are living mirrors of the uni-
verse, spirits go beyond this to mirror God and thereby become
capable of imitating some aspects of God and acting as minor
deities. What is apparent here is Leibniz’ tendency to view things
in terms of gradations; in this instance we approach the top of the
monadic hierarchy to God. The gradations seem to lack any gap
and continue into the infinite. It is essentially a ladder of knowl-
edge, open and accessible to the climber. It may be here that one
can pinpoint the hubris that pervades Leibniz’ system and eats
away at his religious efforts. The notion of a progressive approach
to God is not unusual in religions. But such an approach normally
contains an intense spiritual and moral cultivation. Yet Leibniz fails
to supply this, or at least his system has failed to provide it for
later men.
In the Leibnizian heritage, God becomes completely defined in
terms of the totality of his knowledge. God’s omnipotence is a func-
tion of his intellect; the power of love is neither recognized nor
cultivated. But the most vitiating force of all is the human pride
that lends itself to deification. Suppose that man can imitate God
by knowing as God knows but on a less comprehensive scale. In
reference to this supposition, Galileo spells out what Leibniz im-
plies—namely, that men may know less comprehensively than God,
but in the areas they do know, for example, in mathematics, men
know as well as God.24
It is interesting to note that contemporary China indicts much
of the intellectual inquiry of the West as the product of the self-
serving interests of a particular class. Whether one agrees with
this sort of Marxist analysis or not, one cannot ignore the direction
the Chinese have set for themselves: cultural and moral life is
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founded on the fundamental premise of the intellectuals serving
and learning from the masses.25 Clearly, times have changed in
China. Yet the Chinese remain as convinced now as they were be-
fore that the moral dimension of truth is clear and vital. Are we
really more aware of this dimension than was Leibniz?
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7
Spiritual and Moral Cultivation as a
Basis for Accord
The Jesuit Approach in China
What were the motives of the Jesuit effort in China? In trying to
disentangle the reality from the heated propositions made over
centuries of debate about Jesuitical methods, one cannot elude
the probability that the Jesuits were strongly motivated by a
proselytizing and chauvinistic spirit. But this spirit is more present
in some Jesuits than in others. Longóbardi and Sainte-Marie seem
to have been far more touched by it than was Ricci. Yet Ricci
and Bouvet were not without their biases. Longobardi made a
blanket criticism of Chinese culture, while Ricci was very apolo-
getic of the Confucianists but unfairly harsh toward the Buddhists
and Taoists. Longobardi saw practically nothing in Chinese culture
that could facilitate the introduction of Christianity, while Ricci
believed that Confucianism could be amalgamated with Christian-
ity. Bouvet concurs with Ricci’s position that the ancient Chinese
were not atheistic and superstitious, regardless of how much the
modern Chinese seemed to fit into these categories. Yet Ricci
cultivated contemporary Chinese literati culture, whereas Bouvet
showed little interest in the Chinese scholarship of his day.
Bouvet does not seek Ricci’s solution of maintaining Confu-
cianism as the social element in a future Christian-Confucian amal-
gam. Instead he analyzes the ancient culture in terms of Fu Hsi’s
numerology of the Book of Changes diagrams, trusting them to
explain the bases of all sciences. In this regard, Bouvet sees the
ancient heritage not simply as Chinese but as a universal heritage
whose ideas are reflected as much in Pythagoreanism-Platonism
as in the ancient doctrine of Fu Hsi, long since lost in China. To
the extent that Bouvet sees this heritage as universal rather than
the property of any one race or nation, his outlook is ecumenical.
But since few contemporary Chinese shared either this interpreta-
tion of their past or the specific spiritual practices of Christianity
embodying this interpretation, the foundations for a lasting accord
between Europe and China were not established.
There also seems to have been another motive present in Bou-
vet’s thinking. Elsewhere,1 I have suggested that what motivated
seventeenth-and eighteenth-century Europeans to ask whether
Chinese civilization contained indigenous equivalents of Christian-
ity bears a striking similarity to the motivations of post–World War
II Western sinologists who asked whether Chinese civilization con-
tained an indigenous form of science. In both cases, there is an
implication that the inquiry was brought on, at least in part, by a
growing hesitation and doubt concerning fundamental beliefs and
practices of Western culture. By finding equivalences abroad, one
adds much needed confirmation to wavering convictions toward
things at home. In itself, such a philosophical and spiritual quest
might appear superficially to be concerned merely with manifesta-
tions of confidence. But these projections onto the rest of the
world of what is happening at home can also express deep doubts
couched in face-saving terms.
But even granting the motivation of hesitation and doubt in
one’s own beliefs, what then is the method and content used in
resolving this doubt? In Bouvet’s case, one encounters a basic con-
cern with the fundamentals of religion that transcends division
by sects. Compared side by side, the strong barriers existing in
Longobardi’s mind between the saved and the heathen give way
to the milder and more expedient lines in Ricci’s mind, which in
turn give way to the surprisingly open and creative space of Bou-
vet’s outlook. Within this open area are the fundamentals of a
Book of Changes numerology that is neither Chinese nor restricted
to Pythagoreanism-Platonism but contains ancient and universal
knowledge and religious truths of timeless relevance.
The great Rites Controversy between Europe and China in
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the years 1610 to 1742 was brought on by a number of reasons,
some of them quite political. But these reasons generally mani-
fested the basic complaint against the Jesuit missionaries for their
tendency to compromise Christian doctrine and ritual with beliefs
and practices of the indigenous culture. One of the less subtle ex-
planations of this compromising tendency was to attribute it to a
power-thirsty drive on the Jesuits’ part that led these missionaries
to emphasize skills that could be exploited politically.
But there are other, more reasonable, approaches. For in-
stance, there is a view of missionary practice which holds that
Christianity cannot be assimilated by a non-Western country unless
it is blended with practices and doctrines containing the cultural
or national essence of that land. This was a characteristically Jesuit
view. No matter how difficult such an essence might be to define, it
was regarded as real. The assumption was that it included far more
than the abstractions of scholars and involved concrete phenomena
that could be ascertained only through long and direct experience
with the native culture. The spirit of this approach remains part of
the perspective of a number of contemporary Jesuits.2
Common Ground between Christianity and Confucianism
The Connection between Morality and Truth
A similarity between Christianity and Confucianism is found in the
connection between morality and truth. Confucianism repeatedly
blends morality and truths of nature in what a superficial reader
of the texts might call a confusion of the two. But confusion hardly
applies to the deeper understanding that Confucian philosophy has
traditionally borne in relation to its Western counterparts. In Con-
fucianism, morality is melded with the truth of the natural world
and blended with the seeking of truth in an individual man. Tradi-
tionally, only a moral man was fully entitled to the description of
“learned.” Our tendency to scoff at this as nothing more than a
mouthed ideal misses a connection that the Chinese were quite
clear about and still are.
The modern West has seen the rise of technical experts whose
expertise is judged quite apart from their qualities as good men;
perhaps this is because we have become preoccupied with exter-
nal knowledge. But when we come to knowledge that involves our
inner selves, a dynamic connection emerges between the kind of
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person we are and what we can know. For an openly immoral Chi-
nese to present himself as an exemplary Confucianist would simply
be absurd, although certainly history contains instances of such
absurdity. The continuation of this moral thread in contemporary
China was apparent in the role of morality and confessions of guilt
in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of 1966–1967. The
specific content of the Chinese terms has altered, but the insights
into the connection between morality and knowledge remain.
Yet the West cannot be completely devoid of insight into this
connection if there is any validity to the Christian view that sees
truth as the “fruit of faith and charity.”3 By means of faith and
charity, one experiences a love that enlightens the intelligence and
gives a new understanding different from that produced by discur-
sive reason alone. By means of the practice and experience of
the spirit—whether it be Christian contemplation or charity, Con-
fucian “watchfulness while being alone” (shen-tu) or Benevolence
(jen),4 Buddhist meditation or compassion—intellectual knowledge
is altered in a way that is beyond the reach of the spiritually
unpracticed.
The Flux
A basic insight of the religions of China, and of a great deal of
religious experience, is the realization of a flux in which nothing
remains unchanged even for a moment. The assimilation of the
given moment or the “now” as one of the essentials of religious
experience involves a joyous acceptance of this flux. Leibnizian
philosophy combats Locke’s notions of a passive materialism by as-
serting the continuous activity of both the soul and the body.5 The
body is never without motion, nor is the soul ever without percep-
tions. The perpetual activity of the body relates to Leibniz’ physics
and his notion of force (vis viva), while his assertion of the per-
petual activity of the soul in terms of continuous perception bears
affinity to modern psychological notions of the unconscious. All
perceivable material is retained in the mind, though some percep-
tions are too feeble to be clearly distinguished from the continual
flow of other perceptions.
Leibniz wishes his denial of the passivity of the soul to have
no bearing upon the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, yet he
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concedes that “if the soul is passive, it is also without life, and it
seems that it can be immortal only by grace and by miracle.”6 But
while Leibniz disapproves of using the means of grace or a mira-
cle to prove the immortality of the soul, he believes that the soul
is active and has life and immortality. His refusal to mix theolog-
ical reasons with philosophical reasons is based on solid logical
grounds, but logical elements in philosophy and theology are insuf-
ficient to take us into the integrating core of religious experience,
and this insufficiency was what weakened his attempt at accord.
In the New Essays,7 Leibniz refers to the disagreement be-
tween Locke and the bishop of Worcester, who thought Locke’s
doctrine of ideas threatened Christianity—though Leibniz doubts
that it did. Locke held that the ends of religion and morals were
served by proving the soul to be immortal, although not neces-
sarily immaterial, while the bishop thought the soul could best be
proved immortal by means of its immaterial nature. Leibniz then
adds his comments to the debate. What concerns us are not the
details of the debate but the seriousness with which Leibniz and
others entertain the threat posed to Christianity by intellectual un-
derstanding. In contrast, the beliefs of a Confucianist tended to be
confirmed more by their practical than their theoretical efficacy.
Admittedly, such standards involve internal criteria more than ex-
ternal debate, yet it would be deceiving oneself to identify interior
criteria with mere subjectivity. The practice of a belief does not re-
solve itself into an objective-subjective dichotomy.
The Internal Discipline
Though contemplative and meditative techniques have rarely
played a dominant role in Christianity, they have always been pre-
sent somewhere in the background and have occasionally been
highly significant in the lives of individual Christians. In offering
an ecumenical stepping-stone, William Johnston speaks of how
the Zen meditative technique can be used by Christians who are
potential contemplatives. They must not smother the tiny flame
of love with discursive thinking, but must be “silent, empty and
expectant.”8 Such a position is quite removed from the approaches
of both Leibniz and Bouvet, and of many of the Jesuit missionaries.
To explain why both the earlier Jesuits and Leibniz could not
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perceive the forms of spiritual cultivation present in China as a ba-
sis for accord, one might return to the notion of seventeenth-and
eighteenth-century Europe, which was doubting many of its own
beliefs and seeking to reverse this debilitating tendency by finding
equivalences for these beliefs in China. It is not the turning east-
ward that is crucial but the specific manner in which the turn is
made. Instead of turning within for confirmation from some inner
light, these Westerners sought confirmation in China, but the na-
ture of the search largely predetermined what they found.
The motivation involved tended to supply its own interpreta-
tions, emphasizing the external culture of China and failing to
penetrate the deeper dimensions, such as spiritual and moral
cultivation. The hexagrams of the Book of Changes contain a tech-
nique of cultivation that was practiced by many Confucianists, but
Bouvet and Leibniz dismissed this dimension of the Changes as
superstitious divination. In emphasizing external manipulation of
the diagrams to achieve their binary progression, Bouvet and Leib-
niz neglected the interior aspect of the Pythagorean impulse. More
faithful to this interior aspect, the Confucian gentleman used divi-
nation to cultivate harmony with his circumstances and did not
seek external knowledge. In modern times the West has once more
looked eastward, but now attention is focused on elements of spir-
itual cultivation because something in the Western perspective has
changed.
Religion as Spiritual Cultivation
There is a certain confusion concerning the relationship of the im-
mortality of the soul to religion. This confusion arises, in part, from
an unfamiliarity with the beginnings of the religious impulse in
circumstances where fundamentals are often unexciting. One of
these fundamentals involves a daily discipline that for most devo-
tees contains far more routine and dull practice than anything
associated with the stimulation of mystical experience. Of course,
there are exceptions: there are those who are drawn to religion
through initial experience with the intensity and insight that is
termed fully mystical. But for the most part, the early years of re-
ligious discipline are far more routine.
Too often it is thought that the aim of religious life is the mys-
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tical experience. The novice meditator looks for enlightenment in
a sudden rush of light and weightlessness during a meditative ses-
sion; the supplicant looks for a “sign” as an answer to his prayers;
and both become disillusioned if there is none. But all this misses
the point because the true aim of these practices is what they
may cultivate within us. One of the fruits of such cultivation is
a tranquillity based on acceptance of the moment—the now. This
acceptance is accompanied by an absence of desire to move either
forward in search of the future or backward in search of recreat-
ing the past. It is not passivity bred of fear for the future; nor is
it the product of an intellectual insight. Rather, it is the result of
a daily effort to apply that insight toward the stilling of excessive
ego. And this tranquillity is not attained until its positive value is
experienced and begins to counteract the negative effect of with-
drawal from excessive gratification of ego.
The acceptance of the now is the acceptance of each moment
in the realization that the moment is our only reality. The future
represents a mere anticipation and the past is a recollection,
whether experienced directly or through another, as in transmitted
tradition or history. The acceptance of the moment is marked by
a mild form of joy. This quiet happiness differs as much from the
overpowering feeling of ecstasy as it does from the liberation at-
tained through resignation.
Cultivation of the spirit through specific practices alters the
content of discursive truth and enables one to attain a new and
higher type of knowledge we may call wisdom. The practices are
applied through a discipline that mortifies the self—that is, con-
trols inordinate desires and passions through their denial and
through the expansion and deepening of interior experience. The
latter area is that of the “inner light,” which when properly tapped
through a full sense of harmony can be a source of strength
and sustenance. The specific content of the discipline may vary
according to the needs of the person, but the practices are fre-
quently very physical as well as intellectual and meditative. We
may meet with differences when we begin to discuss specific reli-
gious contexts for cultivating the spirit through practice, and their
comprehension may require direct experience rather than mere
explanation. We can see, however, that notions such as wisdom,
power, and compassion are common to religious elements as seem-
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ingly diverse as Christian Godliness or the Buddha nature and are
also present in Confucianism.
Spiritual Cultivation in Confucianism
In his Discourse 46,9 Leibniz responds to Longobardi’s indictment
of both ancient and modern Chinese as atheistic. Leibniz inter-
prets Confucius as saying that the object of proper worship of the
Spirit of Heaven, the seasons, the mountains, and other inanimate
things should be the Sovereign Spirit, shang-ti, t’ai-chi, and li. Yet
he suggests that Confucius chose not to explain the spirits of nat-
ural things because he thought that the people were incapable of
comprehending such an explanation. In the Discourse 50,10 Leib-
niz states that though he would have preferred to have Confucius
clarify his religious views, the absence of investigation into the na-
ture and operations of spirits does not necessarily make one an
atheist, for certainly such a corresponding lack of interest can be
found among Christians. Leibniz contends that so long as one does
not dispute the existence of the spirits and so long as one honors
spirits and practices virtue for the pleasure of the spirits, one can
surely escape the label of atheist.
Leibniz appears not to realize that most of the time Confucius
was speaking not to gatherings of people but to his disciples, who
supposedly would be able to grasp things better than those of
commoner mind. The notion of spiritual cultivation might offer a
meaningful explanation of Confucius’ reluctance to discuss spir-
its and life after death. Given such a notion, one could begin with
one’s self and one’s own life rather than by contemplating spirits
and death, things far removed from more basic concerns. Spiritual
cultivation can begin with these immediate concerns, but Leibniz
gives little evidence of an awareness or appreciation of a spiritual
discipline, at least of the type present in Confucian tradition.
The joyous acceptance of the now is contained in Confucian-
ism. For example, the well-known Chinese historical consciousness
need not be explained as a yearning to return to the golden age of
the legendary emperors Yao and Shun. It can be seen as a height-
ening awareness of continuity with the past and as a basis for
accepting one’s limited moment in the present. This joyous accep-
tance of the now would seem to occur in the classic most basic
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to the Confucian tradition, the Analects, particularly in section 6:9
where Confucius praises the ability of his disciple Hui (Yen-tzu)
to remain joyous and unperturbed by a lack of food, drink, and
comfortable surroundings. A similar ability to accept waiting is at-
tributed to both Hui and Confucius himself in Analects 7:10. Such
a joyous acceptance implies a highly cultivated inner life acting
as a source of joy in the midst of poor external conditions. The
religious discipline aims at bringing on this unperturbed state by
cultivating an inner source of sustenance, thereby reducing the
need for dependence on one’s surroundings. Mencius seems to
convey a similar outlook in the Mencius 4b:29, where he compares
Hui’s virtuous behavior to that of the legendary figures Yü and
Chi. On the surface, the very active lives of Yü and Chi seem much
more positively oriented than the acceptant waiting of Hui, but in
Confucian doctrine both types of behavior are appropriate at their
respective times. Mencius says that Yü and Chi are acting in an
age of peace, whereas Hui and Confucius lived in times of chaos.
Confucius devotes considerable attention to the problems of living
in times when a gentleman (chün-tzu) must know how to wait not
with anxious eyes but with a joyous acceptance of the moment.
The joyous acceptance of the moment can act as both result
and means. It is the result of detachment from a desire for things
that are not to be had. Yet it also acts as a means to happiness
which, in turn, reinforces the detachment. A similar phenomenon
occurs in Analects 7:15, where Confucius is quoted as saying: “He
who seeks only coarse food to eat, water to drink and bent arm
for pillow, will without looking for it find happiness to boot. Any
thought of accepting wealth and rank by means that I know to
be wrong is as remote from me as the clouds that float above.”11
Joyous acceptance of the moment and detachment are manifested
in the person as tranquillity. Something similar can be found in
Analects 7:36, where Confucius contrasts the serenity of the gen-
tleman and the fretfulness of the small man. This tranquillity
implies an absence of anxiety and fear (Analects 12:4).
In Analects 7:3 and 6, Confucius voices what might be taken
as a prescription for spiritual cultivation: “Not cultivating virtue,
not practicing what has been learned, unable to follow righteous-
ness which has been heard, unable to alter what is not good—these
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are the things I fear.” And: “The master said, Set your heart upon
the Way, support yourself by its power, lean upon Goodness, seek
distraction in the arts.”12 In Analects 12:21, the disciple Fan Ch’ih
asked Confucius about the best methods for elevating virtue, cor-
recting evils, and distinguishing delusions. For the first, Confucius
advises primary attention to service before gain; for the second,
rectification by turning within rather than by rectifying others; for
the third, the advice is less clear but involves filial piety.
The means of achieving Confucian spiritual cultivation may
vary from simple acts of filial piety to a skilled form of meditation,
even though Confucius himself stressed forms of ritual, music, and
social behavior. Confucius’ lack of office in a time of social chaos
provided sanction for later Confucianists to retire from public life
in periods of either personal or general political turmoil. Mingled
with Taoist influences, this practice gave rise to a strong eremitic
tradition. Within this tradition, men such as Wu Yü-pi (K’ang-chai)
(1391–1469) are said to have tilled their own land and fed their
disciples the crops.13 Fostered by Buddhist and particularly Ch’an
meditation and Taoist breath control, Neo-Confucianism came to
include a variety of meditative practices including ching-tso (quiet-
sitting). This practice, however, is not always strictly synonymous
with meditation. Poetry and painting as spiritual techniques were
also essential to the related wen-jen (literati) tradition.
Later Confucianists emphasized these types of spiritual
cultivation in an attempt to create a discipline aimed at the devel-
opment of not only a moral man but also one whose spirit was in
harmony with his position in society and the cosmos. Certainly this
was an ideal, and its path was strewn with failures. Yet it was a
practical ideal and one within reach of the practitioner. Unfortu-
nately, Leibniz failed to perceive it as a basis for accord. The failure
seems to have been a product both of his philosophy and the errors
of his interpreters, on whom he was dependent for so much of his
knowledge of China. Actually, the only interpreter who showed an
appreciation for the Confucian spiritual discipline was Ricci.
Conclusion: Accord for the Present
In the process of seeking an accord between China and the West,
a first step is an attempt to reach some understanding of Chinese
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culture and society. Out of this understanding we can arrive at
similarities between Chinese and Western cultures. However, such
similarities will not necessarily be equally developed in both cul-
tures. Clearly, even if Leibniz had recognized Chinese spiritual and
moral cultivation, he could not have converted the quite different
Christian strain of spiritual cultivation into its Chinese equivalent.
While accord between two nations or cultures must be founded on
some common ground, the ideas and beliefs by which they come
to that common ground may differ. Nevertheless, recognition and
development of these common points, even if not to the degree
of their Chinese counterpart, can enlarge this common ground
and enhance the chances for accord. This is why the Jesuits’ and
Leibniz’ failure to recognize and develop Confucian spiritual culti-
vation weakened their efforts at accord.
On what grounds might an accord be established with China
today? Currently, Confucianism and Buddhism are not viable forces
on the Chinese mainland. Whether they will have a future role
there remains to be seen. However, although the particular forms
in which spiritual and moral cultivation were previously mani-
fested are gone, this does not mean that the cultivation itself has
disappeared. While Confucian and Maoist ideologies may them-
selves be irreconcilable, the intense cultivation of morality found in
contemporary China has much in common with that recommended
in Confucianism. As in the Confucian perspective, issues tend to
become moral issues. Education, politics, art, economic policy, na-
tural sciences, technology, literature, philosophy, and agriculture
all assume varying degrees of moral coloring. This coloring was
abundantly evident in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of
1966–1967 and the Anti-Confucius Campaign of 1973–1974.14
There is a tendency among both religious and secular groups
of America to approach China today from a strictly humanistic
point of view in the belief that humanism alone will suffice as
a foundation for meaningful accord. I believe this to be based
on too narrow a conception of the Chinese. Although they may
practice humanitarian principles, they do not derive their deepest
beliefs from humanism. These deeper beliefs are rather derived
from the Truth and Goodness they perceive in Marxist-Leninist
principles, as interpreted by Mao Tse-tung. At least for the pre-
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sent, Marxist-Leninist principles appear unlikely to generate an
equivalent intensity in the United States. It seems quite possible,
however, that we could arrive at several forms of spiritual and
moral cultivation that might be able to unify the sadly separated
dimensions of American knowledge and action.15
The attempt to find an indigenous foundation for Christianity
in China has been unsuccessful, both in Leibniz’ time and in its
more recent manifestations.16 The nineteenth- and twentieth-cen-
tury Christian missionary experience was a step backward from the
seventeenth-and eighteenth-century Jesuit approach. The techno-
logical superiority of the modern West convinced the nineteenth-
and twentieth-century missionaries that it was far more important
to bring “superior” Western religious and cultural forms to the Chi-
nese than to attempt to understand China. In order to go forward,
we will have to, in our own age, be at least as observant as Ricci,
Bouvet, and Leibniz. In spite of their faults and errors, what these
men did accomplish was motivated by deep religious and moral be-
liefs. To advance from where they left off, our beliefs in something
will have to be at least as deep as the beliefs of these failed seekers
of accord.17
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Appendix:
A Contemporary Western
Interpretation of the Book of
Changes
In addition to comparing Bouvet’s and Leibniz’ interpretation of the Book
of Changes to that of certain Chinese commentaries, one might use a re-
cent Western interpretation to bring out several key distinctions. Both
Bouvet and Leibniz see the sequence found in the diagrams associated
with the Changes as a double geometrical progression. A geometrical
progression builds upon a sequence in which every number stands to the
preceding in the same ratio. In the case of the Changes diagrams, the ratio
is “double” or 2; that is, each number in the sequence is multiplied by 2
in order to attain the next number. From this point of view, the sequence
should be 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, and so forth. This sequence does indeed de-
scribe the number of permutations and combinations of diagrams in each
given category of lines; however, the lines of the diagrams increase in an
arithmetical progression—that is, each number after the first number in
the sequence increases by the addition of the same amount, as in the pro-
gression 4, 8, 12, 16, 20. In the case of the number of lines in the diagrams,
the specific arithmetical progression is 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and so forth.
The painter Alfred Jensen has arrived at an arithmetical interpretation
of the Changes diagrams by using concretely experienced number struc-
tures that he believes were prevalent in ancient cultures, antedating the
abstract numbers used in mathematics since Euclid (fl. circa 300 B.C.).
Jensen believes that the ancient Chinese, Egyptian, Greek, and Mayan cul-
tures “reveal in their building principles concrete, numerically-based art
forms.” (See Jensen’s “The Aperspective Structure of a Square,” the cata-
log from an exhibition at Cordier and Ekstrom, New York, 11 March–4 April
1970.)
Jensen derives a numerical system inseparable from the chromatic
values of quantity, quality, intensity, and pigment. Making great use of
Pythagoras’ theorem that in a right triangle the square of the hypotenuse
is equal to the sum of the squares of the two shortest sides, Jensen explains
this theorem by exploring the significance of Pythagoras’ emphasis on the
numbers 9, 16, and 25. He does this by using the theme of the square
and subdividing three forms of the latter into equal squares totaling 9 (32),
16 (42), and 25 (52), respectively. Instead of interpreting the numerical
sequence of the Changes diagrams in terms of the abstract number of a
binary progression, as do Leibniz and Bouvet, Jensen interprets them by
means of squares, each of which is subdivided into chromatic squares of
equal area. The numerical sequence is computed by counting outward from
the center square into circumferencing square units composed of smaller
squares, each of which differs from the preceding and smaller square unit
by the addition of a constant of two squares to each side of the ever-larger
square unit. Letting two squares equal one numerical element, an arith-
metical progression is formed by a side from each of these squares, which
may be represented as 1, 2, 3, 4, and so forth.
As Jensen stresses, his work cannot be understood by an analysis
that ignores its totality, as represented in his art. Nor am I able to give
a full representation of even this incomplete aspect of his work. What is
significant for the purpose at hand is, first, the recognition of the fertile
potential of the Changes diagrams, whose ability to stimulate those with
whom it comes into contact has persisted from Chinese antiquity down to
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Bouvet and Leibniz) and into the
twentieth (Jensen). Moreover, although differing from Bouvet and Leibniz
in calling the Changes progression arithmetic rather than geometric, and
chromatic rather than abstract, Jensen shares with Bouvet and Leibniz the
tendency to see the numerical progression of the Changes as a supremely
simple key to explaining the principles of ancient sciences. Like Bouvet and
Leibniz, Jensen sees through Pythagorean eyes when he believes that this
simplicity is a long-lost prize that could cut through some of the seeming
complexity of modern life. Conversely, one should note that Jensen shares
a greater belief in the Changes’ power of divination than did Bouvet and
Leibniz. To this end, he has designed a movable divination board, which he
believes duplicates models found in ancient China.
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rejection of transmigration is found in his New Essays Concerning Human Under-
standing, pp. 20–21. The latter work represents a translation of the fifth volume of
Gerhardt’s edition of Leibniz, Philosophischen Schriften.
13. See, in particular, Ricci, Journals, pp. 337–343 and 399–405. In their rever-
ence toward Amitabha (the Buddha of the Western Paradise) and in their frequent
invocation of his name, the followers of Amitabha Buddha may have appeared
theistic, but closer examination yields conflicting interpretations. The Ch’an Bud-
dhists were originally iconoclasts who destroyed Buddhist images and minimized
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theistic treatment of the Buddha. There was a partial blending of the Ch’an and
Amitabha sects late in the Ming dynasty. Certainly, one could find instances where
doctrine was oversimplified, but to the extent that Ricci was exposed to several of
the Buddhist religious leaders, he had opportunities to develop a more discriminat-
ing appreciation of Buddhism. It appears that he rejected the opportunities.
14. Paul Demiéville believes that Christianity might have fared better in China
if Ricci had sought a reconciliation with Buddhism instead of with Confucianism.
Demiéville quotes several Confucianists who perceived a forced logic in Ricci’s at-
tempt to align Christianity with Confucianism. In the view of these Confucianists,
Christianity had a more natural affinity with Buddhism. Though Demiéville does not
note it, the objectivity of these Confucianists’ judgment must be balanced against
the likely presence of Chinese cultural chauvinism and even xenophobia, phenome-
na which Ricci knew were more prevalent in some Confucian literati than in others.
See Paul Demiéville, “The First Philosphic Contacts between Europe and China,”
Diogenes (Montreal) 58(1967):91–93.
15. Otto Franke, “Li Tschi und Matteo Ricci,” Abhandlungen der Preussischen
Akademie der Wissenschaften (1938)5.
16. Leibniz draws this description of Longobardi from a book by a J. Dezio. See
Leibniz’ letter to Des Bosses of 7 March 1716 in Gerhardt, P. S. 2:512.
17. Ricci, Journals, pp. 405f.
18. Des Bosses’ letter to Leibniz of 7 March 1716 in Gerhardt, P. S. 2:512. The
full title of Navarette’s work is Tratados históricos, politicos, ethicos y religiosos de
la Monarchia de China (Historical, political, ethical, and religious treatises on the
monarchy of China). Both Navarette and De Cicé were anti-Jesuit.
19. George H. Dunne, S. J., in Generation of Giants (pp. 109–112 and 162–164)
disagrees with the prominent view that sees Longobardi in great disagreement with
Ricci and uncompromising toward the Chinese. On points outside the Rites Contro-
versy, Dunne believes that Longobardi was in harmony with the dominant practices
of the Jesuits in China.
20. Thanks to a recent breakthrough made by Henry Rosemont, Jr., I am able
to identify Antonio Caballero a Santa Maria with Antoine de Sainte-Marie, author
of the Mission Treatise. Prior to Rosemont’s discovery, it had been customary to
treat these two names as if they designated separate people. Consequently, Antoine
de Sainte-Marie has been presented as a shadowy figure with little or no biograph-
ical detail. The source of the separation apparently dates from the translation of
Caballero’s Mission Treatise from Spanish to French and its publication at Paris in
1703. In the process his name was gallicized into Antoine de Sainte-Marie, and it is
in this form that, to my knowledge, students of Leibniz’ China studies have referred
to him. Likewise, treatments of Antonio Caballero a Santa Maria as a missionary
make no reference to his authorship of the Mission Treatise. Leibniz, who in his
Latin correspondence with Des Bosses referred to Sainte-Marie as “Antonius de S.
Maria,” appears to have been aware of the identity of the two names.
21. Anastasius Van den Wyngaert, O. F. M. (ed.), Sinica Franciscana, Relationes
et Epistolas Fratrum Minorum 2:317–332.
22. Dunne, pp. 237–242.
23. The treatise, T’ien Ju yin (Christianity and Confucianism compared), has
been reprinted with an introduction in T’ien-chu-chiao tung-ch’uan wen-hsien
su-pien (Supplementary volumes of records of Christian missionaries in the Far
East) 1: XXXVII–XL and 2:981–1043.
24. Father Visdelou supported the cause of the mission of Charles Maillard de
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Tournon, papal legate to China in 1704–1710. Tournon came to China for the osten-
sible purpose of investigating the differences between the various orders, though
actually he carried a papal order that was a prejudgment against the Jesuit meth-
ods. (See Leibniz’ letter to Des Bosses of 2 May 1710 in Gerhardt, P. S. 2:403.) Com-
plicating the Jesuit opposition to Tournon were nationalistic factors; for example,
the Portuguese Jesuits, particularly Thomas Pereyra (Hsü Erh-sheng, 1645–1708),
tended to act more aggressively toward the papal legate than the French because
they felt Portuguese status in the mission was threatened by the legate’s presence.
See Kenneth Latourette, A History of Christian Missions in China, pp. 142–143.
In a treatment of the Rites Controversy well documented with European-language
sources, George H. Dunne, S. J., states that nationalist rivalries far more than
interorder competition caused difficulties between Jesuits, Dominicans, and Fran-
ciscans in China. (See Generation of Giants, p. 236.) Dunne’s interpretation may be
shaped by his Jesuit perspective. In this vein it is also noteworthy that Dunne mini-
mizes differences between Jesuits such as Longobardi and Ricci and dates the Rites
Controversy from the arrival of the Dominican, Francisco Dias [Francisco Diez], and
the Franciscan, Francisco de la Madre de Dios [Francisco Bermúdez], in Fukien in
1634. (See Dunne, pp. 245–246.) Also, see Dunne’s excellent analysis of the Rites
Controversy in terms of documentary sources in chap. 16 (pp. 269–281).
25. Sainte-Marie’s Mission Treatise is published, with Leibniz’ marginal nota-
tions, in Christian Kortholt (ed.), Leibnitii epistolae ad diversos ….2:267–412. Ko-
rtholt’s edition of the Mission Treatise, in addition to his own pagination, includes
the page numbers from the earlier edition from which Leibniz cites in the Discourse.
For the sake of consistency, all references to the Mission Treatise will refer to the
page numbers of this earlier edition, which are placed by Kortholt in the margins.
26. The Leibniz-Remond correspondence, which is discussed in chapter 4, indi-
cates that Remond sent Longobardi’s Religion Treatise and Sainte-Marie’s Mission
Treatise to Leibniz on or about 4 September 1715. (See Remond to Leibniz, 4 Sep-
tember 1715, Gerhardt, P. S. 3:651 and Leibniz to Remond, 4 November 1715,
Gerhardt, P. S. 3:660.) This is corroborated by Leibniz’ statement in his letter of
24 December 1715 to Des Bosses that a friend—presumably Remond—had sent
him the treatises of both Longobardi and Sainte-Marie. (See Gerhardt, P. S. 2:507.)
However, Leibniz did possess prior familiarity with both treatises. In a supplement
to a letter to Des Bosses of 12 August 1709, Leibniz speaks of reading reviews of
both treatises. (See Gerhardt, P. S. 2:380–384.)
27. On the subject of Leibniz’ use of the Longobardi and Sainte-Marie treatises
to write his Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese, see Leibniz’ letters
to Des Bosses of 24 December 1715 and 13 January 1716 and Des Bosses’ response
of 7 March 1716 (Gerhardt, P. S. 2:507–513). Of even more direct relevance are
Leibniz’ letters to Nicholas Remond of 17 January 1716, 27 January 1716, and 27
March 1716 (Gerhardt, P. S. 3:665, 670, 675). The Leibniz-Remond correspondence
is discussed in chapter 4.
28. Joseph Needham, Science and Civilisation in China, Vol. 4, bk. 2, p. 226,
fig. 472.
29. Arnold H. Rowbotham, Missionary and Mandarin in China, pp. 233–234.
Rowbotham further refers the reader to J. F. Baddeley, Russia, Mongolia, China, vol.
2.
30. Leibniz-Grimaldi correspondence file, Leibnizbriefe 330, p. 46a. This refer-
ence to the “Tribunal in Mathematics” is found among several pages of notes made
on Leibniz’ conversations with Grimaldi. These are in the form of a draft in Leibniz’
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own hand and a copy by a secretary in Leibnizbriefe 330, pp. 45a–45b and 46a–47a,
respectively.
31. Leibniz to Grimaldi, 19 July 1689, Rome. A draft of this letter in Leibniz’
hand and a copy in a secretary’s hand can be found in Leibnizbriefe 330, pp. 1a–2b
and 3a and 5a, respectively. Leibniz wrote letters in French, Latin, and German.
His correspondence with Grimaldi is in Latin; the correspondence with Bouvet is in
French.
32. Leibniz’ renderings of Grimaldi’s answers to his list of questions are
recorded in a copyist’s hand in Leibnizbriefe 330, pp. 42a–44a.
33. Joseph Needham, “Chinese Astronomy and the Jesuit Mission: An Encounter
of Cultures,” China Society Occasional Papers, no. 10, pp. 6f. The contents of this
paper are incorporated into vol. 3 of Needham’s Science and Civilisation in China.
34. Recent studies by both Chinese and American scholars have criticized the
Jesuits’ introduction of Copernican heliocentric theory into China. The criticism is
directed at the theologically motivated obfuscations and distortions in the Jesuit
presentation of Copernicanism in China. See Hsi Tse-tsung et al., “Heliocentric
Theory in China”, Scientia Sinica 16(3)(1973):364–376, and Nathan Sivin, “Coper-
nicus in China,” Studia Copernicana 6(1973):63–122.
The case for criticism is clear, though perhaps not quite so clear as these studies
assume. In criticizing the Jesuits for mixing scientific with theological motivations,
both studies make dubious assumptions. Indeed, the mixing of scientific motiva-
tions with motivations from other realms is present in the Maoist-Marxist viewpoint
of the Chinese article itself. In comparison with the Chinese article, Sivin’s mono-
graph is technically superior but less sophisticated from an ideological point of
view. He either ignores or regards as undesirable the role of such extrascientific
factors in the determination of scientific knowledge.
Beyond recognition of the presence of such mixtures is the question of the dis-
tance separating scientific truth from other motivating truths, whether in social,
ideological, religious, or other realms. The Maoist-Marxist position is sensitive to
this aspect in that it concedes a distinction, but then it goes on to say that scientific
truth and Maoist-Marxist ideological truth coincide; i.e., the motivations are distinct
and yet concur. The Sivin monograph implies that motivating factors outside the
realm of the natural sciences contribute very little that is positive to the conclusions
of natural science. Sivin’s viewpoint deserves our attention. It certainly has been
shared by a number of esteemed men of knowledge, including Galileo. Nevertheless,
it is but one of several contending viewpoints on the matter. This contention must be
balanced against criticism of the Jesuits when making a complete assessment of the
validity of the criticism of the Jesuit presentation of Copernicanism in China.
35. Leibniz to Grimaldi, 21? March 1692, Leibnizbriefe 330, pp. 39a–39b. This
letter has been translated from the original Latin into German by Albert Heine-
kamp. It is published along with other translations of Leibniz’ writings by the
Niedersächsische Landesbibliothek as Leibniz-Faksimiles, pp. 38–42.
36. This letter from Kepler to Terrentius of 1627 was published in Johannes
Terrentius, Epistolium ex regno Sinarum ad mathematicos Europaeos missum, cum
commentatiuncula Johannis Keppleri (Sagan, Silesia, 1630). Joseph Needham gives
further elaboration to what is probably the same letter. He states that Kepler sent
this letter to China in 1627 with the Polish Jesuit Michael Boym (Pu Chih-yüan,
1612–1659), who in turn forwarded the letter from Macao to Peking. The contents
are said to include a set of Rudolphine (Copernican) Tables. (See Needham, “Chi-
nese Astronomy and the Jesuit Mission,” p. 8.) The Rudolphine Tables were jointly
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compiled by Tycho Brahe (1546–1601) and Johannes Kepler and were named in
honor of their patron, Rudolph II of Prague, emperor of the Holy Roman Empire
and king of Bohemia. Also see Nathan Sivin, “Copernicus in China,” p. 86.
37. See Genesis 10:2–3 and I Chronicles 1:5–6.
38. There is a draft of the letter of 20 December 1696 in Leibniz’ hand and two
copies in the same secretary’s hand in Leibnizbriefe 330, pp. 15a–18a, 21a–26b,
and 28a–33a, respectively. However, there is a postscript in Leibniz’ own hand
added to one of the copies (p. 26b) that differs from the postscript in the draft (p.
17b) and in the other copy (p. 33a).
39. Latourette, pp. 120–121. Also see Rowbotham, pp. 105–106.
40. Latourette, pp. 111f.
41. See Lawrence D. Kessler, “Joachim Bouvet’s Historical Sketch of the
K’ang-hsi Emperor and Its Influence,” unpublished paper, p. 6.
42. Latourette, p. 121.
43. Leibniz-Bouvet correspondence, Leibnizbriefe 105, p. 25b.
44. Rowbotham, p. 115.
45. The work T’ien-hsüeh pen-i (Fundamentals of divine learning) is attributed
to Bouvet. It has a preface written in 1703 by the scholar Han T’an and contains
Bouvet’s annotation of a selection of quotations from the Chinese classics. The per-
spective is, of course, Christian and aimed at comparing the Chinese term t’ien to
the Christian concept of God. The work is said to be based upon an earlier piece
by a Chinese convert, Chang Hsing-yüeh (1633–1711). See Arthur H. Hummel, Em-
inent Chinese of the Ch’ing Period, pp. 275–276.
46. Ludovici Dutens, Leibnitii opera omnia 4:145–151.
47. Dutens, 4:145.
Chapter 3
1. Gorai Kinzō, Jukyō no Doitsu seiji shisō ni oyoboseru eikyō.
2. Liu Pai-min, “Lai-pu-ni-tzu de Chou-i hsüeh,” pp. 99–116.
3. The chief source for the Leibniz-Bouvet correspondence is the file desig-
nated Leibnizbriefe 105 at the Niedersächsische Landesbibliothek, Hanover, Ger-
many. However, this file does not contain all the letters in the Leibniz-Bouvet
correspondence. Furthermore, it contains material extraneous to the correspon-
dence, as well as occasional duplicates of Leibniz’ letters written presumably by a
secretary’s hand. There is a group project currently under way consisting of Alan
Berkowitz (project director), Chris Benoit, and Thatcher Deane that is attempting
to transcribe, translate, and annotate the Leibniz-Bouvet correspondence. At the
time of this writing, the group has transcribed thirteen letters in French and is in
the process of acquiring and transcribing additional letters of Leibniz to Bouvet
dated 20 April 1699 and 15 February 1701.
To help clarify the current status and availability of this correspondence, I list
below the letters, their date and origin (when available), their source, and the
length in pages. Although a number of the letters have been published, I note a
publication only if the manuscript form is unavailable. Because Leibniz and Bouvet
commonly wrote on both sides of the parchment sheets, and because the pagina-
tion assigned by the Hanover archives includes only one number per sheet, I use
“a” and “b” to distinguish the different sides of a sheet, citing, for example, pages
24a and 24b. The manuscript sheets are a folio type, that is, large pieces of paper
folded once with a resulting two leaves and four pages. The page sizes, which vary,
are noted to the nearest quarter of an inch.
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(1) Bouvet to Leibniz. 18 October 1697, Fountainbleau, France. Leibnizbriefe
105, pp. 1a–1b (two 6½” × 8¾” manuscript pages).
(2) Leibniz to Bouvet. 2 December 1697, Hanover, Germany. Leibnizbriefe 105,
pp. 4a–7b(eight 8¼” × 13” manuscript pages).
(3) Leibniz to Bouvet. January 1698, Hanover? Leibnizbriefe 105, p. 8a (one 5½”
× 8” manuscript page).
(4) Bouvet to Leibniz. 28 February 1698, La Rochelle, France. Leibnizbriefe 105,
pp. 9a–12b (eight 6” × 7¾” manuscript pages).
(5) Leibniz to Bouvet. 20 April 1699, Wolfenbüttel, Germany. Leibnizbriefe
954 (Leibniz-Verjus correspondence file), pp. 26a–27b (four 6½” × 8” manuscript
pages). Because a brief notation (apparently in Leibniz’ own hand) in the marginal
heading of this letter designates Verjus as addressee, this letter has been filed with
the Leibniz-Verjus correspondence. However, Antoine Verjus, S. J., was the interme-
diary in the initial Leibniz-Bouvet contact, and it was through Verjus that Leibniz
forwarded his letter to Bouvet of 2 December 1697. Consequently, it is possible that
the intended addressee of this letter is really Bouvet. Certainly Merkel, who quotes
extensively from this letter in Leibniz und die China-Mission, pp. 61–62, believes it
to be addressed to Bouvet.
(6) Bouvet to Leibniz. 19 September 1699, Peking, China. Leibnizbriefe 105, pp.
13a–14b (four 8¾” × 12¼” manuscript pages).
(7) Bouvet via Le Gobien to Leibniz. 8 November 1700, Peking, China. Ludovici
Dutens (ed.), Leibnitii opera omnia 4:146–151 (six printed pages). Also Christian
Kortholt (ed.), Leibniti epistolae ad diversos … 3:5–14.
(8) Leibniz to Bouvet. 15 February 1701, Braunschweig, Germany. Leibnizbriefe
728 (Leibniz-Pinsson correspondence file), pp. 94a–96b (six 7¾” × 13” manuscript
pages).
(9) Bouvet to Leibniz. 4 November 1701, Peking, China. Leibnizbriefe 105, pp.
21a–28 (twelve 9½” × 12” manuscript pages plus a two-page diagram measuring
7¼” × 7½”).
(10) Bouvet to Leibniz. 8 November 1702, Peking, China. Dutens, 4:165–168
(four printed pages); also Kortholt, 3:15–22.
(11) Leibniz to Bouvet. 1703?, Hanover? Leibnizbriefe 105, pp. 30a–35b (twelve
8¼” × 13” manuscript pages).
(12) Leibniz to Bouvet. 28 July 1704, Hanover, Germany. Leibnizbriefe 105, pp.
36a–37b (four 6½” × 8” manuscript pages).
(13) Leibniz to Bouvet. 18 August 1705, Hanover, Germany. Leibnizbriefe 105,
pp. 41a–42b (four 4” × 6¼” manuscript pages).
(14) Leibniz to Bouvet. Undated (1706?), Hanover? Leibnizbriefe 105, pp.
50a–51b (four 6¾” × 9¾” manuscript pages). Although the Leibnizbriefe 105
pagination places this undated letter after the letter of 13 December 1707, a com-
parison with Leibniz’ discussion of receiving sixteen Chinese volumes from Bouvet,
which appears in the opening lines of both this letter and the 1707 letter, gives
some indication that this undated letter is earlier. Given this indication, along with
Leibniz’ tendency in the latter part of the correspondence with Bouvet to write let-
ters on an annual basis (1703?, 1704, 1705, 1707), I would tentatively suggest the
year 1706 for this letter.
(15) Leibniz to Bouvet. 13 December 1707, Hanover, Germany. Leibnizbriefe
105, pp. 43a–49b (four 6½” × 8¾” manuscript pages plus eight 6½” × 8¾” manu-
script pages containing a list of questions).
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4. Thanks to a referral by Thatcher Deane of the Leibniz-Bouvet correspondence
project, I can report on at least two letters from China that came to Leibniz’ attention
after the lapse of the Leibniz-Bouvet correspondence. The letters are unaddressed
and unsigned but dated and found in the Leibniz-Francke correspondence file. The
first, dated 29 September 1709, is from “Tartaria magna” (“Greater Tartary”) (Leib-
nizbriefe 282, pp. 15a–21a). The second, dated 27 November 1709 with an appendix
dated 1710, is from Peking (Leibnizbriefe 282, pp. 22a–25a). These letters in Latin
contain news of the Jesuit fathers, including Bouvet, and indicate one of the ways in
which Leibniz continued to stay in contact with events of the China mission.
5. See Leibniz’ letters to Des Bosses of 4 August 1710 and 8 July 1711 in Ger-
hardt, P. S. 2:410, 424.
6. Mémoires de Trévoux, no. 11 (January 1704). The Bouvet to Leibniz letter of
1701 is said to be published also in Mémoires de l’Académie Royale des Sciences
3:85f.
7. François la Chaise, S. J., preceded Michel le Tellier, S. J., mentioned in chap-
ter 1, as confessor of Louis XIV. In contrast to the mild, and as some felt, religiously
compromising manner of La Chaise, Le Tellier was caustic and unnecessarily harsh
in his positions, especially toward the Jansenists. In the respective chronology of
their methods, these fathers parallel the progressive worsening of the Rites Con-
troversy and the decline of the China mission.
8. See Donald F. Lach’s The Preface to Leibniz’ Novissima Sinica, pp. 33 and 56.
9. Bouvet’s Portrait historique has recently been translated into Chinese by
Feng Tso-min in a study and translation of Bouvet’s work entitled Ch’ing K’ang
Ch’ien liang-ti yü t’ien-chu-chiao ch’uan chiao shih (The Emperors K’ang-hsi,
Ch’ien-lung, and the Catholic missionaries).
10. Leibnizbriefe 105, pp. 4a–7b.
11. The standard accounts of the China missions by Latourette and Rowbotham
give little description of Bouvet’s preparations, but a recent paper by Lawrence
Kessler entitled “Joachim Bouvet’s Historical Sketch of the K’ang-hsi Emperor and
Its Influence” gives more detail. As this paper is unpublished, I am indebted to Pro-
fessor Kessler for sending me a copy.
12. Joseph Henry-Marie de Prémare, S. J., Selecta quaedam vestigia prae-
cipuorum Christianae Religionis dogmatum, ex antiquis Sinarum libris eruta, MS at
the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris. This manuscript was later translated into French
by Augustin Bonnetty and Paul Perny and published as Vestiges des principaux
dogmes chrétiens tirés des anciens livres chinois (Vestiges of principal Christian
dogmas gathered from ancient Chinese books).
13. Jean-Baptiste Régis, S. J., I-king, antiquissimus Sinarum liber. A brief de-
scription of the work is given in Pfister, Notices biographiques 236:534–535. The
Book of Changes is one of the most difficult Chinese texts to translate. The difficulty
stems in part from the content but also from the archaic nature of some of the lan-
guage. The original body of the Changes, as opposed to its appendices, is regarded
by some scholars as the oldest extant Chinese work.
14. Leibniz, Das Geheimnis des Schöpfung (The secret of creation), Neujahrs-
brief an den Herzog Rudolph August von Braunschweig-Lüneburg-Wolfenbüttel, in
Loosen and Vonessen, Zwei Briefe, pp. 19–23.
15. Here Leibniz is referring to his letter to Grimaldi of 20 December 1696, in
which he presents an explanation of his binary system. See Leibnizbriefe 330, pp.
15b–16b (Leibniz’ draft), pp. 22b–24a (copy), and 29b–30b (copy).
16. Bouvet’s letter to Leibniz, 28 February 1698, Leibnizbriefe 105, p. 9a.
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17. Actually, it was still unknown in Leibniz’ time that Hermes Trismegistus was
invented by certain second and third century A.D. Romans who identified him with
the Egyptian god Thoth, scribe to the gods, measurer of time, inventor of number
and language, and god of learning and magic. Consequently, Hermes Trismegistus
became known as the founder of alchemy and other occult sciences and the inventor
of talismans. He was also associated with the early Judaic prophets, such as Moses.
See Frances Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition, pp. 1–19.
18. The vicariats apostolic were bishoprics created in 1696 by Pope Innocent
XII in order to circumvent the Portuguese crown’s monopoly over missionary ac-
tivity in China. The three dioceses of Peking, Nanking, and Macao remained under
Portuguese authority, but the rest of China was divided into regions under the au-
thority of individual vicars apostolic who were appointed directly from Rome by the
congregation, acting by the authority of the pope.
19. Leibnizbriefe 330, pp. 15b–16b, and in corresponding pages in the two
copies of this letter.
20. Leibnizbriefe 728, pp. 94b–95a.
21. Leibnizbriefe 105, pp. 21a–26b. The published version of this letter of 4
November 1701 in Dutens, 4:152–164, has deleted sections totaling one-sixth of
the original letter. Dutens’ principal omissions are: Leibnizbriefe 105, p. 21a (para.
1–3); pp. 24a–24b; and p. 26b (the last eleven lines). The motive for deletion ap-
pears to be mainly an editorial desire for greater clarity and readability.
22. The mathematical significance of the Book of Changes diagrams, including
their parallel to Leibniz’ binary mathematics, is discussed in Leibnizbriefe 105, pp.
21a–23a.
23. Gerhardt, P. S. 2:384.
24. Leibniz, Explication del’arithmétique binaire, in Gerhardt (ed.), Leibnizens
mathematische Schriften (hereafter cited as M. S.), 7:223–227.
25. “Place value” or “value by position” would refer, for example, in the number
5620 to the first figure on the left as representing 103 (10 to the third power); 10 is
used because a denary system is involved. Computed, 103 would be 10 × 10 × 10
= 1000 or a four-digit number, i.e., the number of digits in 5620.
The diagrams found in the Changes exhibit the same characteristic of place
value. For instance, in a given hexagram, the top line might represent 25. Com-
puted, 25 would be 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 = 32, which when translated into the binary
progression yields 100 000 or a six-digit number, the total number of lines in the
hexagram. The line down from the top of the hexagram might represent 24, which
when computed would be 2 × 2 × 2 × 2= 16, which when translated into the binary
system equals 10000 or a five-digit number, i.e., the number of lines remaining in
the hexagram after the first line is subtracted. The bottom line in the hexagram
might represent 20. When computed, 20 would yield 1 or a single-digit number,
which is what the place value of the bottom line could represent. Theoretically, one
could also reverse this order and treat the bottom line of the hexagram as repre-
senting 25 and progressing up to the top line as 20. The order depends upon the
direction in which one counts the lines of the hexagrams. While the traditional Chi-
nese method followed the former order, Bouvet and Leibniz were more flexible.
26. Leibniz presents this conception of a Universal Characteristic most fully
in “Scientia Generalis. Characteristica” in Gerhardt, P. S. 7:3–247. A significant
though brief segment of this work has been translated into English by Paul and
Anne Schrecker as “On the Universal Science: Characteristic” in Monadology and
Other Philosophical Essays, pp. 11–21.
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27. The analysis of the Book of Changes diagrams in terms of color is found in
Leibnizbriefe 105, pp. 22b–23a.
28. Leibnizbriefe 105, p. 23b. Frances Yates makes no reference to such a
representation of Hermes Trismegistus in her Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic
Tradition. However, Denis Sinor discusses and presents illustrations of a dog head-
ed figure, not specifically associated with Hermes Trismegistus, in his article
“Foreigner-Barbarian-Monster,” in Theodore Bowie, ed., East-West in Art (Bloom-
ington, Indiana, 1966). On p. 159 of this article, Sinor speaks of this figure as
appearing both in the West and in China.
29. Leibnizbriefe 105, p. 24a. Compare Bouvet’s rendering of this Li Chi pas-
sage to that in James Legge’s translation of Li Ki, bk. 7 (Li Yun), iv, 4:386–387.
30. Leibnizbriefe 105, p. 24a. Bouvet’s reference is apparently to the Shih chi,
chap. 28, “The treatise on the Feng and Shan sacrifices,” where it states:
A man from Po named Miu Chi … instructed the emperor on how to sacrifice
to the Great Unity. “The Great Unity,” he explained, “is the most honored of
the spirits of Heaven and his helpers are the Five Emperors. In ancient times
the Son of Heaven sacrificed to the Great Unity each spring and autumn in
the southeastern suburbs, offering one set of sacrificial animals each day for
seven days. An altar was constructed for the purpose which was open to the
spirit roads of the eight directions.” [Ssu-ma Ch’ien, Records of the grand
historian of China, trans. Burton Watson (New York, 1961), vol. 2, p. 40.]
31. Leibnizbriefe 105, pp. 24a–24b. This passage is part of over one page of
manuscript edited out from the Dutens edition. In its place Dutens, 4:159–160,
makes the following transition phrase:
Le conjecture dont vous me parlez, touchant les caractères, & la langue des
Chinois me paroit véritable. Il y a, comme je crois, de l’artifice dans la con-
struction des caractères Chinois; & cet artifice est l’effort d’un sérieux….
Although the view embodied in the omitted passage was radical, the Dutens edi-
tion included similar material at the beginning of Bouvet’s letter to Leibniz of 8
November 1702 (Dutens, 4:165). Consequently, the reason for the omission is pro-
bably as much editorial as the desire to make Bouvet’s letter less controversial.
Nevertheless, it is well to be aware that in the year 1768 when the Dutens edition
was published, the Rites Controversy and the Society of Jesus still aroused strong
feelings in Europe.
32. The presence of this dictionary at Le Mans is cited by Henry M. Brock in
his article on Bouvet in the Catholic Encyclopedia 2:723. Also see Pfister, Notices
biographiques 171:438, where reference is made to a small Chinese-French dic-
tionary in manuscript form. However, Pfister is uncertain of its location.
33. Cited by Lach, Preface to Leibniz’ Novissima Sinica, p. 34.
34. See Werner Eichhorn, Chinese Civilization, p. 141.
35. Hellmut Wilhelm (“Leibniz and the I Ching,” pp. 213–214) disagrees and
says that Bouvet’s letter of 8 November 1702 can be understood only as a reply to
a letter by Leibniz. However, the only extant letter from Leibniz to Bouvet which
could possibly fit into that time period is that of Leibnizbriefe 105, pp. 30a–35b.
This letter is undated; however, the prevailing weight of opinion has assigned
the date of 1703. This date has been chosen, in large part, because of Leibniz’
statement in the third line of the letter that he had received Bouvet’s letter of
4 November 1701 through Le Gobien on 1 April 1703. Following this reasoning,
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Merkel suggests 1703 (Leibniz und die China-Mission, p. 92). Franke, perhaps fol-
lowing Merkel, also assigns 1703 (“Leibniz und China,” Zeitschrift der Deutschen
Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 7 (1928):168). However, Gorai Kinzō suggests the
probable dates of 1701 or 1702 (Liu Pai-min, in Li Cheng-kang, I-hsüeh t’ao-lun chi,
pp. 104–105). Wilhelm feels that Leibniz’ reference to “the 1st of April 1703” is er-
roneous by a year and proposes April 1702 as the date of composition of this letter.
I refer to this letter as “1703?”. I am indebted to Professor Wilhelm for sending me
a copy of his rather inaccessible paper.
36. Bouvet notes as an aside that he has not yet been able to locate a treatise
by Kepler in a letter to the Chinese missionary-astronomer, Terrentius, which Leib-
niz had previously recommended. See Dutens, 4:167.
37. Gerhardt, M. S. 7:223–227.
38. Gerhardt, P. S. 7:sec. xiv, pp. 198–201.
39. See the appendix for a modern Western interpretation of the Book of
Changes. This interpretation by a contemporary painter may clarify certain key dis-
tinctions.
40. Chu Hsi’s stress on the practical aspects of divination in the Book of
Changes rather than its philosophical implications is immediately evident in his I-
hsüeh ch’i-meng hsü (Preface to the primer on Changes). [See Chu Hsi, Chu-tzu
ta-ch’üan (Compendium of Master Chu), chap. 76, pp. 17a–17b.] Yet perhaps Hu
Shih overemphasized this tendency in Chu Hsi’s interpretation when he said that
Chu Hsi denied any philosophical significance to the Changes. (See Hu Shih, “The
Scientific Spirit and Method in Chinese Philosophy,” in Charles A. Moore (ed.), The
Chinese Mind, pp. 120–121. Chu Hsi’s I-hsüeh ch’i-meng includes expositions of sev-
eral Shao Yung diagrams, and since Shao’s treatment of the Changes is extremely
philosophical, one wonders whether Hu Shih’s minimization of Chu Hsi’s interest in
the philosophical content of the Changes is justified. In fact, as Fung Yu-lan points
out (see Fung’s History of Chinese Philosophy 2:454), we are indebted to Chu Hsi’s
I-hsüeh ch’i-meng for our present knowledge of Shao Yung’s diagrams because they
are no longer available in Shao’s extant writings. This presentation by Chu Hsi
was the source for Huang Tsung-hsi’s incorporation of Shao’s diagrams into his
Sung-Yüan hsüeh-an (Writings of Sung and Yüan philosophers), chap. 10, 2:219–236.
41. This and several of the following pieces of information on Hu Wei’s stay in
Peking are taken from the entry on Hu Wei in Hummel’s Eminent Chinese of the
Ch’ing Period, pp. 335–336.
42. See David E. Mungello, “The Reconciliation of Neo-Confucianism with
Christianity in the Writings of Joseph de Prémare, S. J.,” Philosophy East and West
26(4)(1976):389–410.
43. The edition reprinted by the Shang-wu book company in Shanghai, 1935,
contains an incorrect depiction of the square arrangement of the Prior to Heaven
diagram on p. 156. In contrast to the circular aspect of this diagram, which is accu-
rate, the square aspect contains duplications of certain hexagrams and omissions
of others. That the error would belong to the printer rather than the author, Hu
Wei, is indicated by the latter’s textual references to the correct form of the square
arrangement.
44. For the source of the following interpretation of Hu Wei’s work, see his I-t’u
ming-pien, chap. 7, pp. 134 and 136–137.
45. The Leibniz-Des Bosses correspondence is published in Gerhardt, P.S.
2:287–521.
46. Longobardi mentions Frs. Pasio, Ruiz, and De Ursis in the opening pages
of the Religion Treatise. Sabatino de Ursis was an astronomer who participated in
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the China mission from 1606 until his death in 1620. He was eventually replaced
by Terrentius.
47. Leibniz’ letter to Des Bosses of 4 August 1710 in Gerhardt, P. S. 2:409–410.
48. Leibniz addresses this complaint directly to Bouvet in two letters. One of
the letters is undated but is estimated by this author to be 1706 (see Leibnizbriefe
105, p. 50a). The other letter is dated 13 December 1707 (see Leibnizbriefe 105, p.
43a). According to a knowledgeable member of the Leibniz Gesellschaft staff, these
Chinese volumes were at some time past sent to the university library at Göttingen.
The opinion was, unfortunately, that they were probably integrated into the collec-
tion without being identified as a gift from Bouvet to Leibniz. Consequently, they
may be difficult to locate.
49. Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese, MS 37, 1810, no.
1, Niedersächsische Landesbibliothek, Hanover, Germany, p. 15b. Also see sec.
69 in the Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese (alternatively titled
“Letter on Chinese Philosophy”) in Christian Kortholt (ed.), Leibnitii epistolae ad
diversos…, and in Ludovici Dutens (ed.), Leibnitii opera omnia.
50. Discourse MS, p. 16a. Discourse 70 in the Kortholt and Dutens editions.
51. Discourse MS, p. 15b. Discourse 68 in the Kortholt and Dutens editions.
Chapter 4
1. Remond to Leibniz, 2 June 1713, Gerhardt, P. S. 3:603–604.
2. Remond to Leibniz, 12 October 1714, Gerhardt, P. S. 3:630.
3. Remond to Leibniz, 1 April 1715, Gerhardt, P. S. 3:640 and Leibniz to Re-
mond, 22 June 1715, Gerhardt, P. S. 3:644.
4. Leibniz to Remond, 4 November 1715, Gerhardt, P. S. 3:660.
5. Leibniz to Remond, 17 January 1716, Gerhardt, P. S. 3:665.
6. Leibniz to Remond, 27 January 1716, Gerhardt, P.S. 3:670.
7. Leibniz to Remond, 27 March 1716, Gerhardt, P. S. 3:675.
8. The only known manuscript of Leibniz’ treatise on Chinese philosophy is
found in the Leibniz archives of the Niedersächsische Landesbibliothek at Hanover,
MS 37, no. 1, pp. 1a–16b (thirty-two 8½” × 12¾” manuscript pages). The manu-
script consists of a draft in French written on folio pages in Leibniz’ own hand and
with considerable marginal emendation. The work takes the form of a letter, which
was possibly never sent, to Remond. The manuscript itself is untitled but has since
been given descriptive titles such as “Lettre de Mr. Leibniz touchant les Chinois”
written on a later added title page to the manuscript, or “Lettre de Mons de Leibniz
sur la Philosophie chinois a Mons. de Remond” in the Kortholt and Dutens editions.
However, Leibniz did refer to the work as the “Discours sur la Theologie naturelle
des Chinois” (Discourse on the natural theology of the Chinese) in his letter of 27
January 1716 to Remond (Gerhardt, P. S. 3:670) and similarly in his letter of 27
March 1716 to Remond (Gerhardt, P. S. 3:675). Leibniz also referred to the work by
the Latin title of “Dissertationem de Theologia Sinensium naturali” (Discourse on
the natural theology of the Chinese) in his letter of 13 January 1716 to Des Bosses
(Gerhardt, P. S. 2:508). Consequently, it would seem appropriate to use Leibniz’
own designation rather than the more familiar descriptive titles from the Kortholt
and Dutens editions.
9. I am indebted to Daniel Cook for suggesting the possibility of the later ad-
dition of the fourth section to the Discourse. In Leibniz’ letters to Remond of 17
January 1716 and 27 January 1716, he refers to three sections on God, Spirits,
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and the Soul and indicates that he has completed the Discourse. In his letter of 27
March 1716, however, he writes that the treatise needs more work. We might ask
whether this additional work involves the addition of the fourth section on Fu Hsi’s
diagrams and binary arithmetic or whether it simply represents Leibniz’ desire to
make emendations, of which the manuscript contains numerous instances.
10. See Christian Kortholt, ed., Leibnitii epistolae ad diversos … (1735)
2:413–494. The Kortholt edition of Leibniz’ Discourse was reproduced in Ludovici
Dutens, ed., Leibnitii opera omnia (1768) 4:169–210. Recently a German transla-
tion of the work, which uses the Kortholt divisions with occasional further subdivi-
sions, appeared in a French-German bilingual edition by Renate Loosen and Franz
Vonessen entitled Zwei Briefe über das binäre Zahlensystem und die chinesis-
che Philosophie, pp. 39–132. Since the Loosen-Vonessen work includes manuscript
material that the Kortholt and Dutens editions omitted—this material is not exten-
sive—it is the most complete published version of the Discourse presently available.
It will soon be joined by an English translation of the Discourse, with introduc-
tion, notes, and commentary, by Daniel J. Cook and Henry Rosemont, Jr. (Society for
Asian and Comparative Philosophy monograph 4). Although not bilingual like the
Loosen-Vonessen edition, the Cook-Rosemont work expands the introductory and
annotative material and attempts to make further improvements in incorporating
material from the manuscript. As all four editions use the basic Kortholt divisions,
all following textual citations from the Discourse will use these divisions to facili-
tate comparison among the various editions.
11. Discourse MS, p. 1a. In this and following citations of Leibniz’ Discourse
on the Natural Theology of the Chinese, the textual citations refer to the seventy-
five numerical divisions found in the Kortholt and later editions of the work, while
the footnote citations refer to the pagination of the folio sheets of the manuscript
in Hanover. In the Discourse citations of the Religion Treatise, Mission Treatise,
Compendium, and Four Books, I have taken the liberty of emending unclear, incom-
plete, and inaccurate citations.
12. Discourse MS, p. 1a.
13. Discourse MS, p. 1b.
14. The seven Chinese texts cited by Leibniz divide into five classical texts and
two texts of lesser antiquity but of near-classical status. The five classics with their
Chinese titles are the Book of Changes (I Ching), Book of History (Shang Shu), Book
of Odes (Shih Ching), Analects (Lun Yü), and Doctrine of the Mean (Chung Yung).
The two works with near-classical status, although separated from the classics by
well over a millennium, are the Comprehensive Mirror (T’ung Chien) and the Com-
pendium (Hsing-li ta-ch’üan shu).
15. The chüan is a traditional Chinese textual unit that is usually longer than a
chapter but shorter than a Western-style volume.
16. Longobardi’s description represents a relatively accurate classification of
Chinese books, except for the misleading distinction between the ta-ch’üan com-
mentary and the hsing-li compendium. As Longobardi himself correctly notes, the
composers of both these categories were the same group of forty-two scholars
called together by the Yung-lo emperor. Longobardi’s placement of this origin as
2500 years prior to his own time is erroneous for, assuming that Longobardi was
writing around 1600, less than 200 years would have already elapsed since the
compilation of the Compendium in around A.D. 1415. Possibly his separation of
ta-ch’üan from hsing-li merely refers to a distinction within the three collections
completed at the Yung-lo emperor’s command. These included the Ssu-shu ta-
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ch’üan, the Wu-ching ta-ch’üan, and the Hsing-li ta-ch’üan. Longobardi’s ta-ch’üan
category may refer to the first two, which involve the classics, while his hsing-li di-
vision may refer to the third work, which is derivative from the classics.
17. Kortholt, 2:174, and Dutens, 4:95.
18. There is a slim possibility that Leibniz might have accepted Longobardi’s
erroneous dating of the Compendium as over 2500 years old. This would place
the Compendium on a level of antiquity equal to the other classics. Yet surely he
would also have considered the more accurate dating of over 300 years attributed
by Sainte-Marie to the Compendium, along with the other references to a more ac-
curate dating appearing in the Religion Treatise and Mission Treatise.
19. Discourse MS, p. 1b.
20. T. S. Eliot, The Four Quartets, “Burnt Norton,” line 62.
21. Aristotle, Metaphysics, bk. Lambda.
22. Chu Hsi, Chu-tzu yü-lei (Classified conversations of Master Chu), compiled
by Chu Hsi’s disciples, chap. 1, pp. 1a–3a.
23. Chu Hsi, Chu-tzu yü-lei, chap. 1, p. 1b.
24. For more information on the involved development of li, see T’ang Chün-i,
Chung-kuo je-hsüeh yüan-lun (A discussion of fundamentals of Chinese philosophy),
1:1–69. T’ang classifies and discusses in detail six essential meanings of li. These
are presented in a context of complementaires, which in very rough translation
may be rendered as follows: (1) wen-li (superstructure-infrastructure), (2) ming-li
(the nameable-the ineffable), (3) k’ung-li (emptiness-absolute), (4) hsing-li (physical
nature-spiritual nature), (5) shih-li (phenomenon-noumenon), and (6) wu-li (con-
crete thing-abstract principle). For a useful article in English on the development
of li, see Wing-tsit Chan’s “The Evolution of the Neo-Confucian Concept li as Prin-
ciple,” Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies, n.s., 4(2)(1964):123–148.
25. Leibniz, New Essays; see Langley’s preface, p. xii, and Gerhardt’s introduc-
tion.
26. Leibniz, New Essays, p. 46.
27. Discourse MS, p. 1b.
28. Since a page in traditional Chinese printing consists of a double leaf with
printing on each side, I have clarified Longobardi’s and Leibniz’ references to Chi-
nese texts by indicating whether the cited page refers to the “a” or “b” side of the
leaf.
29. Discourse MS, p. 5a.
30. Discourse MS, p. 7a.
31. I am indebted to Nathan Sivin for suggesting that wu hsing be translated
as “Five Phases” rather than the more common, but less accurate, “Five Elements”
or “Five Agents.” See Nathan Sivin, “Why the Scientific Revolution Did Not Take
Place in China,” an address to the Metropolitan New York Section, History of Sci-
ence Society, 22 April 1975, p. 6 of the transcription.
32. There has been a great deal of discussion and debate since the beginning
of the twentieth century over the exact form and role that Leibniz gave to subject-
predicate logic in his system. Some of the main differences in interpretation of the
role of Leibniz’ logic may be found in the following: Louis Couturat, La logique de
Leibniz; Bertrand Russell, A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz (see
especially chap. 2 and 3); Nicholas Rescher, The Philosophy of Leibniz, pp. 22–34;
Gottfried Martin, Leibniz: Logic and Metaphysics, p. 85f.
33. All quotations from Leibniz’ Monadology are taken from the translation by
Paul and Anne Schrecker, Monadology and Other Philosophical Essays.
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34. In my interpretations of Leibniz’ physical theory, I am indebted to George
Gale’s “The Physical Theory of Leibniz,” Studlia Leibnitiana 2(2)(1970):114–127.
35. Leibniz to Bouvet, 2 December 1967, Leibnizbriefe 105, p. 6b.
36. Leibniz to Bouvet, 1703?, Leibnizbriefe 105, p. 30b. The draft of the letter
in the Hanover archives is undated but estimated to be 1703. This estimate is sup-
ported by the opening statement where Leibniz acknowledges receiving Bouvet’s
important letter from Peking of 4 November 1701 in April of 1703. Bouvet’s letter
contained the Prior to Heaven diagram of the hexagrams, along with the suggestion
of correspondence between the progression of these diagrams and that of Leib-
niz’ binary system. Leibniz has confirmed the suggestion in his own mind, and his
letter in both content and length indicates an excitement that would lead one to
believe he did not hesitate in responding. This, taken with Leibniz’ tendency to re-
ply promptly to Bouvet’s letters, makes a 1703 date very plausible. The next letter
from Leibniz to Bouvet is dated 28 July 1704.
37. Leibniz’ alternative designations for the concept of the monad include
“individual substance,” “substantial form,” “entelechy,” and, in more limited cir-
cumstances, “soul” or “spirit”. See Nicholas Rescher, The Philosophy of Leibniz, pp.
20–21, and A. G. Langley’s translation of Leibniz’ New Essays Concerning Human
Understanding, p. 101n.
38. Discourse MS, pp. 2a–2b, 3b, 7a.
39. Discourse MS, pp. 3b, 4b, 5a, 9a.
40. Leibniz, De primae philosophiae emendatione, et de notione substantiae, in
Gerhardt, P. S. 4:468–470.
41. Leibniz’ letter to De Volder of 20 June 1703 in Gerhardt, P. S. 2:252. I am
indebted to Frederick Copelston’s History of Philosophy, 4:306, for drawing this
passage to my attention.
42. Leibniz, De ipsa natura (On nature itself), Gerhardt, P. S. 6(11):510–511.
43. Rescher, pp. 80–87.
44. Discourse MS, p. 5a.
45. Discourse MS, p. 7a.
46. Discourse MS, pp. 3b–4a.
47. Discourse MS, p. 3b.
48. For one such instance of a Neo-Confucian text that discusses li in its prior
as well as its simultaneous relationships to ch’i, see Chu-tzu yü-lei, chap. 1, pp.
1a–3a.
49. Analects 15:28: “The master said, ‘A man can enlarge the principles which
he follows; those principles do not enlarge the man.’” [As translated by James
Legge in The Chinese Classics, p. 302.] Alternatively: “The Master said, A man can
enlarge his Way; but there is no Way that can enlarge a man.” [As translated by
Arthur Waley in the Analects of Confucius, p. 199.]
50. It is possible that Leibniz had other access to the Analects 15:28 through
the form of Confucius Sinarum Philosophus, but I have found no evidence that he
made use of it.
51. Discourse MS, p. 4a.
52. Chu Hsi, Lun yü chi-chu (1177), published in Ssu-shu chi-chu (Collected
commentaries on the Four Books), Lun yü, chap. 8, p. 7a.
53. Discourse MS, pp. 2a–2b.
54. The Leibniz-Clarke correspondence appears in Gerhardt, P. S. 7:347–440,
and has been translated by H. G. Alexander as the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence.
55. Gerhardt, P. S. 7:394, no. 33; and Alexander, p. 64.
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56. Alexander, p. 64n, cites Gerhardt, P. S. 1:193, as his source.
57. Gerhardt, P. S. 7:373, no. 2–3; and Alexander, p. 25.
58. Gerhardt, P. S. 7:403–404, no. 52; and Alexander, pp. 73–74.
59. Discourse MS, p. 2b.
60. Gerhardt, P. S. 7:404–405, no. 55; and Alexander, p. 75.
61. Chu Hsi, Chung yung chang-chü (1184), in Ssu-shu chi-chu, Chung yung,
chaps. 20–25.
62. Leibniz’ fifth letter to Clarke, in Gerhardt, P. S. 7:393, no. 21; my transla-
tion.
63. Shao Yung, Huang-chi ching-shih (Cosmological chronology), chap. 7, p.
22b.
64. Shao Yung, chap 7, p. 23a.
65. T’ang Chün-i’s insightful interpretation appears in “Chang Tsai’s Theory of
Mind and Its Metaphysical Basis,” Philosophy East and West 6(2)(1956):124.
66. See Wing-tsit Chan, “Chu Hsi’s Completion of Neo-Confucianism,” Etudes
Song-Sung Studies, ser. 2, no. 1, pp. 67–70. The Jesuit missionary Joseph de Pré-
mare (1666–1736) makes the interesting argument that wu-chi is more fundamen-
tal than t’ai-chi and that li should be identified with wu-chi rather than with t’ai-chi.
See Prémare, Lettre inédite sur le monothéisme des chinois, ed. Guillaume Pauthier
(Paris, 1861), pp. 12–16.
Chapter 5
1. Arguments for the view that Chinese philosophy had a direct influence upon
the development of Leibniz’ philosophy may be found in E. R. Hughes, The Great
Learning and Mean in Action, pp. 12–18; Joseph Needham, Science and Civilisa-
tion in China 2:496–505; and Artur Zempliner, “Gedanken über die erste deutsche
Übersetzung von Leibniz’ Abhandlung über die chinesische Philosophie,” Studia
Leibnitiana 2(3)(1970):223–231. These views and the question of influence between
Leibniz and China were discussed in chapter 1 of the present study.
2. Discourse MS, p. 1a.
3. Discourse MS, p. 1a.
4. Discourse MS, p. 3b.
5. Leibniz mistakenly cites the Compendium passage as bk. 28, p. 13. This
partially duplicates and partially extends an erroneous citing by Longobardi in the
Religion Treatise 12:7–8. Longobardi cites two passages. The first is in reference
to Chu-tzu and refers to bk. 28, p. 2, which is correct. In the succeeding passage,
however, Longobardi cites p. 13 of the same book. Actually, the reference is to p. 3.
Leibniz seems to have omitted the reference to p. 2 and copied the incorrect refer-
ence to p. 13.
6. At times, Leibniz uses the term “entelechy” to refer to the dominant monad
in a monadic aggregate, in which case the reference would seem to be to a “soul”
or “spirit.” See Nicholas Rescher, The Philosophy of Leibniz, pp. 116–120.
7. See Rescher, pp. 118–119.
8. Bertrand Russell, among others, questions whether Leibniz really intended
to view God as a monad. See his Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, p.
187. See Rescher, p. 21, for an opposing view.
9. Discourse MS, p. 11b.
10. Discourse MS, p. 11a.
11. Though Longobardi can be skilled as a translator, at times he takes liber-
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ties with the text to the point that the translation cannot be traced to the textual
source, even given the citation. Of course, faulty citation is sometimes the cause of
this, but not always. One instance occurs in the Religion Treatise 12:5 where Lon-
gobardi also translates a section from the Compendium (bk. 28), which because of
the specific reference to “Dr. Chang Zu” would seem to be referring to the Neo-
Confucian philosopher Chang Tsai, who is quoted on pp. 37b–38a. Longobardi’s
translation is: “That the spirits are none other than solidity and plentitude, that
is, the substance of li joined to its primitive air, which being infinite and immense,
extends everywhere.” However, an examination of the Compendium text shows nei-
ther li nor ch’i (“primitive air”) to be present and little apparent basis for such a
translation.
12. Discourse MS, p. 11b.
13. Discourse MS, pp. 10b–11a.
14. Leibniz follows Longobardi’s use of a nonstandard system of numbering in
which this passage is treated as Analects 3:3 rather than the standard 5:12.
15. Discourse MS, p. 11a.
16. Discourse MS, p. 11a.
17. Discourse MS, p. 7b.
18. The confusion of Analects 2:5 with Analects 5:12 might be accounted for by
an error in transposition, that is, by the reversal of the book and chapter numbers
and the omission of the numeral 1 from 12. While such a double transposition error
of this sort is unlikely, a comparison of the contents of the Analects 5:12 offers sup-
port for such a possiblity.
19. Chu Hsi, Lun yü chi-chu, in Ssu-shu chi-chu, Lun yü, chap. 3, p. 5a.
20. Discourse MS, pp. 4b–5a.
21. Leibniz criticized Longobardi’s failure to cite specific passages—as op-
posed to whole sections of text—in describing his interpretation.
22. Discourse MS, pp. 12b–13a.
23. Discourse MS, p. 12b.
24. Discourse MS, p. 14b.
25. Discourse MS, p. 7b.
26. Unlike Longobardi, who usually cites the section in the quoted Chinese
text, Sainte-Marie’s normal practice is to refer to the quoted work only by title.
In trying to locate the specific passage cited from The Mean, several problems
arise. First, the term t’ai-chi does not appear in The Mean, and the few occurrences
of li (The Mean, chaps. 31 and 33) involve little metaphysical significance. The
metaphysical term li-t’ai-chi was not a familiar combination in the vocabulary of
Confucius or his contemporaries. Furthermore, Chu Hsi’s commentary on The
Mean in the Chung yung chang-chü contains little discussion of t’ai-chi.
27. Chu Hsi, Chung yung chang-chü, in Ssu-shu chi-chu, Chung yung, chap. 20,
p. 19b.
28. Discourse MS, p. 9b.
29. The ambiguous nature of the text of The Mean (chap. 16) is apparent from
the following translation by a contemporary scholar:
Confucius said, “How abundant is the display of power of spiritual beings!
We look for them but do not see them. We listen to them but do not hear
them. They form the substance of all things and nothing can be without
them. They cause all people in the world to fast and purify themselves and
put on the richest dresses to perform sacrifices to them. Like the spread of
overflowing water they seem to be above and to be on the left and the right.
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The Book of Odes [Ode 256] says, ‘The coming of spiritual beings cannot be
surmised. How much less can we get tired of them?’ Such is the manifes-
tation of the subtle. Such is the impossibility of hiding the real (ch’eng).”
[Wing-tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, p. 102.]
30. As textual support in addition to The Mean (chap. 16), Longobardi also
cites the Compendium (bk. 28) without giving page citations. There is an extensive
discussion of the two manifestations of ch’i in the Compendium (bk. 28, pp. 5a–6b).
Here Chang Tsai is quoted as saying on p. 5b that kuei-shen are the inherent ca-
pacities of the two ch’i. In the next few pages, the two manifestations of ch’i are
also associated with yang and yin, expansion and contraction, going and coming,
extending and returning, and so forth, though on p. 5a the two ch’i are said to be
really one. Complementary relationships are developed throughout the chapter.
31. The text of The Mean (chap. 16) makes no specific mention of li or ch’i,
but Chu Hsi’s commentary in the Chung yung chang-chü refers to kuei and shen
as the inherent powers of the two ch’i, which are also described as the spiri-
tual beings of yin and yang, respectively. Familiarity with Chu Hsi’s philosophy
would enable one to infer a li component by viewing yin and yang in terms of
being part of the process dictated by a guiding principle, rather than the comple-
mentary aspect of phenomenality associated with ch’i. Longobardi does not make
this inference but rather emphasizes that the composition of Chinese spirits is
exhausted by ch’i, from which they are inseparable. For this view, Longobardi
relies upon Chu Hsi’s commentary, but he seems to apply a very strict interpre-
tation of this commentary—perhaps to support his own views about the lack of
equivalence between Chinese and Christian spirits—and to ignore a fundamen-
tal tenet of Chu Hsi’s philosophy, namely, that ch’i components cannot exist in
isolation from li, though li can exist in a certain prior sense to ch’i. (In another
sense, of course, Longobardi obviates this tenet by treating li as consisting of
essentially the same essence as ch’i.) Consequently, kuei-shen could not be exclu-
sively ch’i, even though Chu Hsi’s commentary specifically emphasizes this aspect
in discussing it. Yet because of his interpretation of li as materialistic and essen-
tially the same as ch’i, Longobardi is able to dismiss the otherwise contradictory
implications of his own statement in the Religion Treatise 12:8, attributed to the
Compendium (bk. 28), that spirits are a type of li.
32. Discourse MS. p. 15a.
33. Leibniz cites The Mean (chap. 17 and 18). However, Sainte-Marie mistak-
enly cites chap. 18 of The Mean as chap. “78,” and Leibniz, though alert to other
textual discrepancies, fails to catch the error and instead reproduces it.
Chapter 6
1. Leibniz’ letter to Des Bosses of 18 November 1710 in Gerhardt, P. S. 2:413.
2. Merkel, Leibniz und die China-Mission, pp. 11–12.
3. This is the view expressed by G. J. Jordan in The Reunion of the Churches, p.
142f.
4. Leroy E. Loemker’s Struggle for Synthesis presents another tension in
Leibnizian philosophy; he regards Leibniz as a key figure in seventeenth-century
European intellectual history who is attempting to synthesize two diverging forces.
One is that of the libertine, the skeptic of the established orders who recognizes the
supremacy of his own individuality and rational powers. The other is that associ-
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ated with the homo honestatis or homme honnête (literally, “virtuous man”), whose
essential quality derives from the Stoic virtue of honestas, or seeking one’s individ-
ual freedom as part of a larger order. Loemker describes this latter quality as based
upon the Neoplatonic and Stoic doctrine of Logos: each man is a microcosm that
reflects the larger world as a macrocosm, and this rational order produces a bond
between men.
5. Rescher, p. 143.
6. This is the view expressed by R. W. Meyer in Leibniz and the Seventeenth-
Century Revolution, pp. 61–62. De principio individui and De arte combinatoria
appear in Gerhardt, P. S. 6:15–26 and 27–104.
7. The religious nature of Pythagoreanism is discussed by Martin A. Larson
in Religion of the Occident, pp. 155–176. The relationship between the religious
and scientific aspects of Pythagoreanism is discussed by Arthur Koestler in The
Sleepwalkers, pp. 26–41.
8. Meyer, pp. 88–89. For this information regarding Leibniz’ education, Meyer
relies upon a nineteenth-century study by E. Speiss, Erhard Weigel, der Lehrer von
Leibniz und Pufendorf.
9. Though F. M. Helmont seems to have been the source for Leibniz’ adoption
of the term “monad,” Giordano Bruno’s works, with which Leibniz was familiar,
also used the term. For Lull’s influence upon Bruno, see Frances A. Yates, Giordano
Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition, pp. 96 and 195 et passim.
10. Leibniz, De arte combinatoria, in Gerhardt, P. S. 4:61–74.
11. The particular work referred to is G. H. R. Parkinson’s translation and
study, Leibniz: Logical Papers (Oxford, 1966). I can detect only one reference to
Raymond Lull, and this is highly perfunctory and makes no mention of Lull’s art.
What makes the omission doubly surprising is the reputable nature of this study.
Apparently, the author feels that his restricted subject matter allows him to omit
these references, but one cannot help wondering how true such exclusiveness is to
the Leibnizian spirit.
12. Leibniz, Scientia generalis. Characteristica, in Gerhardt, P. S. 4:199.
13. Leibniz, Theodicy, pp. 104–105.
14. Leibniz, The Preface to Leibniz’ Novissima Sinica, p. 74.
15. See Louis Couturat, La logique de Leibniz and Opuscules et fragments
inédits de Leibniz; Bertrand Russell, A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of
Leibniz. A clear and concise criticism of Russell’s position on logic in Leibniz’ phi-
losophy can be found in Gottfried Martin, Leibniz: Logic and Metaphysics, pp. 1–3
et passim.
16. It should be noted that Buddhist logic was a development primarily of India
and Tibet and was little cultivated in China. The classic study on Buddhist logic has
been that of Theodore Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic.
17. According to Loemker, “A note on the Origin and Problem of Leibniz’ Dis-
course of 1686,” p. 449f, Leibniz first conceived of this plan for the Catholic demon-
strations under the influence of Boineburg at Mainz in 1669 or 1670. Loemker
interprets the Discourse on Metaphysics as part of the prolegomena to this work
and maintains that Leibniz sent a summary of the Discourse on Metaphysics to the
Jansenist Arnauld in order to evoke a favorable response and the consequent influ-
ence Arnauld’s blessings would bring. Leibniz’ complete outline of the plan for the
Catholic demonstrations appears in Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, edited by the
Prussian Academy of Sciences, 6:i:494f.
18. See F. C. Happold, Prayer and Meditation, p. 24.
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19. Meyer, pp. 146–147.
20. Leibniz, Animadversiones in partem generalem principiorum Cartesiano-
rum, in Gerhardt, P. S. 4:390–392.
21. Meyer, p. 68.
22. See Russell, chap. 1. For some insightful comments into the relationship
between Russell and Leibniz, see G. H. R. Parkinson’s obituary of Russell in Studia
Leibnitiana 2(3)(1970):161–163.
23. One of the more modern uses of Leibniz’ work has been the application
of binary arithmetic to computer operations on the grounds that its two numerical
units greatly reduce the number of components ordinarily required by a denary or
ten-unit numerical system.
24. Galileo’s most complete statement on the relationship between religion
and science is found in his “Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina” (1615), which
is translated with notes in Stillman Drake’s Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo
(New York, 1957). A useful analysis of Galileo’s religious views is Giorgio Spini’s
“The Rationale of Galileo’s Religiousness,” in Carlo L. Golino (ed.), Galileo Reap-
praised.
25. One of the most frequently cited statements in contemporary China on the
importance of intellectuals’ serving and learning from the masses is Mao Tse-tung’s
“Talks at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art” (May 1942). See the English
translation in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (Peking, 1967) 3:69–98.
Chapter 7
1. David E. Mungello, “On the Significance of the Question: ‘Did China Have
Science?’” Philosophy East and West 22(4)(1972):467–478; 23(3)(1973):413–422.
2. The contemporary Jesuit missionary William Johnston seeks a reconciliation
of Christianity with a Japanese essence. The Japanese experience is relevant to
that of China not merely because the language and much of the Japanese culture,
including its well-known Zen Buddhism, have been derived from China, but also
because a flourishing Christian church in Japan of 1600 experienced devastating
suppression and persecution caused by xenophobic and political fears. By the end
of the seventeenth century, Christianity was a mere underground movement in
Japan, and the Chinese missionaries, particularly the Jesuits, sought to avoid the
mistakes of their persecuted fellows in Japan. In his book of reflections on Zen and
Christian mysticism, Johnston states that many of the past difficulties in the Chris-
tian experience in Japan were due to the failure of Christianity to move beyond its
status as a foreign religion. See Johnston’s The Still Point and Christian Zen.
The spirit identified with the name of Matteo Ricci is given a modern form by a
former missionary to China, George H. Dunne, S. J., in “The Missionary in China:
Past, Present and Future,” Ampleforth Journal 78(3)(1973):9–42.
3. Johnston, p. 134.
4. Shen-tu (watchful while being alone) is an essential element in the Great
Learning and was greatly stressed by Neo-Confucianism; jen (Humanity) was an
object of great Confucian concern from the time of Confucius himself.
5. Leibniz, New Essays, pp. 23–25.
6. Leibniz, New Essays, pp. 24–25.
7. Leibniz, New Essays, pp. 56–58.
8. Johnston, p. 189.
9. Discourse MS, p. 10a.
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10. Discourse MS, p. 11a.
11. Arthur Waley, Analects of Confucius, p. 126.
12. The translation of Analects 7:3 is my own; that of 7:6 is from Waley, pp.
123–124. Rather than follow Waley’s use of “detraction,” I chose a term with more
positive connotations.
13. Confucius himself did not practice farming, nor did he propose that chün-
tzu (gentlemen) do so. See the Analects 13:4. During Confucius’ time there was a
competing school known as the Nung-chia (School of Agriculture) which held that
each person should produce his own food. As time went on, however, the Confu-
cian school absorbed elements from this and several other schools. For a reference
to Wu Yü-pi (K’ang-chai) (1391–1469) see the section on Wu K’ang-chai (Yü-pi) in
Huang Tsung-hsi (1610–1695), Ming-ju hsüeh-an (Writings of Ming Confucianists),
chap. 1, pp. 3–7. Also compare references to Wu Yü-pi in William Theodore de Bary
(ed.), Self and Society in Ming Thought, p. 7 passim.
14. A pertinent project now underway is described in a paper by Charles Wei-
hsun Fu entitled “Confucianism, Marxism-Leninism and Mao: A Critical Study”
in the Journal of Chinese Philosophy 1(3–4)(1974):119–151. While not attributing
deviation from the Marxist path to Mao Tse-tung, Fu sees Mao’s thought as a di-
alectical synthesis of Marxism-Leninism and the ethical humanism of Confucius. Fu
further shows himself to be in the Chinese moral tradition in his creative treatment
of Mao as the true apostolic successor to Marx and Lenin, based on Mao’s attempt
to initiate a proletarian transformation of human nature on fundamentally moral
grounds. Another paper with a number of fresh insights on related matters is Henry
Rosemont, Jr.’s “Confucian Perspectives on Contemporary China,” Canadian Forum
(September 1974), pp. 13–19.
15. One dimension of Confucian spiritual and moral cultivation that is contin-
ued in contemporary China is the concern over the unity of knowledge and action or
theory and practice. One of the foremost Confucian spokesmen on this dimension
was Wang Yang-ming (1472–1529). See Wang Yang-ming, Ch’uan hsi lu, pp. 3–4.
The modern Chinese concern over this dimension is expressed by Mao Tse-tung in
the essay “On Practice,” The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (Peking, 1967), vol.
1, pp. 295–309.
16. Recent attempts at reconciling Christianity with traditional Chinese reli-
gious categories have failed for somewhat different reasons than in Leibniz’ time.
For example, recent attempts at such reconciliation in Hong Kong have failed be-
cause many Hong Kong Chinese no longer subscribe to traditional Chinese religion
and culture. A discussion of this failure and a proposal for a new approach that
comes to terms with modernization in Asia is presented by Peter K. H. Lee in the
article “Indigenous Theology—Overcropped Land or Undeveloped Field?” in Ching
Feng—Quarterly Notes on Christianity and Chinese Religion and Culture 17(1)
(1974)5–17.
17. There is no reason to think that such beliefs must be grounded in Christian-
ity, though Christianity is one source from which to build to an accord. A number
of Christians have been attempting to develop new approaches to contemporary
China, and it may be useful to refer to some of them here.
A contemporary assessment written in the spirit of Matteo Ricci contains what
could be useful guidelines for a program by Christians in China. Note that the au-
thor does not see a return of Christian missions in the traditional sense to China.
See George H. Dunne, S. J., “The Missionary in China: Past, Present and Future,”
Ampleforth Journal 78(3)(1973):9–42. Also the Christian Study Centre on Chinese
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Religion and Culture in Hong Kong is making honest attempts to confront the real-
ities of the present demoralized state of Christianity in mainland China. See their
quarterly publication, Ching Feng—Quarterly Notes on Christianity and Chinese
Religion and Culture. It is published in both Chinese and English editions at Tao
Fong Shan, Shatin, New Territories, Hong Kong.
A secular or humanitarian program born of a deep Christian commitment is
found in the “People-to-People” program of the Division of Overseas Ministries,
Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) of Indianapolis, Indiana. Inspired by Dr.
Joseph Smith, who spent considerable time in the Far East the program stresses
unofficial contacts between Chinese and Americans. Friendship, not conversion, is
the explicit aim.
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Glossary of Chinese Terms
Alternative names and characters are included in parentheses.
The abbreviation “T.” designates the tzu, which are included here
only because of the lesser availability of the Chinese names of
Jesuits in comparison with the Chinese themselves. The Chinese
names for Jesuits in the China mission may be found in Aloys Pfis-
ter’s Notices biographiques … and, in more organized and readily
available form, in Joseph Dehergne’s Répertoire des Jésuites de
Chine de 1552 à 1800.
An To P’ing-shih 安多平施
Chang Ch’eng Shih-chai 張誠實齋
Chang Hsing-yüeh 張星曜
Chang Tsai 張載
ch’eng 誠
Ch’eng Hao (Ming-tao) 程顥 ( 明道)
Ch’eng I (I-ch’uan) 程頤 ( 伊川)
chi 極
Chi-ho yüan-pen 幾何原本
ch’i 氣
ch’ien 乾
chin 巾
chin-min 親民
Chin Sheng 金聲
Chin-ssu lu 近思錄
Chin Ssu-piao 金四表
Chin Te-ch’un 金德純
Ch’in t’ien chien 欽天監
ching 靜
ching-tso 靜坐
ching-t’ien 敬天
Ch’ing K’ang Ch’ien liang ti yu t’ien-chu-chiao ch’uan chiao shih
Chou-i ku-ching chin-shu 周易古經今註
chua
chub 主
Chu Hsi 朱熹
Chu Tsai 朱才
Chu-tzu ta-ch’üan 朱子大全
Chu-tzu yü-lei 朱子語類
Ch’uan hsi lu 傳習錄
ch’üan 犬
chun-shen 辟神
chün-tzu 君子
Chung-kuo je-hsüeh yüan-lun 中國哲學原論
Chung yung 中庸
Chung yung chi-chieh hsü 中庸集解序
Erh-shih-wu-yen 二十五言
Fan Ch’ih 樊遲
fang-pien 方便
Feng Tso-min 馮作民
Feng Ying-ching 馮應京
Fo-Lao 佛老
fua 伏
Fu Hsi 伏羲
fub 復
Gorai Kinzō 五來欣造
HanYü 韓愈
Hou Chi 后稷
hsia 義
hsib㩘
hsin 信
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hsin-min 新民
Hsien-t’ien tzu-hsü 先天次序
Hsing-li ta-ch’üan shu 性理大全書
Hsiung San-pa (T. Yu-kang) 熊三拔 ( 有綱)
Hsü Erh-sheng 徐日昇
Hsü Kuang-ch’i 徐光啟
Hu Kuang 胡廣
Hu Wei 胡渨
Huang-chi ching-shih 皇極經世
Huang Ti 黃帝
Huang Tsung-hsi 黃宗義
i 易
I ching 易經
I-hsüeh hsiang shu-lun 易學象數論
I-hsüeh t’ao-lun chi 易學討論集
I-hsüeh ch’i-meng hsü 易學啟蒙序
i-san 一三
I-t’u ming-pien 易圖明辨
jena 人，亻
jenb 仁
K’ai-chiao san-ta chu-shih 開教三大柱石
K’ang Hsi 康熙
Kao Hsiang 高享
ko-i 格義
kou 姤
kuan 觀
kuei 鬼
kuei-shan 鬼神
k’un 坤
k’ung 空
k’ung-li 空理
Lao Tzu 老子
lei 類
Lei Hsiao-szu 雷考思
Lai-pu-ni-tz’u(tzu) 萊布尼茨（茲）
Lai-pu-ni-tzu de chou-i hsüeh 萊布尼茲的周易學
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li 理
lia 里
lib 裏
lic 立
lid 禮
Li An-tang 利安當
Li chi 禮記
Li Ch’eng-kang 李證剛
Li Chih 李贄
Li Chih-tsao 李之藻
Li Ching-te 黎靖德
Li Kung 李塨
Li Ma-t’ou (T. Hsi-t’ai) 利瑪竇 ( 西奉)
Lieh Tzu 列子
ling-hun 靈魂
Liu Pai-min 劉白閔
liu-tsung 六宗
Liu Ying Sheng-wen 劉應聲聞
Lu Jo-han 陸若漢
Lü Tzu-ch’ien 呂祖謙
Lun yü 論語
Lung Hua-min (T. Ching-hua) 龍華民 ( 精華)
Ma Jo-se 馬若瑟
Meng Tzu 孟子
mien 宀
Min Ming-wo (T. Te-hsien) 閔明我 ( 德先)
Ming-Ju hsüeh-an 明儒學案
ming-li 名理
Nan Huai-jen (T. Tun-pai) 南懷仁 ( 敦伯)
Pa Yung-lo 巴庸樂
pi 比
pien 偏
po 剢
Po Chin (T. Ming-yüan) 白晉 ( 明遠)
Pu Chih-yüan 卜致遠
pu Ju i Fo 補儒易佛
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san-chiao i-ho 三教一合
Shang shu 尚書
shang-ti 上帝
Shao Yung 邵雍
shen 神
Shen Ch’üeh 沈㴶
shen-ling 神靈
shen-tu 慎獨
shih 十
Shih chi 史記
Shih ching 詩經
shih-li 事理
Ssu-ma Ch’ien 司馬遷
Ssu-pu pei-yao 四部備要
Ssu-shu chi-chu 四書集註
Ssu-shu ta-ch’üan 四書大全
Sung-Yüan hsüeh-an 宋元學案
ta 大
ta-ch’üan 大全
Ta hsüeh 大學
t’ai 太
t’ai-chi 太極
T’ai-chi t’u-shuo 太極圖說
t’ai-hsü 太虛
t’ai-i 太一
t’ai-i fen erh kuei t’ien-ti 太一分而規天地
t’ai-i han san 太一函三
T’ang Chün-i 唐君毅
T’ang Jo-wang (T. Tao-wei) 湯若望 ( 道味)
tao 道
Tao Hsüeh 道學
te 德
Teng Yü-han (T. Han-p’o) 鄧玉函 ( 涵璞)
ti 帝
t’ien 天
t’ien chih tao 天之道
GLOSSARY OF CHINESE TERMS 177
t’ien chu 天主
T’ien-chu-chiao tung-ch’uan wen-hsien su-pien
T’ien-chu shih-i 天主實義
T’ien-hsüeh pen-i 天學本義
T’ien-hsüeh shih-i 天學實義
T’ien Ju yin 天儒印
t’ien-li 天理
t’ien-tao 天道
tsai 宰
tung 動
T’ung Chien 通鐘
Wan Tsu-t’ung 萬斯同
wang 望
wanga 王
Wang Yang-ming (Shou-jen) 王陽明 ( 守仁)
Wang Yi-yuan (T. T’ai-wen) 王豊肅 ( 一元) ( 泰穩)
Wei K’uang-kuo (T. Chi-t’ai) 衛匡國 ( 濟泰)
wen-jen 文人
wen-li 文理
wu 無
wu-chi erh t’ai-chi 無極而太極
Wu ching ta-ch’üan 五經大全
wu hsing 五行
wu-li 物理
Wu Yü-pi (K’ang-chai) 吳與弼 ( 康齋)
Yang T’ing-yün 楊廷筠
yin 煙
yu-hun 幽魂
yü 玉
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56
De Volder (correspondent of Leibniz),
82–83
Diagram of the t’ai-chi, 88, 94–97
Diagrams of the Changes, 62, 67–68,
116, 135, 147–148. See also Dia-
grams of Fu Hsi; Hexagrams; Trigrams
Diagrams of Fu Hsi, 7, 43, 163
Diez, Father Francisco (Francisco Dias),
30, 154
Dilher (preacher at Nuremberg), 5
Disciples, of Confucius, 107
Discourse (Discourse on the Natural The-
ology of the Chinese): as Leibniz’
major statement on Chinese philoso
phy, 5, 14, 41, 45, 66, 67; spontaneous
generation versus cultural diffusion,
16; use of Longobardi and Sainte-
Marie treatises, 20, 29, 32, 154;
origin and description of, 69–70; ex-
plication of, 70–92 passim, 99–116
passim; rebuttal of Longobardi on
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Chinese atheism, 141; manuscript,
editions and translations of, 162–163
Discourse on Chinese Philosophy. See
Discourse
Discourse on Metaphysics, 14, 70, 81,
99
Discursive versus spiritual, 128, 130
Disputatio metaphysica de principio in
dividui, 2
Divination, using the Changes‚ 46, 84,
140, 148, 161
Doctrine of the Mean. See Mean, The
Dominicans, Order of, 10–11, 13, 31
Double geometrical progression, 49, 53,
60, 65, 148
Dragon diagram, 64
Dress, ritual, 114
Dunne, Father George H., 154, 170
Dutch, 30
Dyadic, 44, 60. See also Binary arith-
metic
Eckhart (Leibniz’ secretary), 5
Eclipses, prediction of, 33
Ecumenism, Hanoverian, 4; efforts of
Leibniz and Jesuits, 8; of Christianity,
13; of Leibniz, 15, 16, 44, 117, 125;
Leibniz’ numerical calculus, 49;
Leibniz’ plans for, 61, 67, 116; ac-
cord as founded on li, 75; movement
of, 119; failure of Leibniz, 120; Bou-
vet’s outlook on, 136; Zen meditation
as stepping stone for, 139. See also
Irenic negotiations; Irenics
Edict by K’ang-hsi emperor on Chinese
rites (1700), 37–38
Edict of Nantes, revocation of, 120
Edict of Toleration, by K’ang-hsi em-
peror (1692), 12
Egypt: Leibniz’ plan for invasion of, 2,
149; language of, 56; ancient culture
of, 147
Egyptians, 58
Eliot, T. S., 76
Elsholz, Johann, 5
Encyclopedic interest, of Leibniz, 33
English Act of Settlement, 4
Enlightenment, European, 56; spiritual,
140
Enoch, 47, 54
Entelechy, 81, 82–83, 85, 102, 165. See
also Monad
Entretien d’un philosophe chrétien et
d’un philosophe chinois sur l’exis-
tence et la nature de Dieu, 69
Eremitic tradition, 144
Ernest Augustus (duke of Hanover), 4
Ernst, landgrave of Hessen-Rheinfels, 4,
5, 119, 150
Essay Concerning Human Understand
ing,77
Ether, 83. See also Ch’i
Etymology of li, 76–77, 102
Euclid, 151
Europocentric attitudes, 19
Evil, 129
Exchange of learning, between China
and Europe, 33
Ex illa die, 38‚ 119
Explication de l’arithmétique binaire,
52, 60, 67
Ex quo singulari, 38, 119
Extension, Cartesian, 80, 82, 97, 127
Factual truths, 123. See also Contingent
truths
Faith, 120, 138
Fan Ch’ih, 144
Fasting, 104–105, 114
Feng Mu-kang‚ 23, 151
Feng Ying-ching, 151
Feudal lords, 104
Figurist theories: of Bouvet, 16, 42, 46,
55; on common origin of Chinese
and European cultures, 21, 37; on
ancient Chinese knowledge of True
Religion, 33; of Prémare and Bouvet,
44, 63; on Fu Hsi, 47
Filial piety, 144
First philosophy, 123
First principle, 90. See also li
Five Classics, 73
Five Forces. See Five Phases
Five Phases (wu hsing), 64, 79, 164
Flood, The, 55
Flux, 138
Fo-Lao (Buddhism-Taoism), 23
Folk religion, Chinese, 103
Force, 81, 82–83, 97, 100, 116, 138
Four Books, 73
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Four Quartets, 76
Franciscans (Order of Friars Minor), 11,
30, 31
Franke, Otto, 25, 161
Frederick of Brandenburg (Frederick I
of Prussia), 4
Frederick William of Prussia, 5
French court, 60
French Jesuits, 31, 35, 56
Fu, Charles Wei-hsun, 170
Fu Hsi: Leibniz on the correspondence
between binary arithmetic and the
diagrams of, 7, 67, 70; Bouvet ex-
plains the diagrams of, 42, 46–55
passim, 59, 60, 64, 135–136; as a
benefactor of China, 149
Fung Yu-lan, 161
Furtado, Father François (Fu Fan-chi),
26
Galileo, Galilei, 133, 169
Gamans, Father Johann, 5
Gassendi (philosopher), 122
Geometrical, versus arithmetical, 57; el-
ements, 47; progression, 147–148
Geometry, 121, 123. See also Double
geometrical progression
George I (king of England). See Georg
Ludwig
Georg Ludwig (duke and elector of
Hanover; George I of England), 4
Gerbert (Pope Sylvester II), 52
Gerbillon, Father Jean-François (Chang
Ch’eng), 35
German Jesuits, 31, 35
God: graven image of, 5; as Creator, 55;
Chinese equivalents of, 57, 66, 116,
151; in Discourse, 70, 107, 110, 115,
162; as the first principle of the uni-
verse, 76; the complete concept, 80;
as the supreme monad, 86, 103; li,
87, 89; space and, 90–91; identity of
indiscernibles, 93; European natural
philosophy, 106; in Leibnizian philos-
ophy, 120, 123, 126–128; in the
Theodicy, 122, 125, 129–130
Gods, 133
Golden age of China, 141
Gorai Kinzō, 40, 161
Gospels, Christian, 73
Göttingen, university library of, 162
Grace, 139
Great Compendium of Natural and
Moral Philosophy. See Compendium
Great Learning (Ta hsüeh), 5
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of
1966–1967, 138, 145
Grimaldi, Father Claudio Filippo (Min
Ming-wo): meeting with Leibniz at
Rome in 1689, 7, 14, 41, 44; as key
China interpreter, 18, 32–35 passim;
receives Leibniz’ binary arithmetic,
49; correspondence with Leibniz, 99
Guerike, Otto von, 91
Han dynasty, state religion of, 58; Taoist
corruption of Changes, 64
Hanover, court of, 4, 41, 119; Leibniz’ li-
brary at, 5–7; Leibniz’ archives at,
20, 32, 35, 40, 70, 149, 150, 155
Han T’an, 155
Harmony, of music, 47, 131;
Pythagorean, 122, 124; experiential,
131
Heaven, 94; as t’ien, 107–108; and
Earth, 78, 93, 106, 111, 115
Hebrews. See Jews
Helmont, F. M., 169
Hermes Trismegistus, 47, 54, 61, 149,
158, 159
Hexagrams, 42–43, 54, 70, 84, 140,
158. See also Diagrams of Changes;
Diagrams of Fu Hsi
Hieroglyphs: Egyptian, 42; Chinese, 54,
68; ancient, 59
Hindus, mathematicians, 52
Histoire de l’Edit de l’Empereur de la
Chine en faveur de la Religione
Chrestienne, 45
Hobbes, Thomas, 122
Homo honestatis (virtuous man), 169
Hong Kong, 170
Hsia dynasty, 115
Hsing (inherent nature), 92–93
Hsing-li (human nature and principle),
73; philosophy, 72; Neo-Confucian
ism, 76; school, 77, 79. See also
Neo-Confucianism
Hsing-li ta-ch’üan shu. See Com-
pendium
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Hsi Tse-tsung, 154
Hsü (emptiness; void), 94–97
Hsü, Paul Kuang-ch’i, 23, 27, 28, 110,
151
Huang-Lao (Yellow Emperor-Lao Tzu),
65
Huang Tsung-hsi, 62
Hubris, in Leibniz’ philosophy, 131–133
Hughes, E. R., 13, 149
Hui Yen-tzu, 143
Hu Kuang, 72
Humanism, 145
Human nature, conception of, 55
Hu Shih, 161
Hu Wei, 52, 62, 64, 68
Huygens, Christian, 3
Hypothesis physica nova, 2, 126
I Ching. See Book of Changes
Identity of indescernibles, 93
Idols, 103; worship of, 19, 25
Ignatius of Loyola, 9, 151
I-hsüeh hsiang shu-lun, 62
Imagio Creationis, 44
Immortality of the soul, 138–139, 140
Indigenous Christianity, 146
Indigenous theology, 170
Individual substance, 81
Inertia, 82
Influence, of Chinese philosophy upon
Leibniz, 13–16, 99–100, 149–150
Inner light, 140
Innocent XI (pope), 11
Innocent XII (pope), 158
Intellectualization, 129
Intellectuals, 134
Intellect versus spirit, 123
Intermediate group (between ancient
and modern Chinese), 75
Irenic negotiations, 128
Irenics, 119
Italy, 32; Jesuits of, 18, 31
I-t’u ming-pien, 62
Jade, 77
Jansenists, 10, 157
Japan, missionary experience in, 22, 31,
47
Japanese assimilation of Christianity,
169
Japeth (son of Noah), 35
Javan (son of Japeth), 35
Jen (Humanity; Benevolence), 93, 138
169
Jena, 2
Jensen, Alfred, 147–148
Jesuitism, 22
Jesuits (Society of Jesus), 5, 8, 9 passim.
See individual Jesuits
Jews, as chosen people, 35; ancient, 47
Johann Phillip (elector and archbishop
of Mainz), 2, 3
John Frederick (duke of Hanover), 3
John Sobieski (king of Poland), 5
Johnston, Father William, 25, 139, 169
Journals of Ricci (De propagatione
Christiana apud Sinas), 5, 19, 20,
22, 23, 150
Jungian archetypes, 15
Jupiter, 107
Justice, of God, 131
K’ang-hsi emperor: and Christianity, 8,
12, 118–119; assisted by Grimaldi,
32; tutored by Jesuits, 33, 44, 123;
Bouvet’s contact with, 37, 40, 41,
43; Chinese rites; 37, 45; science,
49; binary progression, 56; as a new
prince, 71
Kepler, Johannes, 35, 154–155, 161
Key to the Chinese language, 42. See
also Clavis Sinica
King-on-high. See Shang-ti
Kircher, Father Athanasius, 5, 7, 122
Knowledge and action, 146, 170
Kochanski, Father Adam, 5, 57
Ko-i method, 110
Kortholt, Christian, 70, 154, 163
Kuei-shen (spirits), 75, 114, 168
K’un hexagram, 51–52, 94
K’ung (emptiness), 94
la Chaise, Father François, 41–42, 60,
157
Lao-tzu, 64, 97
Law, in Leibniz, 128
Laxism, 11
Le Comte, Father Louis, 12, 13
Legge, James, 89, 108, 109
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Le Gobien, Father Charles, 12, 13, 37,
44, 46
Leipzig, university at, 1, 2, 121
Le Mans, library at, 56
Le Tellier, Father Michel, 13, 157
Letter on Chinese Philosophy. See
Discourse
Lettre sur le monotheisme des chinois,
151
li (principle), Neo-Confucian concept of,
15, 92, 97, 164; Longobardi’s in ter-
pretation of, 29, 111, 114, 165–167;
Leibniz’ interpretation of, 66–67,
75–90 passim, 99–109 passim, 116,
141; in universal-particular relation-
ship, 84–85; Sainte-Marie’s inter-
pretation of, 112; six essential mean-
ings of, 164; Prémare’s
interpretation of, 165
lia (inner), 77
lib(lining of clothing), 77
lic(first established), 58
lid(Propriety; Ritual), 108
Libertine, 168
Li chi. See Record of Rites
Li Chih, 25, 29
Lieh-tzu, 64
Li-hsüeh school. See Ch’eng-Chu
school; Hsing-li school; Neo-Con fu-
cianism
Li Kung, 62
Li, Leo Chih-tsao, 27, 151
Li Ma-t’ou. See Father Matteo Ricci
Ling-hun (soul that subsists after
death), 110–111, 117
Liu Pai-min, 40
Livy (Roman historian), 1
Locke, John, 77, 139
Loemker, Leroy, 14, 168–169
Logic, 97–98, 123, 139; subject-predi-
cate logic in Leibniz’ system, 80, 124,
164; priority, 116; Buddhist, 169
London, visited by Leibniz in 1673, 3,
51
Longobardi, Father Nichola (Lung Hua-
min): as a stimulus to Leibniz’
compositon of the Discourse, 7, 32,
41, 69, 154; as an interpreter of
China, 18, 26–29, 39, 163–164,
165–167, 168; his Religion Treatise
used by Leibniz in the Discourse, 20,
67, 69–92 passim, 101–114 passim;
as non-accommodationist on Chi-
nese rites, 30, 66, 135–136, 141,
152; located in provincial China, 37;
compared to Hu Wei, 64
Loosen-Vonessen translation of
Discourse, 163
Louis XIV (king of France), 2, 3, 4, 12,
43
Love of God, 133
Lull, Raymond, combinatory art of,
121–122, 169
Lun yü. See Analects
Lun-yü chi-chu, 89
Lutheranism, 2
Lutherans, 4, 5, 10
Luther, Martin, 119
Macao, 18
Maigrot, Charles (bishop of Conon and
vicar apostolic in Fukien), 12, 47, 118
Malebranche, Nicholas, 69
Manchu (language), 62–63
Manchus, 63
Mandarins, 71
Mandate of Heaven (t’ien-ming), 110
Man-god, 54
Manila, 30
Maoism-Marxism, 154
Maoist ideology, 145
Mao Tse-tung, 145, 170
Marble figure of Hercules, 77
Martini, Father Martin (Wei K’uang-
kuo), 31, 71
Marxism-Leninism, 145–146, 170
Marxist analysis, 133
Mass, physical, 82
Masses, social, 134
Materialistic philosophy, 78
Materiality, associated with ch’i, 114
Mathematics: in tutoring the K’ang-hsi
emperor, 8, 44; as a basis of the
Leibniz-Grimaldi relationship, 32; of
Europe, 33, 44; in astronomy in Chi-
na, 33–35, 35; in Pythagoreanism,
121, 130; as a moral exercise, 123; a
new notion of identity in Leibniz,
126; human versus divine knowl-
edge of, 133
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Matter, material, 70; primary, 82;
prime, 111
Maximal One, 55
Mean (golden mean), 112
Mean, The (Doctrine of the Mean or
Chung yung), 5, 72, 90, 92–94,
111–115, 167–168
Mechanistic philosophy, 1
Medina, Bartholomeus de, 10
Meditation: Christian, 124, 139; Bud-
dhist, 138; Zen or Ch’an, 139, 144;
Confucianist, 144
Mémoires des Trévoux, 41
Mencius (Meng-tzu), 77, 143
Merkel, Franz Rudolf, 5, 149, 156, 161
Metaphysical, versus phenomenal level,
82–83
Metaphysics, of Aristotle, 76
Metaphysics, 77–78, 80
Meyer, R. W., 126
Ming dynasty, loyalists, 25, 63; transi-
tion to Ch’ing by Jesuits, 25–26; Chi-
nese astronomy of, 33; chaos of, 71
Mirroring process, 116, 133
Mission Treatise (Traité sur quelques
points importants de la mission de la
Chine), reflects thirty years of Sainte-
Marie’s experience, 30; as a stimulus
to Leibniz’ compositon of the
Discourse, 31–32, 69, 154; used by
Leibniz in Discourse, 73, 78, 107, 111,
115; on li, 87–88; on spirits and sacri-
fices, 104–105; translation of, 152
Modern Chinese, versus ancient, 73,
74–75, 141
Moderns, material philosophy of, 81
Mohammedan astronomers, 33
Monad: as spiritual atom, 14; cor re-
spondence with Neo-Confucian li, 15,
79–83, 85–86, 102–103, 116; force,
97, 100; God as supreme monad, 86,
103; preestablished harmony, 113;
systems of relation, 126; alternate
designations of, 164; source of the
term, 169. See also Entelechy
Monadic: units, 92; hierarchy, 133; ag-
gregate, 165
Monadology, 4, 80–81, 83, 85, 109, 133
Moral cultivation, 70, 140, 145, 146.
See also Spiritual cultivation
Morale pratique des Jésuites, 13
Morales, Father Juan Bautista de, 30,
31
Morality and nature, 137
Moral tradition, Chinese, 170
More, Henry, 126
Müller, Andreas, 5, 7, 42, 67
Music, 122, 144. See also Harmony
Mystical experience, 125, 140
Mystics, Christian, 124
Napoleon Bonaparte, 149
Nationalist rivalries, in China mission,
154
Natural law, 16, 60
Natural philosophy, 92, 106
Natural reason, 23
Natural religion, 73–75, 85. See also
Natural theology
Natural theology, 21, 45, 67, 72, 82
Nature, laws of, 81
Navarette, Father Domingo, 26
Necessary truths, 61
Needham, Joseph, 14, 33–35, 150
Neo-Confucianism: organicism of, 15,
83, 109; as orthodox philosophy of
the seventeenth-eighteenth cen-
turies, 22, 63; as the source of the
Compendium, 72; compared to clas-
sical Confucianism, 74–75, 100–101;
interpretation of li, 77, 79, 84,
87–89, 100–101; interpretation of
ch’i, 82–83, 87, 100–101; the Mean,
94; on wu-chi and t’ai-chi, 94; spiri-
tual cultivation of, 105, 113, 144
Neo-Confucianists, 97, 103
New Essays Concerning Human Un-
derstanding, 77, 139
Newton, Isaac: dispute with Leibniz
over invention of calculus, 4, 128, 149;
followers of, 4, 132; theories of,
91–92, 106
Nichomachean Ethics, 10
Niedersächsische Landesbibliothek,
Hanover, 155. See also Hanover
Nine Colors, in Changes, 64
Noachide theory, 35
Noah, 35
Nominalism, versus realism, 2
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Nouveaux Mémoires sur l’État present
de la Chine‚ 12
Novissima Sinica, 13, 42, 45, 99, 122
Now, the, 138, 140
Numerology, 135–136
Nung-chia (School of Agriculture), 170
Oldenburg (secretary of the Royal Soci-
ety), 2, 3
Old Testament, 66
Ontological levels, 80
Organic monadic scheme, 104
Organic whole, as connecting li and the
monads, 116
Organicism, 14, 15, 83
Painting, 144
Paris, 3, 5, 11–12, 51
Parkinson, F. H. R., 169
Parts: in li, 85; in space, 91; in spirits,
113
Pascal, Blaise, 3, 10–11
Pasio, Father Francesco (Pa Yung-lo),
66, 161
Patriarchs, 16, 46
Peking, 32, 35, 62
Pelison, Monsignor Paul, 4, 119
People-to-People program, of Christian
Church, 172
Pereyra, Father Thomas (Hsü Erh-
sheng), 154
Persecution of 1665, 30
Peter the Great (czar of Russia), 5, 7,
149
Pettiness, of Leibniz, 128
Phenomenal, versus metaphysical level,
82–83
Philippines, 18
Physical theories, 80, 91
Physics, 80
Physics, separation of metaphysics
from, 127
Piao (permit), 118
Place value characteristic, 52, 158
Plato, 47, 123
Platonic doctrine of ideas, 126
Platonic-Pythagorean influence, in Leib-
niz’ youth, 121
Platonists, 126
Plenitude, sovereign, 94
Pneuma, 83. See also Ch’i
Poetry, 144
Pole star, 94
Political aim, of Leibniz, 128
Portrait historique de l’Empereur de la
Chine, 12, 42–43
Portugal: in China mission, 31, 154,
158; king of, 35; missionaries of, 18,
31, 35
Possible versus actual world, 122
Posterior to Heaven learning, 64
Power of God, 132
Predisposing elements, in Leibniz’ in
terpretation of Chinese philosophy,
99–100
Preestablished harmony, 13, 80, 83,
102, 113
Prefect apostolic, Sainte-Marie’s ap
pointment as, 30
Prémare, Father Henry-Marie de (Ma
Jo-se), 22, 44, 63, 151, 165
Pride, human, 133
Primitive active force. See Force
Primitive passive force. See Force
Prince of Millet (Hou Chi), 35
Principle, School of, 93. See also Neo-
Confucianism
Prior to Heaven diagram, 50–52, 54, 64,
65, 164. See also Prior to Heaven or-
der
Prior to Heaven order (Hsien-t’ien
tzu-hsü), 46, 52, 63
Probabiliorism, 10
Probabilism, 10
Prophets, Judaic, 35
Proselytizer, Bouvet as, 56
Proselytizing spirit, 134
Protestant: China mission, 119; rela-
tions with Catholics, 120; work
ethic, 126
Protestants, 2, 4, 10
Provincial Letters, 10
Prussian Academy of Sciences, 4. See
also Academies of learning
Pu Ju i Fo (Complete Confucianism and
displace Buddhism), 23
Pythagoras, 47, 58
Pythagorean: fashion, 46; numbers, 61;
theorem, 148
Pythagoreanism, transmigration of the
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soul, 23; in Bouvet, 54, 57; in Leib
niz’ philosophy, 121–124, 130–131;
Platonism, 136; interior aspect of,
140; viewpoint of, 148
Realism, versus nominalism, 2
Reason, 43, 47, 120
Record of Rites (Li chi), 55, 58
Régis, Father Jean-Baptiste (Lei Hsiao-
szu), 44
Religion Treatise (Traité sur quelques
points de la religion des chinois),
French translation of, 26; cited, 27,
28, 29, 76, 79, 80, 85, 86, 88, 90, 92,
101, 103, 105, 107, 109–110, 113,
114, 167; as a stimulus to Leibniz’
Discourse, 69, 154; Leibniz’ use of in
the Discourse, 73, 78
Religious practice, 130
Remond, Nicholas, 69–70, 154, 162
Rescher, Nicholas, 120–121
Reservatio mentalis, 10
Reverence, Confucian, 116
Reward and punishment, doctrine of,
117
Ricci, Father Matteo (Li Ma-t’ou): as in-
terpreter to Leibniz, 5, 18–29, 39;
Christian-Confucian synthesis of, 9;
view of ancient China, 33, 135; con-
trasted with Bouvet, 37; rites
debate, 66; Longobardi, 70, 154;
sympathetic toward Chinese, 73,
136, 144, 170; views cited by Sainte-
Marie, 89–90; criticizes Buddhists,
103–104, 135, 152; praised by
K’ang-hsi emperor, 119; failure at
accord, 146; distinguishes t’ai-chi
from God, 151
Rites Controversy: Jesuit accommoda
tion, 11, 136–137; Ricci’s accommo-
dation, 19; opposing Christian sides,
20–21, 27, 66, 118–119, 154, 157;
Sainte-Marie, 30; Morales’ protest,
31; Bouvet, 37, 40, 159; K’ang-hsi
emperor’s edict of 1700, 38, 45;
Leibniz’ role in, 67, 78, 150; Longob-
ardi, 152
Ritual, 144
River diagram, 64
Roman Catholic converts, 119
Roman Catholics, 10. See also Catholic-
ism
Romans, 58
Rome, city of, 7, 14, 31, 32–33; ecclesi-
astical authority, 13, 38
Rosemont, Henry, Jr., 152
Rosicrucian society, 2
Rudolphine (Copernican) Tables, 154
Rudolphus Augustus (duke of Bruns-
wick-Lüneburg-Wolfenbüttel), 44
Ruiz, Father Jean (Joāo Rodreigues; Lu
Jo-han), 66, 161
Russell, Bertrand, 14, 124, 128
Russian academy of arts and sciences,
Leibniz’ proposal for, 149. See also
Academies of learning
Sacrifice: Bouvet on, 54–55, 159; by the
emperor on T’ai mountain, 58; Chu
Hsi on, 104–105; Longobardi on,
113–114; Leibniz on, 115, 117; Ro-
man decree of 1704 on, 118
Sainte-Marie, Father Antoine de (alias
Antonio Caballero a Santa Maria; Li
An-tang): as a stimulus to Leibniz’
Discourse, 7, 41, 67, 69–70, 154; as
an interpreter of China, 18, 29–32;
his Mission Treatise used by Leibniz
in the Discourse, 20, 39, 70–75,
78–79, 87–90, 101, 104, 107,
110–113, 115; compared to Hu Wei,
64; as non-accommodationist toward
China, 31, 135; identity of, 152
Salvation, 126
San-chiao i-ho (the harmonization of the
three teachings), 23
San-han chiao (the three teachings
united), 23
Satan, school of. See Buddhism
Savant, 3, 45, 73
Schall von Bell, Father Johann Adam
(T’ang Jo-wang), 30, 33
Scholasticism, 81
Scholastics, 1, 86
Schreck. See Terrentius
Science: European, 8, 18, 33; used in
tutoring K’ang-hsi emperor, 33, 123;
European versus Chinese 33–35; of
numbers, 49; natural, 127, 136
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Scientia Generalis. Characteristica, 61,
122
Scrokins (correspondent on China), 57
Secret of creation, 44
Secular: aims in Leibniz’ philosophy,
120–121; ethos, 126; versus
theological, 127
Secularizing: of European thought, 120;
tendencies of knowledge, 128
Sensorium of God, 91
Shang-ti (King-on-high; God): accommo-
dationist Jesuits on, 11, 19, 22, 55,
58; non-accommodationist position
on, 13, 28, 47, 108, 118; Leibniz’ use
of, 66, 75, 78, 111, 117, 141; Ch’eng
I on, 103; Longobardi cites from
Odes,110
Shao-chou, 26
Shao Yung, 52, 62, 64–65, 94, 97, 161
Shen Ch’üeh, 30
Shen-ling (spiritual substance), 102
Shen-tu (watchfulness while being
alone), 138, 169
Shih chi (Historical records), 55
Shih ching. See Book of Odes
Shu ching. See Book of History
Shun (legendary emperor), 115, 141
Simple substance, 13
Simplicity, 122, 124
Sin, 55, 129, 132
Sincerity (ch’eng), 92, 112, 114
Sinologists, post-World War II, 136
Sivin, Nathan, 154, 164
Smith, Joseph, 172
Societas Theophilorum, 127
Society of Foreign Missions (Société des
Missions étrangères), 11–13, 26, 31,
35, 35, 66
Society of Jesus. See Jesuits; individual
Jesuits
Sophia (electress of Hanover), 4
Sophia Charlotte, 4
Soul: as treated in the Discourse, 70,
85, 100, 107, 109–111, 162; Locke’s
conception of, 77; as monad, 82–83,
102, 103; Leibniz interprets the Chi-
nese notion of, 117; Leibniz on, 127,
133, 138
Sovereign Lord, 57
Space, 91–92, 116; and time, 116
Spain, 31; missionaries of, 18, 35
Spathary, Nikolai Gavrilovitch, 32
Spinola, Christophede, 4
Spirit: as monad, 82; as li, 102; versus
intellect, 121, 123, 138; Leibniz’
contemplative insight into, 126
Spirit of Heaven, 141
Spirits: modern Chinese skepticism of,
20; and sacrifice, 103–105; Confucius
view of, 106–109; Discourse on, 110,
162; Leibniz on Chinese view of,
113–114; Leibniz on, 70, 127, 133, 141
Spiritual and moral cultivation, 133,
145, 146
Spiritual cultivation: versus intellectual
approaches, 83, 98, 125, 130; in Con-
fucianism, 105, 141–144; Leibniz in
terprets Confucius, 107; of China as
eluding Leibniz, 113–115, 140, 145;
as the essence of religion, 140–141
Spiritual discipline, 124. See also Spiri-
tual cultivation
Spiritual Exercises, 9, 151
Spirituality, 117
Spiritual practice, 120, 125, 131–132
Spiritual substance, 99, 100, 102
Spirit versus intellect, 123
Spizel, G., 5
Spontaneous generation, 15–16
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fied with Christian God, 22, 151; as
maximization of nothingness, 94–94;
as minimized potential or maximized
actuality, 94; as subordinate to
t’ai-chi, 97; as superior to t’ai-chi
and equated with li, 165
Wu-ching ta-ch’üan‚ 72
Wu Yü-pi (K’ang-chai), 144, 170
Xenophobia, Chinese, 20, 152
Yang, 76, 88, 94, 113
Yang, Michael T’ing-yün, 23, 27, 28, 151
Yao (king), 35, 109, 115, 141
Yin, 76, 88, 94, 113
Yü (legendary king), 115, 143
Yüan period, 65
Yu-hun (wandering soul; ghost),
110–111
Yung Cheng emperor, 119
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